Limitation Act (IX of 1908)

  1. —S.2 (4) & (8)—plaintiff/defendant definition of. Muhammad Anwar Khan & others v. Muhammad Sarwar Khan & others  2017 SCR 733 (I)                                                                                                       
  2. —Section 2 (7) —Azad Kashmir Penal Code—S.52—Anything which has not been done with due care and attention, cannot be deemed to be done in good faith. Shabaz Akram  v. Competent Authority & others 2017 SCR 1257 (B)
  3. Section 3 — dismissal of suit etc. filed after period of limitation — amendment — effect of — mandatory to discretionary-the substantial amendments have been introduced in section 3 of Limitation Act, 1908 according to the spirit of which the suit cannot be thrown out merely on the basis of question of limitation rather the question of limitation has to be resolved by the Courts keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Through the amendment, the mandatory application of prescribed limitation for filing suit has been termed into the discretionary relief of the Court by substitution of the word “shall” with the word “may”. (substituted vide Act X of 1992, dated 29-6-1992) M. Miskeen v. Shabir H.  2015 SCR 938 (C)  2014 CLC 1362 rel.
  4. S. 4 — AJ&K Service Tribunals Act 1975 — An aggrieved civil servant may prefer an appeal before the Service Tribunal within 90 days on communication of order whether the order is original or appellate — If a civil servant is aggrieved from an original order then he may file appeal from that order within 90 days of the communication of the order and if he is aggrieved from an appellate order of the authority then he may file  appeal within 90 days from the communication of the order of appellate authority — Held: The period of limitation shall reckoned from the date of communication. M. Riaz Khan v. IGP and 19 others 2010 SCR 131 (D) 1994 SCR 214 rel.
  5. Section 4 — public holiday — last day of limitation — to be excluded while computing limitation — The learned High Court while treating the version of the respondents that the notice was served upon 26.09.2011 as correct, declared that the references are time barred. The counsel for the appellant has rightly pointed out that the learned High Court has skipped the fact that on 25.12.2011, it was holiday which according to the provisions of section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908, has to be excluded while computing the limitation. On 25th December the Court was closed and on the very next day i.e., 26.12.2011 the references have been filed. This aspect has not been considered by the High Court, therefore, according to the statutory provisions after deduction of one day the references were within time. The observation of the High Court that the references are one day time barred is not correct, hence,  not sustainable. Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Mr. Muhammad Abbas Qadri 2016 SCR 940 (A)
  6. S. 5 — See Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act (XI of 1993), S.5. Naveed Farid v.     Raheela Razzaq 2012 SCR 341
  7. S. 5 — See AJK Interim Constitution Act, 1974, S. 42. Mst. Shamim Akhtar v. M. Shafi and 9 others 2013 SCR (SC AJ&K) 1102 (D)
  8. Section 5 — condonation of delay — sufficient cause — According to section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay of each and every day has to be explained. There is a chain of authorities in this regard, wherein it has been held that the delay is fatal for the case of a party and if a party seeks condonation, it must have furnished the sufficient cause and explained the delay. Nazeer-ullah Shah Gardazi v. AJK Liberation Cell  2015 SCR 458 (A) 2003  SCR  313 & Ch. M. Rashid vs. Controlling Authority & others (Civil Appeal No. 14 of 2010, decided on 27.2.2013) rel.
  9. Ss. 5 and 14- Appeal-suit-Wrong forum-S. 14 deals with time spent in suits whereas S. 5 deals with the time spent in appeals in the wrong forum. Masud Ah. v. United Bank Ltd. 1992 SCR 98 (A)
  10. Ss. 5 and 14- If a person files a civil appeal and wishes to seek extension of time which he spent even with due diligence in a civil suit or appeal-S. 14 would not be applicable. Masud Ahmad  v. United Bank Limited 1992 SCR 98 (B)
  11.  Ss 5 and 14- Appeal wrong forum-Negligence on the part of the counsel and the party in filing appeal in proper Court-condonation of delay refused. Masud Ahmad v. UBL. 1992 SCR 98 (D)
  12. S. 6 — Provides that if a person who is entitled to institute a suit is minor or insane or an idiot he can file a suit after disability has ceased or attaining the majority and period of limitation for such suit shall be same which is provided in first shedule of Limitation Act or section 48 of C.P.C. Muhammad Hafeez Khan and 5 others v. Muhammad Nazir and 2 others 2009 SCR 305 (B)
  13. S. 12 — Computation of limitation — Time requisite for obtaining a certified copy has to be excluded   — Time requisite means “the interval between the date of application for supply of copy and the date when it was ready for delivery”— Said interval was to be excluded. Muhammad Amin v. Muhammad Hameed and 2 others 2000 SCR 537 (A)
  14. Section 12 — sub sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of section 12 — provide that requisite time for obtaining a copy of decree, sentence, order, judgment, or award shall be deemed to be time intervening between the day when the application for obtaining the copies was made and the day actually intimated to the applicant to be the day on which the copy will be ready for delivery. Abdul Aziz  v. Muhammad Hussain & 89 others 2015 SCR 114 (A)
  15. —Section 13—computation of limitation—the time during which the plaintiff or the defendant has been absent from Pakistan, shall be excluded while computing the period of limitation. Arshid Mehmood v. Yasmin Arshid 2019 SCR 210 (A)
  16. Section 12 — exclusion of time for computation of limitation — The time spent in the proceeding between an application for obtaining the copy of judgment and decree and intimation to the party that the copy is ready for delivery, shall be excluded while computing the period of limitation. Held: it is enjoined upon the Court, in which an appeal is filed, that it shall exclude the time consumed in obtaining the copies. Abdul Aziz  v. Muhammad Hussain & 89 others 2015 SCR 114 (B)  2012 SCR 587 & 2014 SCR 479 rel.
  17. Section 12 — A party is entitled for exclusion of time spent in obtaining the copies of judgment and decree appealed from under section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Abdul Aziz v. Muhammad Hussain & 89 others 2015 SCR 114  (C)
  18. Section 12 — limitation — calculation of — time spent in obtaining copies — to be excluded — According to the statutory provisions of section 12 of Limitation act, 1908 — while computing the limitation the time spent in obtaining the requisite certified copies has to be excluded. On this legal proposition there are number of judgments and the learned counsel for the appellant has rightly placed reliance on the case reported as Azad Govt. & others vs. Muhammad Qadir Javaid & others [ 2014 SCR 479] wherein in paragraph 7 this legal proposition has been dealt in detail. Thus according to the principle of law enunciated in the referred judgment as well as the provisions of section 12 of Limitation Act, the time spent in obtaining the requisite certified copies has to be excluded while computing the limitation. Muhammad Hanif & another v. Muhammad Arif & others 2016 SCR 956 (A)  2014 SCR 479 ref.
  19. S. 12(2) — AJK High Court Procedure Rules, 1986, Rr. 147, 149, 153 — Appeal in High Court — Time requisite for obtaining copies — Exclusion — Condonation of delay — Analysis — Respondent moved application for issuance of copies of grounds of appeals, judgments and decrees of Civil Judge on 24th June, 2003 — Copying officer ordered for issuance of copies under rules — No date for delivery of copies was fixed nor applicant was intimated that the copies were ready for delivery — Copies were prepared on 29th July, 2003 — Court-fee was furnished on 9th August, 2003 and copies were issued on 9th August, 2003 — Where no date was fixed by copying agency that when copies would be ready for delivery then it was mandatory for the copying agency to intimate the applicant that the copies were ready for delivery that he should file Court-fee and receive copies — Held: Respondent was entitled for exclusion of time actually spent in obtaining copies of judgment/decree from the date of application i.e. 24th June to 9th August, 2003, the date when the copies were issued — After deducting period of 47 days consumed in obtaining copies, appeal before High Court was within time, hence question of limitation did not arise — Order accordingly. LIMITATION — (Exclusion of time consumed in obtaining copies) [After deducting the period consumed in obtaining copies, appeal in High Court was within time]. Muhammad Siddique v. Muhammad Aslam and 4 others 2013 SCR (SC AJ&K) 587
  20. Section 13 — computation of limitation — exclusion of time — spent abroad — Under the provision of section 13, while computing the period of limitation, the period for which the plaintiff or defendant is absent from Pakistan or the territories beyond the Pakistan, shall be excluded. Fazal Hussain  v. Fatima Bibi & others  2015 SCR 1384 (A)
  21. Section 13 — exclusion of time — benefit of — proceedings in Land Acquisition Act, 1908 — benefit of exclusion of time provided under section 13 will be available to the parties in the proceedings conducted in special law i.e the Land Acquisition Act. Fazal Hussain  v. Fatima Bibi & others  2015 SCR 1384 (F)
  22. Section 13 — legislative development — benefit to plaintiff — Previously, the benefit of section 13 of the Limitation Act was only available to the defendants but vide Act X of 1992, amendment has been introduced in section 13 — By which benefit has also been extended to the plaintiff by adding the word “plaintiff” in the statutory provision. Therefore, for these distinguishable features, the principle of law laid down in the judgments prior to the major amendment of section 13 of the Limitation Act,  without proper appreciation of the scope of section 29 of the Limitation are no more attracted hence cannot be followed. Fazal H.  v. Fatima Bibi & others 2015 SCR 1384 (G)
  23. Application of — on special law — Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Sections 4, 9 to 18, 22 & 29 — the provision of section 13 and 29 of the Limitation Act read with the provision of special law, the Land Acquisition Act, there remains no doubt and ambiguity that provision of section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22 of the Limitation Act are applicable to the proceedings because there is no express provision of special exclusion of the application of the mentioned section. Fazal H. v. Fatima Bibi & others 2015 SCR 1384 (E) PLD 1991 SC 246 & PLD 1984 SC 208 rel.
  24. S. 14- Although S. 14 does not apply to civil appeal but its contents can be made applicable by analogy so that if a litigant shows that he had been in good faith prosecuting another civil proceeding within the meaning of S. 14- Such circumstances may be treated ‘sufficient cause’ for condonation of delay within the meaning of S. 5. Masud Ahmad v.  UBL. 1992 SCR 98 (C)
  25. The extension or condonation, if any, could be sought under section 18 of the Limitation Act if a person having a right to institute a suit is kept away from the knowledge by means of fraud or the documents of sale having been fraudently concealed from him. Sallah Muhammad v. Muhammad Sharif & another 2006 SCR 204 (B)
  26. S. 18 — Plea of — Point of limitation — Provision of — Effect — If a specific plea has been taken that the documents have been procured by way of fraud and concealment, the time limit for institution of the suit or making an application shall be computed from the time when the fraud first became known to the person injuriously affected thereby, or, in the case of the concealed document, when he first had the means of producing it or compelling its production. Noordad and 6 others Versus Muhammad Sadiq and 40 others 2013 SCR (SC AJ&K) 1168 (A)
  27. Section 18 — Limitation — in case of fraud, limitation starts running from the date when it first comes into knowledge of the party. Ch. M. Zaman v. Amir Hanif 2014 SCR 1571 (B)
  28. Section 18 — limitation for challenging transaction based on fraud — under the provisions of section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908 any transaction or act based on fraud can be challenged when it is discovered to the concerned aggrieved party. M. Miskeen v. Shabir  H. 2015 SCR 938 (B)
  29. Section 18 — limitation — in case of fraud — when to start — from date of knowledge — Held: in the cases where the material facts have been concealed or kept out of the knowledge of the affected party by fraud, limitation has to be computed from the date when such fact firstly comes to the knowledge of affected party. M. Iqbal & others Custodian & 23 others 2016 SCR 358 (A) 
  30. —Section 18—limitation—fraud. Syed Mehar Ali Shah vs Syeda Nudrat Bibi & others 2018 SCR 9 (B/1)
  31. —-section 18—-computation of limitation in case of fraud—from the date of knowledge—according to the provisions of section 18 of the Limitation Act,  1908, if any material fact is kept secret by playing fraud , in that case limitation stars from the date when this fact came into knowledge of the plaintiffs. As the plaintiffs have specifically asserted that they got knowledge of the mutation on 11.12.2000, thus, from the date of knowledge the suit appears to be within time. Abdul Hameed Khan v. Mst Para Begum and others  2017 SCR 269 (A)
  32. —Section 18—limitation—computation of—under section 18, if found is alleged, the limitation starts running from the date of knowledge. Robeena Aftab v. Shabbir Ahmed & 4 others2020 SCR 78 (B)   —section 18—fraud—computation of limitation—when a person by means of fraud has been kept out of the knowledge of any right or title due to concealment or fraudulently executed document, the limitation will be computed from the date when fraud become known to the plaintiff. Raja Muhammad Aftab & 6 others v. Raja Muhammad Iftikhar  & another 2020 SCR 141 (B)
  33. Ss. 18, 5 — See AJK Interim Constitution Act, 1974, S. 42. Noordad and 6 others v. Muhammad Sadiq and 40 others  2013 SCR (SC AJ&K) 1168 (B)
  34. S. 28 — Right of adverse possession — Amended provision — After the said amendment, the suit on the basis of adverse possession could not be succeeded except the true owner admits the claim of the person having the possession of the suit property adversely. M. Abbas and 5 others Versus Muhammad Rafique Khan (Deceased) and 10 others 2013 SCR (SC AJ&K) 1153 (A)
  35. S. 28, Art. 144 — See Specific Relief Act, 1877, S.42. M. Maroof Khan and 3 others v. Mansoo Khan and 2 others 2013 SCR 250 (C)
  36. S. 28, Art. 144 — Provision — Effect of amendment — After the omission of Section 28, a decree on the ground of adverse possession cannot be passed in favour of a person who claim adverse possession against  the real owner — The title of property always remain with the true owner and after the deletion of Article 144 if a true owner files a suit against a person for possession on the basis of title, he can file suit at any time irrespective of limitation except the suit which is filed on the ground that the owner was in possession and he has been dispossessed. Zahid Hissain v. Afsar Din and 11 others  2013 SCR (SC AJ&K) 488 (A)
  37. S. 28, 144 — See AJK Interim Constitution Act, 1974, S. 42. Muhammad Saleem Khan and 4 others Versus Muhammad Fayyaz Khan and 15 others 2013 SCR 990 (B)
  38. Art. 144, S. 28 — See AJK Interim Constitution Act, 1974, Ss. 42, 56-A. Muhammad Abbas and 5 others v. M. Rafique Khan (Deceased) and 10 others  2013 SCR (SC AJ&K) 1153 (B)
  39. —Section 28—Article 144—adverse possession—claim against injunctions of Qura’n & Sunnah—amendments—legislative history—In compliance of Maqbool Ahmed’s case (1991 SCMR 2063) amendments were introduced in limitation Act, 1908 to make the law in conformity with the injunctions of Qura’n and Sunnah—Through Act No. II of 1995, section 28 and Article 144 of the first schedule to the Limitation Act were omitted—In AJK through Act No. X of 1992 in section 28 the word “extinguishment” was substituted by the word “Bar”, and the word “extinguished” was substituted with the word “Barred”. A proviso was also introduced according to which the Court has to decide the cases on the basis of admission of the landowner— subsequently through Act No. IV of 1997, the provisions of section 28 and Article 144 were omitted— Undoubtedly, the claim of title on the basis of adverse possession has been declared void and against the injunctions of Qur’an and Sunnah. Muhammad Anwar Khan & others v. Muhammad Sarwar Khan & others  2017 SCR 733 (A)  1991 SCMR 2063 ref.
  40. —Section 28—Article 144—Enforcement of Sharia Act, 1989— AJ&K interim Constitution Act, 1974—Section 3 and 31—claim on the basis of adverse possession—amendments in limitation Act—pending litigations—fate of—divergent opinion— in the cases reported as PLJ 2012 SC(AJ&K) 211 ,PLJ 2013 SC(AJ&K) 215, the principle laid down that deletion of section 28 and Article 144 will not affect the pending suits whereas in the case reported as 2015 SCMR 301, it is held that pending cases which have matured into decree of Court shall not be affected— cutoff date in Maqbool Ahmed’s case (1991 SCMR 2063) was fixed as 31.8.1991— The apex Court in a number of cases has held that the pending claims of adverse possession can only bore  fruit, if the same have matured through the Court decree subsisting on the cutoff date— the suits or claims of adverse possession which have not matured into the decree cannot be continued—According to the provisions of section 3 of Act, 1974, Islam is the state religion— under section 31 there shall be no law repugnant to Qur’an and Sunnah— Under the provisions of Enforcement of Shar’iah Act, the Courts have to decide the cases according to Shar’iah—The term “Shar’iah” has been defined as “the injunctions of Qur’an and Sunnah”— In Maqbool Ahmed’s case, the claim of title on the basis of adverse possession is declared repugnant to Qura’n & Sunnah and void and the cutoff date fixed for such claim as 31.8.1991—Held: the principle enunciated is consistant with the injunctions of Qura’n & Sunnah. Muhammad Anwar Khan & others v. Muhammad Sarwar Khan & others  2017 SCR 733 (B)                                                                                    
  41. —Section 28—Article 144—AJ&K Interim Constitution Act, 1974—Section 56-C—General Clause Act, 1897—Section 6—adverse possession—claim of—amendments in law—effect onpending cases—cutoff date in AJ&K—appreciation of legislative development— In Maqbool Ahmed’s case the plea of adverse possession is declared  against the injunctions of Qur’an and Sunnah— opinion formed in the case reported as PLJ 2012 SC(AJ&K) 211 and PLJ 2013 SC(AJ&K) 215,distinguished— No doubt under section 56-C of Act, 1974 and  section 6 of General Clauses Act, dealing with the repeal of law the protection is provided to the right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired– whereas, the claim of the right of adverse possession is not accrued or incurred under law, specially, when its status being repugnant to Qur’an and Sunnah has been determined in Maqbol Ahmed’s case—Legislative development in AJ&K were taken while following the principle of law enunciated in Maqbol Ahmed’s case and after mentioning of cuttoff date, Act No. X of 1992 was enforced on 29th June, 1992, and the word “extinguishment” was substituted with the word “bar” and the word “extinguished” with the word “barred” in section 28 — under proviso in case of admission of the land owner, the claim of the plaintiff could be decided according to admission— Subsequently, on enforcement of Act No. IV of 1997 and after deletion of section 28 and Article 144 the proviso to section 28 also vanished—Held: after enforcement of Act No. IV of 1997 on 14th April, 1997 the Courts are not bound to grant the decree on the basis of admission of the owner— to this context, the observation in the referred judgments appears to be result of non-consideration of effect of Amendment Acts— Further held: after declaration of the plea of the adverse possession as repugnant to Qur’an and Sunnah, the pending suits and claims cannot be continued after the enforcement of Act No. X of 1992 with effect from 29th June, 1992 and only the claims which have matured into the decree of the Court have to be protected— view expressed in the cases reported as PLJ 2012 SC (AJ&K) 211 and PLJ 2013 SC (AJ&K) 215 the pending suits of adverse possession shall be decided irrespective of the amendments according to the law enforced at the time of filing the suit” is in inconsistent with the statutory provisions and principle of law enunciated by the Courts, therefore, the same is modified and it is held that no claim or suit on the basis of adverse possession can be continued after 29.06.1992, i.e. from enforcement of Act No. X of 1992 and only the suits or claims which have matured into the decree of the competent Court are recognized and protected. Muhammad Anwar Khan & others v. Muhammad Sarwar Khan & others  2017 SCR 733 (D)
  42. The time allowed under the Limitation Act is relatable to the presentation or institution and has nothing to do with question of payment of Court fee which is dealt within the Court Fees Act and the two provisions of the C.P.C. — Under section 149 the Court has been specifically empowered to received the whole or part of the Court fee at any stage – The words ‘at any stage’ clearly indicate that limitation has nothing to do with the exercise of discretion vested by this section. Executive Engineer Munir  v.  Raja Muhammad Nawaz Khan  1994 SCR 287 (D)
  43. Limitation — The period provided to enforce the right of pre-emption is four months from the date of sale or taking over the possession of the sold property — The words of Article 10 are very much clear that limitation starts from the date of sale or the date of taking over the possession of land, not from the date of knowledge of the sale. Sallah M. v. M. Sharif & another 2006 SCR 204 (A)
  44. —Art. 10 — pre-emption suit—limitation for—the period provided to enforce the right of pre-emption is four months from the date of sale or taking over the possession of the sold property and not from the date of knowledge. Khizar Hayat v. Muhammad Sagheer & others  2022 SCR 104 (A)
  45. Article 10, Schedule 1 — Limitation — Suit for right of prior purchase — The amendment application for impleading respondents No.5 to 8 was moved on 14th October 2005, after a period of one year and 6  months from the execution of gift deed.Under Article 10, Schedule 1 the period of limitation is four months if the application is allowed, then the suit against respondents No.5 to 8 was treated to have been filed on 5th October 2005 which was clearly beyond limitation and grant of leave in such circumstances is only and exercise of futility and giving false hope to the petitioner. Muhammad Pervaiz v. Muhammad Munshi & 7 others 2010 SCR 415 (B)
  46. Article 12(3) — The time which has been consumed for procuring copies necessary for filing of appeal has to be excluded from the time fixed for filing of appeal and is to be added to the period of limitation fixed for filing of aapeal — In present case 20 days were consumed for obtaining the copies of judgment and decree of lower Court — Limitation for filing appeal before Additional District Judge was 110 days whereas appeal has been filed after 18 days which comes to total of 108 days — Held: Appeal before Additional District Judge was filed within time. Said Muhammad Khan v. Muhammad Yousaf & 2 others 2007 SCR 235 (C)
  47. Art. 14 — Provision of — Contemplated — A suit for setting aside an act or order of an officer of the Government in his official capacity can be filed within one year from the date of such act or order provided  no limitation otherwise is provided for such order — The phraseology implied in the said Article is indicative of the fact that any order of a Government officer can be challenged within a period of one year if it is passed in the official capacity and the order is a legal one — The Article is applicable in the case if the order passing officer has jurisdiction to pass such order, it is a legal one and if the order/act is void or issued without jurisdiction and is ultra vires, the Article is not applicable in the case but where the order is passed by a competent authority and no period of limitation is provided otherwise, then the case is governed by the said Article. Azad Govt. v. Neelum Flour Mills Asgharabad, Muzaffarabad, 2013 SCR 16(A) Ref. PLJ 2001 Lah. 159, 1992 MLD 116.
  48. Art. 91 — The limitation for declaring any instrument null and void is three years. Ghulam Asghar v. Muhammad Aziz & 2 others 2008 SCR 78 (B)
  49.  Article 96 — limitation — suit for the correction of entries in an instrument — suit may be filed within a period of three years from the date of knowledge. Muhammad Rasheed Khan & 7 others v. Muhammad Ayub Khan & 6 others 2016 SCR 1278 (B)
  50. — Article 103 — the limitation for filing suit for recovery of dower is six years — petitioners filed suit for recovery of dower and maintenance allowance after three decades — Courts below rightly declared the suits as time barred. Mst. Shameem Akhtar & another versus Manzoor Ali & another 2023 SCR 711 (B) 2008 SCR 73 ref.
  51. Art. 113 — Transfer of property Act, 1882 Section 54 — Contract, specific performance of — Agreement to sell, execution of — Suit land — Sale-deed — Date fixed, phraseology of — Transfer of land-Delay, condonation of — Witnesses — “Sale”, definition of — So far as question of execution and agreement to sell is concerned that is amply proved from the statement of marginal witness of agreement and from the proof of signatures of other marginal witness (now deceased) — According to definition of word “Sale” given u/S.54,Transfer of Property Act, the sale is transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or post paid and part promised” — Question as to whether suit was instituted after the period of limitation under Art.113, Limitation Act if a date is fixed for performance of an act in the agreement, the period of limitation would start from the said date and if no such date is fixed, it would start from the date of refusal — In the instant case although no specific date was fixed yet, it was specifically written in the agreement that the sale-deed would be executed after the final adjudication of litigation between respondent No.1 and others which was pending in the Civil Court — Term “date fixed” used under Art. 113,Limitation Act would be inclusive of any date so ascertained — In the instant case the suit should have been instituted within 3 years of termination of litigation between to respondent No.1 and others which took place on 10.1.1974 — No application for condonation of delay was made — Appeal dismissed. Nawab Din  v. Khalid Shamsi and others 2000 SCR 408 (A)
  52. Article 113: Provides that in a suit for specific performance of a contract the limitation provided at the relevant time was three years from the date fixed for performance or if no such date is fixed when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused — The suit having become barred by limitation a valuable right had accrued in favour of defendant-respondents which could not have been taken away by inserting an amendment as that will amount to circumvent the process of law. Mumtaz Hussain Khan and 5 others v. Muhammad Hussain and 3 others 2000 SCR 618 (E)
  53. ––Article 113—limitation for specific performance ofcontract—six years—the limitation starts running from the date fixed in the agreement for performance—in absence of such date when the plaintiff has noticed that the party has refused. Muhammad Ayub vs Ali Zaffar & others 2018 SCR 20 (B)
  54. — article 113 — suit for specific performance of agreement-to-sell — commencement of limitation — question as to whether suit was instituted after period of limitation — Held: under Article, 113, the Limitation Act, 1908, if a date is fixed for performance of an act in the agreement, the period of limitation begins from the said date; if no such date is fixed, the period of limitation begins from the date of refusal — The fact of filing of previous suit by respondent No.1, in 1983, was proof that the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants had refused the execute the sale deed [in furtherance of agreement-to-sell, made in 1982], prompting respondent No. 1 to approach the Court for specific performance of the agreement-to-sell, albeit on the basis of a fabricated plea. Kh. Muhammad Azam & others v. Khadim Hussain & others 2023 SCR 372
  55. — article 113 — suit for specific performance of agreement-to-sell, made in 1982 — beginning of limitation — earlier suit filed in 1983, albeit on different grounds — knowledge of refusal to the plaintiff — the filing of the earlier suit was by fiction of law, and the date of refusal of the agreement-to-sell by the defendant, the appellants’ predecessor-in-interest, marked the start of the limitation period. The limitation had started running from the date of refusal to execute contract of sale by the defendant, when respondent No.1 filed the first suit in 1983, against the defendant. As a result, the limitation of three years [ as was enforced under un-amended provision] under article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908, had come to end in 1986. Suit filed by respondent No.1, was declared in circumstances barred by limitation. Kh. Muhammad Azam & others v. Khadim Hussain & others 2023 SCR 372 (E)
  56. Article 120 applies in a case when no period of limitation is provided elsewhere. Sallah Muhammad v. Muhammad Sharif & another 2006 SCR 204 (C)
  57. Article 120 — A suit for cancellation of the sale deed can competently be filed within six years from the date of registration of sale -deed. Muhammad Hafeez Khan and 5 others v. Muhammad Nazir and 2 others 2009 SCR 305 (A)
  58. Art. 120 — See AJK Interim Constitution Act, 1974, S.42. Mst. Aziza Begum v. M. Hussain Khan (Deceased) through represented by legal heirs and 32 others 2013 SCR 563 (H)
  59. —Article 139 and 142—Specific Relief Act, 1872—suits for recovery of possession on the basis of possessory and proprietary title—suit for recovery of possession from tenant—limitation for 12 years— Article 142 is applicable to both the suits for recovery of possession on the basis of possessory and proprietary title— basically the limitation under Article 142 covers the suits which come within the purview of section 8 of the Specific Relief Act— under section 8 the suit for recovery of possession can only be filed by a person entitled to the possession— The person having the proprietary title is deemed to have the same either on the basis of actual possession or constructive possession through an agent/tenant etc.—Any person who is holding the actual possession on behalf of the proprietor is also entitled to hold the possession, thus, his possessory title is recognized by law, whereas, the possession of the property shall be deemed constructive and legally both shall be deemed to be in possession— A person who is holding the possession as agent is in fact holding the possession in continuation of the possession of the proprietor — if he denies the title of the owner it will be deemed discontinuation of possession of proprietor— if a person holding the possession on behalf of the proprietor is dispossessed by a 3rd person or discontinues possession, it shall be deemed that both the proprietor and agent have discontinued the possession— both of them have right to sue for recovery of possession, the agent being having possessory title, and the owner being having proprietary title — the suit will be governed for the purpose of limitation under Article 142 ,under  Article 139, after determination of the tenancy, the landlord has to file the suit for recovery of possession from the tenant within 12 years. Muhammad Anwar Khan & others v. Muhammad Sarwar Khan & others  2017 SCR 733  (G)  1987 SCMR 1791, PLD 2001 Lah. 390 ref.            
  60. Article 142 — It is now a settled law that Article 142 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to a case where the plaintiff himself does not allege in the plaint that he was dispossessed or discontinued the possession of the disputed land from a certain date. Dewan Ali Khan v. Jehandad Khan & others 1995 SCR 116(A)  — AIR 1939 Nag. 7, AIR 1942 Cal. 180, AIR 1950 Pesh. 31, AIR 1939 Cal. 354, AIR 1938 Sind 198, 1979 SCMR 481, PLD.  1960 Kar. 428, PLD 1974, Kar. 235,PLD 1962 Pesh. 124, PLD 1957 Lah. 45,PLD 1956 Dacca 277, PLD 1953 B.J. 10, PLD 1989 SC (AJK) 45, relied. Abdul Rehman vs. Karamat Khan & others (Civil Appeal No. 7 of 1993 decided on 8.9.1993) overruled.
  61. Article 142 is not applicable in a suit filed by landlord against a tenant. Dewan Ali Khan v. Jehandad Khan & others 1995 SCR 116(B) 1974 SCMR 45 relied.
  62. —Article 142—suit for possession—limitation—12 years from the discontinuation of the possession— if the suit is not based upon the dispossession or discontinuation of the possession and the title of property is not disputed then mere holding of possession on behalf of the owner by any other person does not attract the provisions of Article 142 but when according to the alleged facts the title is disputed and dispossession or discontinuation of the possession of the owner is alleged then Article 142 is very much applicable. Muhammad Anwar Khan & others v. Muhammad Sarwar Khan & others  2017 SCR 733 (E&F)  PLJ 2012 SC (AJ&K) 46 distinguished, 1992 SCMR 1610 rel.                   
  63.                 —Article 142—suit for possession—limitation— If the landowner or person having possessory title fails to file the suit for recovery of possession his suit will be deemed barred— the remedy of decree of possession will be refused— the owner except the claim of possession can claim all other rights and benefits arising out of such property. Muhammad Anwar Khan & others v. Muhammad Sarwar Khan & others  2017 SCR 733 (H)    
  64. Article 142 & S.3 — Article 142 of the Limitation Act prescribes twelve years limitation for filing suit of possession regarding immovable property from the date of possession or discontinuation of possession  — Held: If one fails to bring suit within prescribed period of limitation, the Court is empowered by section 3 of the Limitation Act to dismiss such suit. Fazal Jan & 5 others v. Muhammad Saleem Khan & 22 others 2010 SCR 259 (B)
  65. Article 158 — Limitation — The Arbitrator submitted his report in presence of counsel for the parties, but no objections were filed by the appellant in the prescribed period of thirty days as stipulated under Article 158 of the Limitation Act. Safdar Ali Khan v. Azad Govt. & 2 others 2010 SCR 250 (A)
  66. Art. 158 — See Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.2. Safdar Ali Khan v. Azad Government of the State of J&K  2012 SCR 331(A)
  67. Art. 169—limitation for filing application for cancellation of ex-parte decree/rehearing of appeal is 90 days. Azad Govt. & others vs Muhammad Amin 2018 SCR 1006 (A/1)
  68. Art. 178 — See Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.2.  Safdar Ali Khan v. Azad Government of the State of J&K 2012 SCR 331(A)
  69. Art. 181 — Operation of this Article is not limited to applications made under the C.P.C. — Since the application for reconstruction of record is moved under C.P.C. the Civil Court whether appellate or original has inherent jurisdiction to reconstruct the record under the C.P.C. — Held: Therefore, the relevant Article applicable would be Article 181 of the Limitation Act which provides a period of three  years for moving the application for reconstruction of record when the right to apply accrues. Mst. Zenab Jan v. Mst. Zahida Begum 1996 SCR 122 (A)
  70. Reconstruction of record — Limitation for — The application for reconstruction of record whether the same was under the Code of Civil Procedure or out side the ambit of Civil procedure Code in both the eventualities the relevant Article of Limitation applicable would be Article 181 which provides a period of three years — Held further;  The High Court had no jurisdictional competence to fix a period of limitation of 120 days for filing the application for reconstruction of record based on mere assumptions. Mst. Zenab Jan v. Mst. Zahida Begum 1996 SCR 122 (B)
  71. Art. 182 — See Specific Relief Act, 1877, S. 8. Jalal-ud-Din Versus Mst. Rozman and 31 others  2013 SCR (SC AJ&K) 29 (B)
  72. Petition for leave to appeal — Delay of each day to be explained – Petition late by one day not excused. Mabboob v. Muzaffar Din 1992 SCR 338 (A)
  73. Law of limitation is procedural law and generally it is given retrospective effect, even if it is not so provided by the statute itself — Judgment and decree of High Court to that extent set aside — Case remanded to Additional District Judge for deciding it afresh. M. Nazir v. A. Rashid and another 1998 SCR 248 (B)
  74. If the application for obtaining the copy of the judgment etc. is made and the same is supplied on the same day one day is to be excluded while computing the limitation — If a copy is supplied on the same day on which it is applied for only a part of the day may be consumed but the concept of bifurcating a single day into two parts has not so far been accepted by the superior Courts — Nor it has been proved that whole day was not consumed in obtaining the copy. M. Amin v.  M. Hameed and 2 others 2000 SCR 537 (B)
  75. The plaintiff-appellant failed to file objections within prescribed period of limitation, thus the trial Court has rightly made the award of Arbitrator as decision of the Court. Safdar Ali Khan v. Azad Govt. & 2 others 2010 SCR 250 (D)   
  76. Where a party had knowledge of filing of award in the Court, further notice need not be issued to it by the Court informing about the filing of award — Held: Objections to award should have been filed within thirty days from the starting point of limitation — Further held: The objections filed later than thirty days were beyond time. Safdar Ali Khan v. Azad Govt. & 2 others 2010 SCR 250 (B) PLD 1994 Kar.127 & 1983 SCMR 716 rel.
  77. — pre-emption suit — limitation of — the period provided to enforce the right of pre-emption is four months from the date of sale or taking over the possession of the sold property. Abdul Waheed Khan v. Aurangzeb Khan & others 2023 SCR 282 (C) 2006 SCR 204 ref.
error: Content is protected !!