AJK Islamic Penal Laws Act (enforcement) 1974

  1. S. 2 (6) Diyat — No distinction in the punishment of Diyat whether the victim is male or female. Shaukat Hussain v. The State 1992 SCR 155 (G)
  2. Islamic Penal Laws of Azad Jammu & Kashmir relating to ‘Qisas’, ‘Diyat’ and ‘Tazir’ now stand transposed to the Penal Code — Sections 209 to 323 of the Code carry out the spirit of sections 2 to 13 of Islamic Penal Laws Act — The ‘wali’/heirs of deceased stand on a higher pedestal in the matters of ‘Qatal’ —The power of President under section 10 of AJ&K Interim Custodian Act to pardon, commute etc. the sentence in case of ‘Qisas’ etc. are barred and are vested in the heirs of the deceased — It is the ‘wali’/heirs of the deceased who are the necessary party, in whose absence no effective order can be passed — State was not a party at all in the presence of the ‘wali’. Muhammad Riaz & 2 others v. The State 2006 SCR 170 (F)
  3. S. 3. All the punishments envisaged under the Islamic Penal Laws Act are valid according to Muslim Law – The Court has discretion to award one or more punishments. Mian Talib v. The State 1992 SCR 120 (C)
  4. A ‘Tazeer’ and ‘Hakoomat-e-Adal’ – Tazeer does not include sentence of Hakoomat-e-Adal — sentence of Hakoomat-e-Adal cannot be awarded under section 3 of the Act. M. Aslam v. The State 1993 SCR 199 (F)
  5. Ss. 3 and 14- More than one punishments permissible. M. Khalil v. The State 1992 SCR  249 (F)
  6. Ss 3, 15 and 24 — It may not be logical that in case or an offence of ‘Zarar’ only one of the sentences enumerated under section 15 of the Act can be awarded but there is no such prohibition if the Courts resort to section 3 read with section 24 of the Act. A Court of law is bound to interpret a statutory provision as is and not as it should be. However, a Court of law cannot ignore the unambiguous meanings of a statutory provision and refuse to give effect to them because those do not appeal to reason. Muhammad Aslam v. The State 1993 SCR 199 (B)
  7. Ss. 3 & 24 — Qatl-e-Amad — Punishment — Qassas — -If the punishment of ‘Qassas’ is not awarded for one reason or the other, the punishment of death instead of ‘Qassas’ could be awarded under section 3 read with section 24 of the Islamic Penal Laws Act. Abdul Rashid and 3 others v. Abdul Ghaffar and 5 others 2001 SCR 240 (O) 1983 PAK Cr.LJ. 1418, PLJ 1997 SC AJK 46, Islamic Laws by Dr.Tanzeel-ur-Rehman P.366 note 13 ref.
  8. Section 3 and section 24 — No reason has been given by the Shariat Court as to why accused was not awarded capital punishment either as ‘qisas’ or as ‘tazeer’ under section 3 read with section 24 of the Islamic Penal Laws Act — This Court has already held that if it is not deemed desirable to award the punishment of ‘qisas’ in murder case to an accused person, he is liable to be awarded capital punishment as ‘tazeers’. Abdul Aziz  v. Muhammad Lal and 2 others 2001 SCR 402 (C)
  9. S. 5. Murder case- Bail- Plea of ali bi- Shariat Court analysed the plea of ali bi and noted that full particulars of a person detained in sub-jail Mandi Bahauddin were the same as those of accused Ghazanfar Ali on the tentative assessment of evidence granted bail to the accused- Held: Shariat Court did not draw the conclusion in accordance with this principle – record connecting the accused with crime — accused’s name in F.I.R. and related to the complainant- does not lead to mistaken identity- bail refused. Abdul Haq Aziz v. Ghazanfar Ali 1992 SCR 105
  10. S. 5- Murder- Bail- Supreme Court does not interfere in the Order of the Courts below unless it is caprious, fancitul or against law.  Muhammad Manzoor v. The State 1992 SCR 360 (A)
  11. S. 5. — Bail — Observation of Shariat Court that death was direct result of the injury inflicted on the person of the deceased by the accused does not furnish a ground for interference in the exercise of the discretion of the Shariat Court or the Court below — Supreme Court should not go into deeper appreciation of the evidence at the bail stage. Mehmood Ahmed v. The State 1993 SCR 251 (A)
  12. S. 5 — Payment of Diyyat — Whether payment can be made in instalments — There is no such legal provision in cases of ‘Qatil-e-Amad’ under section 5 of the Islami Tazeerati Qawaneen Nifaz Act — But relying upon the judgment of this Court reported as 1993 P.Cr.L.J. 914 the amount of Rs. 4 lakhs was ordered to be paid in three equal instalments. Hassan M. v. The State 1996 SCR 95 (C)
  13. S. 5 — Plea of self-defence — Mere fact that injuries on the person of accused were not explained would not bring the case within the ambit of self-defence. Shabbir Ahmad v. The State and another 1997 SCR 206 (B)
  14. S. 5 — Sentence — Motive — Principle that death sentence should not be awarded if the prosecution fails to establish motive set up by it, cannot be upheld — What truly motivates an accused person to commit a crime is best known to him and not others. Shabbir Ahmad v. The State and another 1997 SCR 206 (E)
  15. The offence of Qisas which erstwhile was punished under section 5, is transposed to section 302 of Penal Code by way of amendment in Penal Code through Act No.XII of 1995 — By way of amendment in Criminal Procedure Code through Act No. XIII of 1995 dated 23.7.1995, the Court of Magistrate and Sessions Judge are designated as Tehsil Criminal Court and the District Criminal Court, for purpose of cases of Hadood and Qisas arising under Islamic Penal Laws. Hakam Deen v. State & 16 others 2005 SCR 314 (V)
  16. Offence of Qisas which erstwhile was punished under section 5 of Islamic Penal Laws Act, 1974 is transposed to section 302, P.C. by way of an amendment in Penal Code through Act No.XII of 1995 —Through Act No. XIII of 1995 dated 23.7.1995 the Courts of Magistrate and Sessions Judge are designated as Tehsil Criminal Courts and District Criminal Courts — Irrespective of the effect of transposing the offence relating to Qisas, Tazeer and Diyyat to Penal Code, the provisions of section 26, Islamic Penal Laws Act, relating to standard of witnesses is intact and applies in all cases of Hadood and Qisas — This provision is in addition to and supplements the general provisions of Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Hakam Deen v. State  2006 SCR 120 (U)
  17. S. 5 — There was no provision for payment of ‘Diyat’ in three instalments in case of ‘Qatal-e-Amad’ — Instalments of three years were provided in cases of ‘Qatal-e-Shuba-e-Amd’, ‘Qatal-e-Khata’, “Qatal-e-Kaim-Muqam Khata’ and ‘Qatal-bis-sabab’— Now these provisions have been repelaed — S.5 has also been repealed — No challan under section 5 of the Islami Tazeerati Qawaneen Nifaz Act was submitted, but challan under section 302 was submitted and section 331 A.P.C. is applicable — Where punishment of ‘Diyat’ was awarded under section 5 of the Islami Tazeerati Qawaneen Nifaz Act even then the accused were released on bail on furnishing bail bond equivalent to the ‘Diyat’ amount.M. Owais v. The State 2007 SCR 302 (B)1993 P.Cr.L.J. 914 rel.
  18. S. 5 read with S. 24 — Motive — Mortire — It is not necessary to prove the motive for murder in all cases, especially so when no motive was initially attributed to the accused — Even otherwise if the charge against an accused person is satisfactorily proved by other evidence, failure to prove alleged motive is not fatal to prosecution case. Usman Khalid v. M. Yunus and another 1996 SCR 197 (A) 1984 SCMR 124,1984 SCMR 312, 1984 SCMR 646, PLD 1975 SC 227 relied.  
  19. Section 5, 25 and 6-A — Creation of District, Additional District and Tehsil Criminal Courts —  Appeal/Revision from the judgment/order of Criminal Courts — Trial of offences of murder and hurt — amendments — its effect — before promulgation of IPL, Act, the appeals were governed by the provisions of Cr.P.C. — the Tehsil and District Criminal Courts are creation of the IPL, Act, 1974 for the trial of offences of murder and hurt — the  procedure and right of appeal in cases falling in the ambit of this Act is provided in section 25 of the IPL — Initially there were District Criminal Courts — through amendment in IPL Tehsil Criminal Courts were created and Section 5 IPL was amended — Initially under section 25 IPL, High Court was the Court of appeal but after creation of the AJ&K Shariat Court, the powers to hear appeal were transferred to it by an amendment in section 25 IPL — through Act XII of 1995, Azad Penal Code and Cr.P.C. were amended — Section 5 to 15 of IPL were deleted through amendment in IPL, Act, 1974 — through section 6-A, Additional Tehsil Criminal Courts were created — Amended provisions of the IPL, APC and Cr.P.C.  do not affect the provisions of section 25 of the IPL — Section 25 of IPL was not amended, it remained intact. M. Malik v. Karam Elahi 2011 SCR 431 (A,B,C,D, & E)
  20. Two amended laws show that it does not even change the application of Chap XX which has to apply in trial of cases before the Courts constituted under Islamic Penal Laws Act, 1974 and in Cr.P.C through section 6-A. State through Adv- General v. Hakam Deen  2005 SCR 374 (X)
  21. In 1995 certain amendments were introduced in P.P.C and Cr.P.C and sections 53,54,55, 55-A, 109, 229 to 338 of P.P.C and sections 6,6-A, 32, 337,338,345,381,402 Cr.P.C were repealed, altered or re-defined and the remaining provisions of I.P.L. Act were kept in tact — Section 6-A was enacted to include two members Court with the assigned name in ‘Classes of Criminal Courts — District Criminal Court and Tehsil Criminal Courts are in addition to classis of Courts provided by section 6 — Newly enacted section 6-A does not substitute any Court or class of Magistrates established under section 6 Cr.P.C or S.7. State through Adv-General v. Hakam Deen & 15 others 2005 SCR 374 (W)
  22. Ss. 8 & 9 — Necessary ingredient for constituting the offence — There should be mistake in the intention or in the act done by the accused — Prosecution failed to prove the case — Accused could not have been convicted. Tazweez Hussain v. Zafar Iqbal 1997 SCR 361 (A)
  23. S. 9 Shariat Court acquitted the accused on the ground that prosecution failed to prove the case negligence or rash driving — Held: These are not relevant considerations to be looked into while convicting or acquitting an accused person. Tazweez Hussain v. Zafar Iqbal 1997 SCR 361 (B)
  24. S. 15- Bail Discretion must be exercised in light of correct facts of the case- Discretion of Shariat Court is of primary importance. Tahir Akbar Khan v. State  1992 SCR 388 (A)
  25. Provisions of Islamic Penal Laws Act which earlier governed the cases relating to murder, injuries etc. under different sections of the Act, stand merged in Penal Code as sections 300 to 337 in view of amendment effected in section 23 of the Islamic Penal Laws Act — However, the jurisdiction to try the cases remained vested as before in Tehsil Criminal Courts and District Criminal Courts. — S. 23 (2) — Words ‘High Court’ substitued to be read as the ‘Shariat Court’ for the purpose of above of offences whenever finding place in the Code of Criminal Procedure — In view of this legal position, the procedure for appeal and reference has to be governed by Code of Criminal Procedure — The Shariat Court has to follow the provisions of Cr.P.C. Muhammad Alam & another v. The State 2009 SCR 458 (A) 
  26. S. 23 (3) is applicable to all cases triable by the District Criminal Court or any other Court initially set up by the Islami Act whether the offenses are triable with reference to the Islami Act or with reference to schedule-II of the Cr.P.C. — The argument that single member of the District Criminal Court could not record the statement of the accused has no force. Zahid Hussain Mirza v. The State and another 2000 SCR 524 (E)
  27. S. 24 — If prescribed numbe of witnesses are not available sentence mentioned in S. 3 may be awarded. Death is normal sentence in case of murder. Misri  v. State  1998 SCR 337 (F)
  28. Section 24 read with section 3 IPL — witnesses ‘ghair Aadil’ — Sentence of ‘Qisas’ can’t imposed —contention that the death sentence awarded as ‘Tazeer’ be converted into death as Qisas — eye witnesses found ‘ghair Aadil’ under section 24, IPL, if a witness is found ‘ghair Aadil’ the sentence of ‘Qisas’ cannot be imposed. Held: The Court is competent to pass alternate sentence or sentences provided under section 3, IPL — The witnesses were found ‘ghair Aadil’ the trial Court correctly passed the sentence of death as ‘Tazeer’. Ghulam Rasool & another v. The State and another 2011 SCR 324 (K)
  29. S. 24 (3) — State can file an appeal for enhancement of punishment– Shariat Court can enhance the sentences. Shaukat Hussain v. The State 1992 SCR 155 (F)
  30. S. 24 (3) Courts may award one or more punishments – As may be provided. Shaukat Hussain v. The State 1992 SCR 155 (I)
  31. S. 25 — Appeal — Any aggrieved person can file an appeal in Shariat Court against an order adversely affecting his interests. Muhammad Sharif Khan and another  v. Zahir Hussain Shah & another 1998 SCR 106 (B)
  32. S. 25 — An appeal to the Supreme Court is filed under section 25 of the Islamic Penal Laws Act within sixty days of the judgment of the Shariat Court — As the State had not filed appeal before the Shariat Court there was no occasion for the State to file appeal before the Supreme Court — Thus the only party which has an interest and is likely to be affected is the legal representatives of the deceased who in any case are necessary party. Muhammad Riaz & 2 others v. The State 2006 SCR 170 (B)
  33. Section 25 IPL — the appeals from the orders of Tehsil Criminal Court, District Criminal Court and the Shariat Court are governed by the provisions of IPL, 1974. Muhammad Malik v. Karam Elahi & another 2011 SCR 431 (F)
  34. Section 25, IPL — Right of appeal and maintainability of appeal in cases of Hudood laws from acquittal or enhancement  of sentence before District Criminal Court, Shariat Court and Supreme Court  — the person ‘aggrieved’ can file appeal from acquittal or for enhancement of the sentence by the Tehsil Criminal Court in the District Criminal Court, Shariat Court and this Court — for the purpose of Qisas and Hudood laws the aggrieved persons have right to file an appeal — in case of ‘qatl-i-amd the wali/legal heirs or the Government/State and in case of hurt, the victim himself, if he is minor, his wali or upon death of victim his legal heirs or the Government /State can file appeal. Muhammad Malik v. Karam Elahi & another 2011 SCR 431 (T)
  35. S. 25 — See Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979), Ss.10/16/19.  Muhammad Iqbal v. Abdul Qayyum and another 2012 SCR 110   
  36.  S. 25 — See Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(B)/34/308/337-A. M. Hanif v. State 2012 SCR 146 (A)
  37.  — section 25 — AJ&K Shariat Appellate Bench of High Court Act, 2017— Section 8 — Azad Penal Code, 1860 — sections 302/24 — appeal by complainant — enhancement of sentence — validity of — under Islamic dispensation of justice in criminal cases, primarily the wali is considered in case of qatleamd to be a person interested in the prosecution alongwith a right to compound the offence — Strangers including the informer can neither claim qisas nor can compound the offence — in the cases of hurt only injured being the victim is recognized for the purpose of receiving arsh, daman or compound the offence — any other interested person can neither compound the offence nor can claim qisas or recover arsh or daman. Held: appeal filed by the complainant who is not a legal heir of the deceased, in presence of legal heirs, is not competent. Habib-ur-Rehman Chughtai v. Kabir Hussain & others 2023 SCR 87 (B &C) Zia Qamar’s case (Crim. Appeal No. 24/2022 decided on 16.02.2023) ref.
  38. S. 25 r/w Ss. 324/341/506/452/337/147/148/149, A.P.C. — Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, Ss. 540-A, 205, 353 —  Criminal trial — Matter of exemption from personal appearance — Rule — Considerations — 15 accused persons were challenged before the Court — One of the accused was exempted on ground that she was a woman and could not appear in the Court on every date of hearing — Two others were exempted on ground that they were of advance age and another was exempted on ground that she was a Government servant — Twenty-seven dates of hearing had been fixed in instant case but still there was no progress in case and delay in trial was only due to reason that there was a large number of accused and on every date of  hearing any one of the accused was absent on one or the other pretext due to which there was delay in disposal of case — Observation that petitioners (respondents herein) had allegedly committed bailable offences was uncalled-for — Impugned order of exemption was maintained by Supreme Court — Criminal appeal dismissed. TRIAL — (Exemption from personal appearance) Impugned order of exemption from personal appearance of accused in said Criminal Case was maintained. M. Anwar v. Naveed and 3 others 2013 SCR 270 (C)
  39. S. 25 r/w S. 302(B), A.P.C. — Arms Act, 1965, S. 13 — Commission of occurrence — Criminal trial —Trial Court convicted/sentenced appellant to life imprisonment (25 years’ R1) — Said sentence of life imprisonment (25 years’ R1) was converted into sentence of life imprisonment (25 years’ R1) was converted into sentence of death as Qisas by Shariat Court — Expectancy of life — It was contended that awarding of 25 years’ R1 and setting aside of death sentence in the first round by Shariat Court had created an expectancy of life in favour of appellant — Appraisal of evidence — Validity — Case was of direct evidence — In F.I.R. four eye-witnesses were nominated, who appeared as PWs in support of prosecution Version — There appeared no pre-meditation —  Origin of fight appeared to be shrouded in mystery —Investigation appeared to have been conducted in an illegal and partisan manner and SHO fabricated facts — There was no data on crime empty for determining the bore of crime empty — Recovery of crime empty was doubtful — Post-mortem report negated prosecution version — It revealed that prosecution had not come forward with true picture — In a case where independent witnesses were present on place of occurrence but instead or producing them only related witnesses were produced and post-mortem report as well as Fire-arm Expert report did not support prosecution story — In these circumstances; awarding of sentence of Qisas by Shariat Court was not justified — Direct evidence coupled with other circumstances was not of such standard on basis of which sentence of Qisas be awarded to appellant — Convict-appellant had made out a case for expectancy of life — Impugned sentence of Qisas by the Shariat Court was set aside and sentence awarded by Trial Court was restored by Supreme Court — Criminal appeal accepted. MURDER — (Expectancy of life) Zabir Maqsood alias Kashif Maqsood v. The State and another 2013 SCR 642 (C)
  40. S. 25(1) — Revision to this Court is competent. Sanaullah Raja v. Muhammad Shafi and 2 others 1997 SCR 149 (F)
  41. S. 25 (1) postulates that against the judgment of District Criminal Court appeal shall be filed before Shariat Court within a period of six months and the same shall have the revisional powers, the limitation for which has been prescribed as sixty days — Against the judgment of the Shariat Court appeal in the Supreme Court shall be lodged within a period of sixty days and the same Court shall have the revisional powers, the limitation for which shall be sixty days. Muhammad Asif v. The State 2002 SCR 108 (A)
  42. S. 25(3) Transfer of case from Criminal Court to some other Court — Wrong order does not constitute sufficient ground for transfer of a case — However flagrant departure from normal procedure may furnish a good ground for transfer of a case. Mst. Gulzar Begum v. Asif and others 1994 SCR 116 (A)
  43. —Sections 25 and 32(2)— appeals, revisions etc—interlocutory order—forum of revision— any one aggrieved from the interim order or judgment of Tehsil Criminal Court, can file a revision  before the Shariat Appellate Bench of the High Court within 60 days of the order impugned— although, u/s. 32(2), the matters which are not governed by any express provision shall be dealt with under the provisions of the Penal Code and Cr.P.C—however, in presence of the express provision of section 25 only revision  is competent before Shariat Appellate Bench of the High Court— revision before the District Criminal Court  not competent . Khalid Mehmood v. Noreen & another 2022 SCR 473 (A)
  44. S. 26 — Contention that purgation of prosecution witnesses was not conducted by the trial Court, and provisions of section 26 I.P.L. Act being mandatory in nature, its violation has rendered the entire trial into illegality and same stands vitiated — Held: That the instant case does not rest upon the evidence of two male eye-witnesses rather the whole case of prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence —  S.26 I.P.L. Act postulates that the standard of evidence in cases of Qassas shall be two adult Muslim eye-witnesses — In absence of such standard, sentence of Qassas could not be enforced — Sub-section (2) of section 26 however postulates that in all cases of Hadood and Qassas, Tazkia-al-Shahood of witnesses shall be essential — In present case admittedly the prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence, i.e., the evidence of last scene, the recovery of crime weapon and the recovery of broken piece of wooden butt and  recovery of dagger from scene of occurrence, similarly the recovery of 3 or 4 cardboards from scene of occurrence — Therefore, the provisions of section 26 of Islamic Penal Laws Enforcement Act are not attracted in this case . The trial Court by not conducting the purgation of witnesses committed no illegality which may require interference — Where there are no two male adult eye-witnesses and the case of prosecution rests on a single female eye-witness and on the testimony of other witnesses who reached on the spot soon after the occurrence  they could not be termed as eye-witnesses  — Provision of section 26 I.P.L. Act were not attracted  — The trial Court by not conducting the purgation of witnesses committed no illegality — The objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant repelled. Muhammad Mushtaq v. State 2001 SCR 286 (A)
  45. S. 26 — ‘Tazkia’ means purgation of witnesses which is conducted with the object to know their competency and other virtues in order to place implict faith in their statements to record conviction in cases of ‘Hadood’ and ‘Qisas’ — Held: Without purgation judgment passed by Sharait Court is illegal and cannot sustain. Khushhal Khan & another v. State 2005 SCR 200 (A)
  46. S. 26 — Irrespective of effect of transposing the offences relating to Qisas Tazeer and Diyyat to the Penal Code, the provisions of section 26 relating to a standard of witnesses is intact and applies in all cases of Hadood and Qisas — This provision is in addition to and supplements the general provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. Hakam Deen v. State & others 2005 SCR 314 (W)
  47. S. 26 — Provides number of witnesses in Hadood and Qisas cases, which overrides all other laws — Two major male Muslim witnesses are required to prove the cases of Hadood and Qisas. — The Court is also bound under sub-section (2) of section 26 to conduct ‘Tazkia’ (purgation) of the witnesses in Hadood and Qisas cases. Hakam Deen v. State and 15 others 2006 SCR 120 (T)
  48. I.P.L. was enacted and enforced on 5th , Sep,1974 — This Act was introduced as first codified law in respect of Islamic Penal Laws, establishment of Courts, Procedure to be followed, question of evidence and the sentence to be passed by Courts — It consisted of certain provisions from Penal Code, Cr.P.C. and Evidence Act and also introduced certain provisions foreign to the English/Indian law as adapted in Pakistan which included purgation of witnesses and right of heirs to compromise — According to section 28, the cases under Islamic Penal laws are to be tried according to procedure laid down by Chap. XX of Cr.P.C. — S.28 is available in I.P.L. State through Advocate General v. Hakam Deen & 15 others 2005 SCR 374 (V)
  49. Code of Criminal Procedure may or may not be amended further, — the legal position as far as procedure to be adopted  by the Courts under I.P.L is concerned, will remain same as provided by S.28 of I.P.L Act and S.173(5) Cr.P.C.
  50. S. 31 — The sentences of ‘Hadood’ and ‘Qisas’ passed by District Criminal Court or the Additional District Criminal Court are subject to confirmation by Shariat Court — Chap. XXVII Cr.P.C. relates to confirmation of sentences in all the cases involving Hadood, Qisas and death where words ‘High Court’ are to read as ‘Shariat Court’ in view of section 23 of Islamic Penal Laws Act — This section corresponds to section 374 Cr.P.C. M. Alam & another v. The State 2009 SCR 458 (B)
  51. S. 32 — Where there is no specific provision in respect of any matter then the provisions of Cr.P.C. shall apply. Muhammad Bashir v. The State 1992 SCR 33 (C)
  52. S. 32 — Where there is no specific provision in respect of any matter then the provisions of Cr.P.C. shall apply. Muhammad Bashir  v. The State 1992 SCR 33 (D)
  53. Whether a particular law is according to the tenets of Islam or not, can be gone into only by a Court Subordinate to the High Court. Muhammad Khalil v. The State 1992 SCR 249 (G)
  54. Sudden and grave provocation. Keeping in view the close relationship between the parties and the fact that the accused appellant started beating his wife in the house of his in-laws-any unpleasant words ultered by his father-in-law who was also his uncle cannot be held sufficient to cause a provocation to the accused appellant much less grave or sudden provocation. Abrar Hussain Shah v. The State 1992 SCR 294 (F)
  55. Question whether complainant can file appeal against order of acquittal — The right of appeal is provided under the Act and is exercisable by complainant or any other aggrieved person — Complainant competent to file appeal against acquittal order. Abdul Khaliq v. Muhammad Asfar Khan 1995 SCR 144 (A)
  56. Appeal against the order passed by Tehsil Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, was competent which had to be filed within a period of six months. Muhammad Afsar Khan & 6 others v. Muhammad Azam Khan and another 2004 SCR 324 (A)
  57. All the offences provided by I.P.L Act, stand incorporated in the P.C through amendment in the Cr. P.C — A few sections of only procedural nature have remained in I.P.L, Act, 1974 — A special section 6-A is added in the Code whereby the Courts provided in I.P.L Act are established in Cr. P.C — The Courts are now part of Cr. P.C not of Islamic Penal Laws Act. State through Advocate General v. Hakam Deen & 15 others 2005 SCR 374 (N) 
  58. Act XIII of 2001 — Amendments introduced in Cr.P.C. 1898 made applicable in Azad Kashmir which amongst other includes Chap. XXII-A — Chap. XXII A — was introduced in Cr.P.C in 1976 in Pak — It has been adapted in AJK — It does not apply in this part of State particularly to the cases triable by two Members Court. State through Advocate General v. Hakam Deen & 15 others 2005 SCR 374 (Y)
  59. A comparative study of the provisions of I.P.L and Cr.P.C shows that in AJ&K the Shariat Court is a Court of appeal and revision as far as the I.P.L are concerned — Shariat Court has not been vested with original jurisdiction to try a case — Chap. XXII-A cannot be stretched to include trial before the Shariat Court as the said Court is not vested with this jurisdiction. State through Advocate General v. Hakam Deen & 15 others 2005 SCR 374 (Z)
  60. Compromise can be entered into by the parties under the I.P.L Act in cases of Hadood and Qisas, there is no provision in the Act which suggest that trial Court should give time to the parties to enter into compromise. State through Advocate General v. Hakam Deen 2005 SCR 374 (BB)
  61. Purgation of the witnesses is to be conducted by the Court in cases of Hadood and Qisas — There is no provision that purgation must be conducted in all cases under I.P.L Act — I.P.L Act appears to have been enacted keeping in view the needs of the society where it has become almost impossible for the people to get immediate relief rather to wait for years together. State through Advocate General v. Hakam Deen & 15 others 2005 SCR 374 (CC)
  62. Code of Criminal Procedure  may or may not be amended further, — The legal position as for as procedure to be adopted by the Courts under IPL is concerned, will remain same as provided by S- 28 of I.P.L. Act and S.173 (5) Cr.P.C. — Justice delayed by application of lengthy procedure cannot be justified and still amounts to justice denied. State v. Hakam Deen 2005 SCR 374 (DD)
  63. The offence of murder under Islamic Penal Laws Act now stands transposed to the Penal Code — Right to waive or compound the offence of murder under sections 309/310 P.C. is vested in heirs/wali of the deceased — ‘Qatl-e-amad’ is compoundable by the heirs of victim under section 345 Cr.P.C. — In the case in hand the ‘wali’ of the victim are his parents — The Government/State could be ‘wali’ only if there was no heir — Thus the only necessary party in this case was ‘wali’ of the deceased, not the State. Muhammad Riaz & 2 others v. The State 2006 SCR 170 (C)
  64. Contention that the sentence passed against the accused-appellant is not ‘Qisas’ but of ‘Tazir’ the State alone is the necessary party is misconceived for the reason that the case of ‘Qatal-e-amad’ is liable to ‘Qisas’ irrespective of the fact whether the sentence of ‘Qisas’ is passed or not — It is the nature of the case not the sentence which is of essence  — ‘Walayat’ in the case of murder is vested in the heirs of the deceased — Government or the State does not matter in the case — In Islamic Penal Laws the primacy in the case of ‘Qisas’, ‘Tazir’and ‘Diyat’ is vested in the ‘wali’/heirs of the deceased and not the State — Before the introduction of Islamic Laws the State had the overriding power in all the cases of murder etc. — State is however bound to prosecute for and on behalf of the victims — It is the responsibility of the State to protect the life, honour and dignity of its subjects — It cannot waive or forgive the rights of the victims. Muhammad Riaz & 2 others v. The State 2006 SCR 170 (D)
  65. Islamic Penal laws were introduced in AJ&K in 1974 — Courts have given full effect to the Islamic principles of criminal jurisprudence in the matters of ‘Qisas’ and ‘Diyat’ — Legal heirs of the deceased have been accepted as the relevant and most necessary party in cases of ‘Qisas’ and ‘Diyat’ and were given the right to prefer an appeal irrespective of the Cr.P.C. Muhammad Riaz & 2 others v. The State 2006 SCR 170 (E)
  66. Islamic Penal Laws of AJ&K relating to ‘Qisas’, ‘Diyat’ and ‘Tazir’ now stand transposed to the Penal Code — Sections 209 to 323 of the Code carry out the spirit of sections 2 to 13 of the Islamic Penal Laws Act — The ‘wali’/heirs of deceased stand on a higher pedestal in the matters of ‘Qatal’ — The power of President under section 10 of AJ&K Interim Constitution Act to pardon, commute etc. the sentence in case of ‘Qisas’ etc. are barred and are vested in the heirs of the deceased — It is the ‘wali’/heirs of the deceased who are the necessary party, in whose absence no effective order can be passed — State was not a party at all in the presence of the ‘wali’. Muhammad Riaz & 2 others v. The State 2006 SCR 170 (F)
  67. The ‘wali’ are not arrayed as party and the party arrayed in the case is not aggrieved and necessary party, hence it practically amounts that the appeal is in vacuum which is incompetent. Muhammad Riaz & 2 others v. The State 2006 SCR 170 (G)
  68. Whoever under law is a necessary party, i.e., whose legal interest would be adversely affected if order is against him or who had been a party before the lower forum has to be arrayed as a party whether there is any specific legal provision in the Code to that effect or not — It is a common sense perception. Muhammad Riaz & 2 others v. The State 2006 SCR 170 (H)
  69. The right of appeal and the format of appeal is regulated by law and it is century old practice that a person who is legally to be affected by the decision or who by law is a necessary party has to be impleaded as a party — Declaration to that effect is not a fresh or a future declaration or interpretation of law which would apply prospectively — But is a declaration of the existing law. Muhammad Riaz & 2 others v. The State 2006 SCR 170 (I)
  70. Under Islamic Penal Laws Act, it was provided that in case of the legal heirs compromised or compound the murder of deceased, the other heirs could claim the share in Diyyat — But after amendment in Pakistan Penal Code the right of compromise has been declared as an individual right and the other legal heirs are not bound by said compromise — To meet such an eventuality S. 311 has been introduced. Badar Shehzad & another v. The State & another 2007 SCR 218 (F)
  71. Appeal before Shariat Court against conviction —  necessary party — objection that convict-appellant has not arrayed the heirs of the deceased as party in appeal before the Shariat Court and  in the light of the principle of law laid down by this Court in the case reported as [2006 SCR 170], appeal before the Shariat Court was not competent . Consequently, the appeal of the convict before this Court is also not maintainable. Held:  As in the trial Court the conviction order has been passed in the case filed by the State. Neither, the legal heirs were party before the trial Court nor there was any private complaint of the legal heirs upon which conviction order has been passed. Whereas the accused in their appeals have arrayed apart from the State, Saghir Ahmed, complainant, as respondent.  Although, the arraying of complainant, Saghir Ahmed in presence of State is superfluous, however, be that as it may, as mentioned hereinabove, the legal heirs were neither party before the trial Court nor on their behalf there was any complaint on which conviction order was passed, therefore, they were not necessary and due to their absence the appeal before Shariat Court could not be deemed as incompetent. As the legal heirs filed separate appeals before the Shariat Court and through the impugned consolidated judgment their appeals have also been disposed off and the convict-appellant in appeal before this Court has arrayed them as party, thus, the objection being baseless, has no substance. Tasawar Hussain versus The State & 9 others 2016 SCR 373 (A) 2006 SCR 170 distinguished.
  72. —Appeal before Shariat Court as well as before the Supreme Court against conviction—necessary party—Objection that legal heirs were not entered as party in appeals against conviction by the appellants before the Shariat Court as well as the Supreme Court— Held: appellants were convicted by the trial Court on the basis of the case filed by the State, in which legal heirs were not party. Legal heirs were neither any party nor there was any complaint by the legal heirs, therefore, the appeal before the Shariat Court not incompetent. Argument repelled. Muhammad Khalil Khan v. State & others 2022 SCR 1462 (D) 2016 SCR 373 rel.
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