Code of Criminal Procedure

  1. —section 4(t)—Public Prosecutor, defined. The State vs Khalid Hussain Rathore & 10 others 2024 SCR 313 (B)
  2. 1.S.5(2) — Special Act — Silent about procedure — Cr. P.C. will apply — S.5(2) would reveal that it is not intended to be all embracing and exhaustive of the Criminal Procedure — A special Act creating the offences may also create a special forum and a special procedure — Where no such procedure has been provided for, then the normal procedure in the Code shall have the application — In a case under special law, wherein a complete procedure has been provided for, then the Code would have no application — However, where a special procedure has been prescribed, by a special Act only for some matters, then the provisions contained in the Code would be excluded only to that extent and not beyond. The State & another v. Javed Iqbal 2001 SCR 1 (E)
  3. —Section 22-A—powers and duties of Justice of Peace—scope and nature of— if Justice of Peace reaches at the conclusion that prima-facie a cognizable offence is made out, he is not required to issue notice to the persons against whom registration of case is solicited rather to summon the concerned police officer for giving him direction to register the case. Sharoom Khan&another v. Justice of Peace & others 2022 SCR 267 (E)
  4. —Section 22-A (6), Cr. P.C.—functions performed by Ex- officio Justice of Peace—proposition: whether powers exercised by Ex-officio Justice of Peace are administrative, executive and administerial character or quasi-judicial nature? The Court concluded that the power of the Ex-officio Justice of Peace is quasi-judicial in nature, and not administrative, executive or administerial character. Sikandar Azam & others v. Zulqarnain Akhtar & others  2022 SCR 1133 (C) PLD 2015 SC 581 rel.
  5. —Sections 22- A and 174—argument that after initiating proceedings u/s 174 Cr. P.C—application u/s 22-A, not competent—medical report—cause of death recorded as ‘head injury’ —the proceedings u/s 174 Cr.P.C were not warranted as the same into play only when the cause of death is unknown. Muhammad Nazir vs Justice of Peace & others 2018 SCR 273 (A)
  6. —Section 22-A, Cr. P.C.—whether appeal or revision lies against the order of Ex-officio Justice of Peace—held: there is no statutory right of appeal or revision under the provision of Cr.P.C., against the order, passed under section 22-A, Cr.P.C., by the Ex- officio Justice of Peace. Section 561-A Cr.P.C. is applicable where there is no specific provision given in the Cr.P.C. Sikandar Azam & others v. Zulqarnain Akhtar & others  2022 SCR 1133 (D)
  7. —Section 22-A, Cr. P.C.— —question for determination by Justice of Peace —Justice of Peace has to determine the question; whether any cognizable offence has been committed or not—If it appears that a cognizable offence has been committed, Justice of Peace is under a legal obligation to accept the application and give direction for registration of F.I.R. Sikandar Azam & others v. Zulqarnain Akhtar & others  2022 SCR 1133 (J)
  8. Section 35 — proviso (A) — award of punishment — Aggregate not longer than 14 years — concurrent or consecutive running of sentence — Admittedly, the trial Court has not issued any direction whether the awarded punishments will run consecutively, one after expiration of the other or the punishments awarded have to run concurrently. The statutory provision of proviso (A) of section 35 of the Cr.P.C., prohibits that in no case, a person shall be sentenced to imprisonment longer than the period of 14 years. In this case, aggregate punishment awarded  to the petitioner comes to 33 years and if it is deemed as consecutive surely it is not allowed in view of proviso (A) of section 35 of the Cr.P.C. Absence of any direction of trial Court whether the punishment awarded has to run consecutively or concurrently, the obvious consequences have to be considered.  If it is deemed that intention of the Court is consecutive running of the punishment, it will amount to violate the statutory provision of proviso (A) of section 35 of the Cr.P.C. Thus, the judgments cannot be implemented in a manner which violates the statutory provision. The only alternate is running of punishment concurrently in such case violation of statutory provision can be avoided. Muhammad Ikhlas v. Ehtesab Bureau & others 2015 SCR 1430 (A) PLJ 2011 SC 210 rel.
  9. Section 35 Cr.P.C. read with section 71 PC., 30,31,32 and 34 Cr.P.C. — Courts of Magistrates have limited sentencing powers — District Criminal Courts/Courts of sessions have unlimited sentencing powers authorized by law — Question whether proviso to sub-section(2) of section 35 Cr.P.C, applies only to Courts of Magistrates or it applies to Courts of Sessions/District Criminal Courts — Under section 35 Cr.P.C. the Court may convict a person at one trial for two or more offences, subject to provisions of section 71 P.C, sentence him for such offences to several punishments and such sentences shall commence one after the expiration of other unless the Court directs that such punishments shall run concurrently — Sub-section (2) of section 35, Cr.P.C. provides maximum term of punishment and proviso (A) to sub-section (2) provides that in no case the sentence of imprisonment shall be for more than 14 years — A plain reading of sub-section (2) of section 35 leaves no doubt that it deals with only those Courts which have limited sentencing powers. Held: the Shariat Court and the District Criminal Courts are authorized by law to pass any sentence provided for the offences. Further held: The Courts of Magistrates have limited powers of sentencing under section 30, 32 and 34 Cr.P.C., while Shariat Court and the District Criminal Courts can pass any sentence under section 31 Cr.P.C. — Further held: The restriction laid down in proviso to sub-section (2) of section 35 Cr.P.C. is not applicable to District Criminal Courts/ Sessions Judges while convicting an accused. The District Criminal Court can pass any sentence authorized by law. Ghulam Rasool, another v. The State and another 2011 SCR 324 (G,H & I)
  10. —section 35—sentences awarded in one trial to run—consecutively or concurrently—principle—if aggregate of sentences  of imprisonment—less than 14 years—sentence run consecutively—unless court directs otherwise—if aggregate punishment more than 14 years imprisonment—sentence to run concurrently— Under section 35, Cr.P.C,   when a person is convicted at one trial  of two or more offences and the trial court sentenced him for separate punishments prescribed therefore, and such punishments when consisting of imprisonment less than 14 Years in aggregate, will, run consecutively unless the court directs that the punishments shall run concurrently. Whereas, the punishments consisting of imprisonment of more than 14 years in aggregate will run concurrently, whether, there is any direction of the court in this regard or not. Sairan Bibi & others v. Muhammad Javed & others 2017 SCR 1334 (C)
  11. — section 35(2)—sentences awarded in one trial—to run consecutively or concurrently—principle of law—if aggregate sentence of imprisonment—more than 14 years—  sentence to run concurrently—In the case in hand the Court concerned awarded death sentence as Tazir to Zaheer Ahmed convict under section 396, APC, 1 month simple imprisonment under section j41, APC, 2 years simple imprisonment and fine of Rs.l0 ,000/ … under section 13 of the Arms Ordinance, 1965, with a condition that in case of non-payment of fine, he shall undergo further imprisonment of 6 months and also ordered for payment of Rs. 500,000/- under section 544-A, Cr.P.C. compensation to be paid to the legal heirs of the deceased . The petitioner was awarded sentences for more than one sentence in a single trial. The Shariat Court converted the death sentence into life imprisonment. The punishment or sentences awarded to the convict is more than 14 Years imprisonment in aggregate. The trial Court as well as the Shariat Court did not a direct that the substantive sentences of imprisonment for the different offences will run concurrently or consecutively. Surely the sentences will take effect concurrently, as section 35 (2), Cr.P.C., clearly postulates that in no case sentences  awarded to convict in one trial, the aggregate of  which is 14 years or more, will take effect consecutively rather the same will take effect concurrently. Sairan Bibi & others v. Muhammad Javed & others 2017 SCR 1334 (D)  2015 SCR 1430 rel.
  12. —S.40—discretionary power of Court to recall a witness and  to  record  the  statement—requirements—The  law  is  well settled  that  discretion  vested  in  the  Court  under  the  aforesaid provision of law, should not be exercised to fill in the lacuna in the case or to encourage a witness to change his loyalty as a result of any pressure or ulterior motive. Held: In the administration of criminal justice, a court is duty bound to watch the interest of justice and disallow such frivolous applications which have been made after recording the evidence of the witnesses. Muhammad Javed vs State & another 2018 SCR 326 (A)
  13. Section 44 Cr.P.C. — It is the duty of the every citizen to inform the police if it comes in his knowledge that an offence has been committed or is going to be committed, under section 44 of Cr.P.C., but.  Held: Such a person only can be termed as an informant if he has no direct interest in the case. Muhammad Malik v. Karam Elahi & another 2011 SCR 431 (S)
  14. Sections 54 & 200 — reports & complaints in criminal matters — two courses open for an aggrieved person; (i) he may report the matter to the police under section, 54. or; (ii) make complaint to the Magistrate —when a complaint is made to the Magistrate, for the offence triable by the Magistrate, the magistrate by taking cognizance of such complaint is duty bound to examine the complaint, record the statement forthwith on oath and the said statement shall be reduced in writing — The purpose and object of recording the statement of the complainant is, to ascertain the truth of allegation made in the complaint. M. Mumtaz v. A.Rehman & others 2016 SCR 140 (A)
  15. S. 56-A r/w Ss. 10/11, 16/18, ZHA & 109, A.P.C. — Abduction for purpose of committing zina — Right of marriage — Impugned F.I.R was quashed by Shariat Court — Validity — An affidavit had been filed by female respondent in Shariat Court in which she had submitted that she was a virgin and unmarried — Her parents wanted to marry her to some other person, that is why she left her home with her own will — Neither she had been abducted by any body nor she was married to any person before Nikah with co-respondent — Only statements recorded by police had been placed on record which could not be relied in presence of affidavit filed by said respondent — Argument that Sharait Court had committed illegality while recording impugned order on basis of compromise deed, was having no substance — All the criminal proceedings initiated by complainant were only in the name of ‘‘Ghariat’’ at the same were withdrawn by them through compromise — Respondents, being sui juris, had lawfully married with each other and in those circumstances offence was alleged in F.I.R. was not made out; conviction of accused was not possible and continuance of investigation under circumstances against respondents may amount to unnecessary harassment, therefore, said F.I.R. was rightly quashed by Shariat Court — Respondents were adult sane and according to Constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights, they could not be deprived from the right of marriage — Criminal revision was dismissed by Supreme Court. QUASHMENT OF F.I.R. — (Lawful marriage) [Respondents being sui juris had lawfully married with each other and in these circumstances F.I.R. was rightly quashed]. State through Adv. General Muzaffarabad v. Safeer Khan and another 2013 SCR 42
  16. S. 87 — Absconsion — Contention that accused’s absence was due to his business affairs — Held: Not satisfactory proved that during three months and eighteen days in this of age swift means of communication he was remained ignorant of registration of case against him. Alam Zaib v. Muhammad Ramzan & another 2001 SCR 71 (D)
  17. S. 103 — Recovery — Section does not apply to a case where the accused himself leads the Investigating Officer to the place where the incriminating articles have been concealed. Noor Ahmad v. The State 1992 SCR 1 (D)
  18. S. 103. Recovery — Weapon of Offence at the instance of the accused person is not strictly governed by section 103 Cr.P.C. Abrar Hussain Shah v. The State 1992 SCR 294 (E)
  19. S. 103 — Recovery — Proof of — Strict compliance of section 103, Criminal Procedure Code is not necessary in case of recovery or seizure made by police — Relationship of witnesses of the recovery memos is not ground to reject their testimony. Abdul Rashid and 3 others v. Abdul Ghaffar and 5 others 2001 SCR 240 (G)
  20. S. 103 — Objection that provision of section 103 has not been complied with at the time of recovery of looted articles — Provisions of section are mandatory in nature — It was enjoined upon Investigating Officer to call for two independent respectables of locality to effect the recovery from accused persons  — Recovery witnesses are relatives of the complainant — They are not independent witnesses — Recovery is in violation of section 103 and cannot be relied upon for convicting the appellants — Held:   Both recovery witnesses are local and respectables of the locality — Normally general public hesitates to become witness in criminal cases, particularly in cases of docoity against those person who are involved in a number of criminal cases — Provision of section 103 is applicable under Chapter VII of Cr.P.C. in cases of search — But where the accused person leads the Investigating Officer to the place where he has concealed the stolen articles and himself produces the same the provisions of section 103 are not strictly applicable. Qamar Shehzad & 3 others v. The State 2010 SCR 113 (C) 1992 SCR 1 rel.
  21. —Section 103—recovery—word ‘locality’ used in provision, cannot be strictly construed and the person of other village can be produced as a witness. Syed Kamran Hussainshahv.   State & another 2022 SCR 365 (L)
  22. —Section 103—applicability of—recovery—provision of section 103 are applicable in cases of search—where the recoveries are made at the instance of accused there is no strict rule that such a recovery must be made according to section 103. Syed Kamran Hussainshahv. State & another 2022 SCR 365 (L)
  23. —Section 103, Cr.PC—recovery of crime weapon— recovery witnesses were close relatives of complainant—despite availability of independent witnesses, no such witness was entered as recovery witness—Held: Police did not fulfill the requirements of section 103, Cr.PC—despite availability of independent witness, non-producing them as such, the statements of closely related witnesses cannot be blindly relied upon. Malik Zaffar v. Rashid Hussain Shah & others 2022 SCR 1489 (K)
  24. —Section 103, Cr. PC—recoveries made after 7/8 days, makes the recovery of weapon doubtful. Malik Zaffar v. Rashid Hussain Shah & others 2022 SCR 1489 (L) 1991 SCMR 331 rel.
  25. Proceedings under section 107 and 145 Cr.P.C are different in nature and cannot proceed jointly. Perveiz Khan v. Gulam Mustafa & another 2005 SCR 197 (B)
  26. Sections 127, 128 and 132 — powers of Magistrates or Officers-in-Charge of a Police Station to disperse an unlawful assembly — legal immunity to Magistrates and Officers-in-Charge against prosecution without Government sanction — under section 127, a Magistrate or an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station can command any unlawful assembly or any assembly of 5 or more persons, which is likely to disturb the public peace, to disperse — if the participants of assembly refuse to obey the command then under section 128, such unlawful assembly can be dispersed by using civil force — such Officer or Magistrate may seek help of the airmen of armed forces for dispersing such assembly — the acts of an Officer in-charge of a Police Station or Magistrate done under sections 127 & 128 have been provided legal immunity and protection under section 132 against prosecution without Government sanction. Kh. Muhammad Naheem & 4 others v. Justice of Piece & 5 others 2014 SCR 1049 (A)
  27. Section 132, Cr.P.C — Chapter IX, Cr.P.C., scope — Held: the protection provided to the Magistrate and officer-in-charge of the Police Station under section 132, Cr.P.C is only against prosecution subject to the Government sanction — there is no bar in registration of the case against the officials mentioned in Chapter IX, Cr.P.C., nor any protection is provided against registration of F.I.R. Kh. M. Naheem & 4 others v. Justice of Piece & 5 others 2014 SCR 1049 (H)
  28. Section 132, Cr.P.C. — object & scope — section 132  does not provide protection against the registration of case and inquiry — the object of providing protection against prosecution is to protect the responsible public servants against the possible frivolous and vexatious institution of criminal proceedings while they act under Chapter IX, Cr.P.C. — this protection is only against the prosecution and not against the registration of F.I.R. — the legislature while providing protection under section 132 has not issued a license to the Magistrate or officer-in-charge of a police station to act in an illegal manner and use sections 127 to 132, Cr.P.C., as a shield against such illegal acts. Kh. Muhammad Naheem & 4 others v. Justice of Piece & 5 others 2014 SCR 1049 (D)
  29. Section 132 and section 197, Cr.P.C. — object and scope — comparison — the provisions of section 132, Cr.P.C are analogous to section 197, Cr.P.C., which provide protection to the Judges and public servants that they shall not be prosecuted without the previous sanction of the relevant authority — section 197, Cr.P.C. provides that no Court shall take cognizance of such offence which is done by a Judge or public servant while acting in official capacity — the protection provided to the Magistrate, Judge or public servant under section 197, Cr.P.C. is wider one and it provides protection against prosecution without the previous sanction of the relevant authority — under sections 132 and 197, Cr.P.C. the concerned Magistrate, or officer-in-charge of a police station, can be prosecuted with the previous sanction of the Government, if they being public servant act — under section 132, Cr.P.C. there is concept of prosecution without registration of F.I.R. and investigation. Kh. M. Naheem & 4 others v. Justice of Piece & 5 others 2014 SCR 1049 (E) AIR 1929 Madras 659 & AIR 1964 SC 269, ref.
  30. S. 133 — AJ&K Interim Constitution Act, 1974 — Specific Relief Act, 1877, S. 42 — Removal of encroachment on road — Powers of District Magistrate — Pendency of civil suit — Features of case — Controversial issue raised before ADC (G) regarding removal of encroachment upon road was sub judice before Civil Court — Appellant moved an application for initiation of proceedings under Section 133, Cr. P.C. before Deputy Commissioner with regard to same subject-matter which was already pending before Civil Court — Deputy Commissioner entrusted matter to the ADC(G) — Respondent challenged said order of Deputy Commissioner in a revision before High Court — High Court while accepting revision and quashed all proceedings initiated by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 133, Cr.P.C. and directed Trial Court to decide the case accordingly — Criminal appeal in Supreme Court — Whether District Magistrate was competent under Section 133, Cr.P.C. to proceed with matter brought before it when same matter was sub judice before Civil Court — Question for determination — Held: When the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction was proceeding with the matter, the Magistrate or any other judicial officer holder was debarred from entertaining the same cause between the same parties — Appellant should have approached the Civil Court regarding removal of nuisance, if any, but had approached the District Magistrate for exercise of powers which were available with the Civil Court where the lis was already sub judice — High Court had rightly appreciated the factual/legal position — Criminal appeal dismissed. REMOVAL OF ENCROACHMENT — (Powers of District Magistrate) [Since such controversy was sub judice before Civil Court, District Magistrate could not initiate proceedings under Section 133, Cr.P.C. for removal of encroachment on road. High Court had correctly quashed proceedings. Supreme Court dismissed appeal]. Karamat H. (Dr.) v. Shams-U-Din 2013 SCR 554
  31. S. 133 — public and private nuisance — its clarification — this provision has meant to remove the public nuisance and not to redress the individual grievance —‘Public nuisance’, means an act or illegal omission, which causes any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general who, dwell or occupy in the vicinity, whereas the ‘private nuisance’ is anything done to the annoyance of some particular individuals as distinguished from public at large. Mohammqad Lal v. Mohammad Rafique 2014 SCR 1032 (A)
  32. S. 133, Cr.P.C. — Public and private nuisance — juxtaposition examination of the definition—along with the statutory provision — held: it is crystal clear that section 133, Cr.P.C. can only be invoked in a case of public nuisance as the same deals with the public rights i.e. obstruction or nuisance to anyway, path, river or water channel lawfully used by the public at large or to a public place. Mohammqad Lal v. Mohammad Rafique 2014 SCR 1032 (B)
  33. S. 133 — its scope — the appellant moved application — for removal of the obstruction from the way, which he is using for the last so many years, meaning thereby that the grievance of the appellant is of individual nature and the path for which he wants to seek order for removal of obstruction is not in the use of public at large — Held: the provisions of section 133, Cr.P.C. are not attracted.  Further held: it was the duty of the Magistrate to look into the contents of the application at the time of its filing and if he comes to the conclusion that the matter pertains to the individual‘s grievance and not of public at large, the same should have been dismissed at the very first day.  Further held: all the Courts are unanimous on the point that the proceedings under section 133, Cr. P.C. in the case of individual’s grievance are not warranted under law rather the same can only be invoked in the case of public nuisance. M. Lal v. M. Rafique 2014 SCR 1032 (D) 1994 SCMR 665, AIR 2004 SC 4818, AIR 1962 SC 1794 and AIR 2003 SC 3226 rel.
  34. S. 133 — power of Magistrate — the Magistrate is only empowered to proceed under this section in case of ‘public nuisance’ and not in ‘private nuisance’ the contents of the application moved by the appellant under section 133, Cr.P.C. do not indicate any sort of public nuisance — the application was liable to be dismissed in limine. M. Lal v. M. Rafique 2014 SCR 1032 (E)
  35. S.133 — extraordinary powers — to be exercised in the extraordinary circumstances — this provision has been enacted to meet the emergent situation for taking measures for removal of nuisance including the power to prohibit the conduct of any trade, occupation or keeping of any goods or merchandize, which is injuries to the health or physical comfort of the community. It also gives the power for removal of such trade and occupation. Held: this is why the extraordinary powers are meant to be exercised in the extraordinary circumstance.  But, unfortunately, the position is otherwise, the Magistrate has acted against the spirit of this section and the proceedings under section, 133, remain continued for a long time, which amounts to deviate from the mandatory provision of this section. Held: the Magistrate should be vigilant while exercising these powers and to act strictly according to the wisdom behind its enactment. M. Lal v. M. Rafique 2014 SCR 1032 (G)
  36. S. 133 — its requirements and procedure — the Magistrate — should pass ‘conditional order’ — to remove — such obstruction or nuisance — in a manner as decided by him. If the person who allegedly caused nuisance, appears and shows cause against the conditional order.  The Magistrate shall record the evidence in the matter and if he is satisfied that the order is not reasonable and proper, he shall take further steps accordingly, but if he is not so satisfied, the conditional order shall be made absolute. Mohammqad Lal v. Mohammad Rafique 2014 SCR 1032 (H)
  37. S. 133 — speedy proceedings — are the requirement of law — Held: that speeding proceedings under this section are the requirement of law and any deviation from it amounts to destroy the very object of the provision. Mohammqad Lal v. Mohammad Rafique 2014 SCR 1032 (I)
  38. S. 133(2) — power of Magistrate to issue order — subsections (2) of section 133 enables the Magistrate to make order promptly and deals with the cases where a public nuisance has been committed. M. Lal v. M. Rafique 2014 SCR 1032 (C) AIR 1921 Bombay 29 rel.
  39. S. 133(2) — jurisdiction of Civil Court — the object of provision of S. 133(2), Cr.P.C. empowers the Magistrate to make speedy orders and deal speedily with the cases where a public nuisance has been committed and even the Civil Court has also jurisdiction — remedies available in respect of public nuisance in the Civil Court are of a protracted nature, take such a long time for completion, as such the very purpose of the proceeding is defeated. Held: an order passed under this section cannot be questioned in the Civil Court. M. Lal v. M. Rafique 2014 SCR 1032 (F)
  40. S. 145 — Breach of peace — Proof of — Attachment of property — Statement of witnesses — Argument of learned counsel for the appellant that there was no evidence about apprehension of breach of peace has no force. M. Gulzar Khan v. Begum Jan & 5 others 1998 SCR 63 (A)
  41. S. 145 Cr.P.C. Possession taken by way of attachment u/s 145 has to be given back to the person from whom it was taken, if it is found that he was in possession. M. Usman & 3 others v. M. Hussain and 10 others 1999 SCR 86 (A)
  42. Proceedings under section 145 Cr.P.C. relate to breach of peace. Muhammad Usman & 3 others v. Muhammad Hussain and 10 others 1999 SCR 86 (B)
  43. S. 145 — Proceedings u/s 145 Cr.P.C. are subordinate to a decree or order passed by the civil Court in respect of the property in dispute before the Magistrate — The primary concern of the proceedings under Criminal Procedure Code is to prevent breach of peace arising out of a dispute concerning the land or water — The resolution of the dispute lies exclusively in the realm of a  civil Court, therefore, if the civil Court finally decides or through any interim injunction regulates the possession of the subject matter of dispute in such case if apprehension of breach of peace prevails the Magistrate can take action under Ss. 107 & 151 Cr.P.C. but he cannot take action u/s 145 Cr.P.C. M. Siddique & another v. M. Rashid and 3 others 2003 SCR 526 (A) 1983 P.Cr.L.J. SC(AJK)2590, PLD 1990 AJK 15, PLD 1970 SC 470 rel.
  44. S. 145 — In case the possession has been regulated by civil Court, the criminal Court shall have no jurisdiction. Perveiz Khan v. Gulam Mustafa 2005 SCR 197 (A) PLJ 1997 SC (AJK) 146 rel.
  45. S. 145 — Dispute concerning land was likely to cause breach of peace — Procedure — Purpose — Main purpose of proceedings under S. 145, Cr.P.C. was to maintain the peace and tranquility, and to avoid the breach of peace — Magistrate would proceed only after satisfaction that there existed a dispute over possession of immovable property likely to cause breach of peace — Proceedings under S. 145, Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate were not the ultimate solution of the problem, but in fact were of preventive nature for the time being; and subject to the final resolution of the controversy by the Court of competent jurisdiction. M. Khurshid Khan v. M. Rahim Khan and 2 others 2012 SCR 156 (A)
  46. S. 145 — See Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.94. M. Khurshid Khan v. M. Rahim Khan and 2 others 2012 SCR 156 (B & C)
  47. S. 145 — Pendency of civil suit — Effect — Proceedings under said section are not maintainable in presence of civil suit where the Civil Court has already regulated the possession. Saleem Akhtar v. Abdul Waheed and 6 others 2013 SCR (SC AJ&K) 115 (A)
  48. Ss. 145, 561-A, 439 — Initiation of proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. — Attachment order — Pendency of civil suit — High Court converted second revision petition into application for quashment of proceedings under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. accepted the same and quashed order passed by Magistrate — Validity — Prior to filing of complaint before Magistrate and the order of Magistrate, civil suit was already pending in the Court — If a civil suit in respect of a property is pending in a Court and the application for proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. is filed before the Magistrate and the Civil Court has already regulated the possession while issuing stay order, the Magistrate has no power to continue the proceedings — On the date when Magistrate passed attachment order, the stay order for maintaining status-quo was already in field — Magistrate had no jurisdiction to issue the attachment order — In circumstances, it was enjoined upon the Session Court to vacate order of attachment passed by Magistrate — It was an abuse of process of Court — High Court was justified in exercising powers under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. for quashing proceedings initiated under Section 145, Cr.P.C. — Criminal appeal was dismissed by Supreme Court. PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 145, Cr.P.C. — (Pendency of suit) [Proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. were not maintainable in presence of civil suit where Civil Court had already regulated possession. High Court while exercising inherent jurisdiction had rightly set aside proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. Appeal before Supreme Court dismissed.] Saleem Akhtar v. Abdul Waheed and 6 others 2013 SCR 115 (D)
  49. S. 154 — A mandatory provision — Whenever an information disclosing a prima facie commission of offence is made the concerned police officer is bound to enter it in the prescribed book and then proceed in accordance with law — Every information has to be entered in the relevant book — The words “Every information” indicate that subsequent report must also be registered — The power to investigate a non-cognizable case is vested by law in the police officer but cancellation of a case can only be ordered by a Magistrate — If section 154 is not construed as a mandatory provision the powers of a Magistrate whether to cancel a case or not would become meaningless. Muhammad Afzal v. Najeeb Ali 1996 SCR 66
  50. S. 154 — Delay in filing complaint–Documents produced by the complainant, in the circumstances of the case, were deemed to be sufficient to explain the delay for filing the complaint — When the delay is sufficiently explained and the documents are also placed on record, which prima facie, make it to believe that the appellant did all he could do, coupled with his subsequent conduct of vigorously following the case complaint cannot be dismissed on that ground. M. Sadiq v. Raja M. Nasim & others 1996 SCR 215 (A) PLD 1974 Kar. 36, PLJ 1982 Cr.C (Karachi) 333 relied.
  51. S. 154 — Provisions of section 154 Cr.P.C. are mandatory in nature and the moment it is brought to the notice of S.H.O. through an information in writing about the commission of a cognizable offence, he is bound to reduce it into writing and he must conduct an investigation as required by law. Khadam Hussain & 9 others v. Abdul Rehman and 2 others 1999 SCR 484 (A)
  52. S. 154 — When an information relating to Commission of an offence is given to an Incharge of Police Station it is registered and investigation is begun by the police, report whereof is to be submitted to the competent Court u/s 173 Cr.P.C. in accordance with the procedure laid down therein — When report is so filed, the competent Court is authorised to take cognizance of the offence u/s 190 Cr.P.C. and to issue process u/s 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure there are sufficient ground for proceedings — The police is not debarred from making further investigation after having submitted u/s 173 Cr.P.C. or after the process being issued by the Court on the basis of that report. The code does not prevent investigating officer from submitting subsequent report in addition to or in supersession of earlier one and the Court does not become functus officio after taking cognizance of first report/challan u/s 173 Cr.P.C. M. Arshad v. M. Mushtaq 2003 SCR 204 (B)
  53. S. 154 — Whenever any information is furnished to a police officer relating to a cognizable offence he is under statutory obligation to enter such information and proceed with investigation without any delay. Nazar Hussain and 4 others  v. Azmat Bibi and 9 others 2002 SCR 150 (A)
  54. S. 154 — First information report — Evidentiary value — If at all F.I.R. recorded after preliminary investigation, this irregularity by itself will not be sufficient to discard the prosecution case — Prosecution case could not be thrown away simply on the ground that F.I.R. was recorded after preliminary investigation.Niaz Ahmed v. The State & 2 others 2008 SCR 326 (A)
  55. Section 154, Cr.P.C. — FIR — SHO/Police Officer is bound to record an information about commission of a cognizable offence and conduct investigation — Under section 154 Cr.P.C. the police is bound to record an information about commission of a cognizable offence and conduct investigation as required by law. Held: This provision is mandatory in nature. The moment it is brought to SHO through information in writing about commission of a cognizable offence, he is bound to reduce it in writing and must conduct investigation and in case the police officer comes to the conclusion that the report is false, he may forward the result to the Magistrate to cancel the case. Ch. Muhammad Younas Arvi & 2 others v. Abdul Aziz Ch. & 4 others 2011 SCR 50 (B)
  56. Section 154, Cr.P.C. — registration of FIR — every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence when brought to the officer-in-charge of a police station, shall be reduced in writing whether it is oral or written and S.H.O. after entering the same in the relevant register, read over the same to the complainant — the provisions of section 154, Cr.P.C. are mandatory — S.H.O. has no option except to register the said information and if any cognizable offence is made out from the contents of the application, he shall start the investigation.  Kh. M. Naheem & 4 others v. Justice of Piece & 5 others 2014 SCR 1049 (J)
  57. Section 154, Cr.P.C — registration of 2nd FIR — counter version — normally when an F.I.R. is registered in respect of cognizable offence and if the other party brings second version in respect of the same occurrence, it is the duty of the police to investigate the counter version put-forth by the other party regarding the same occurrence but no hard and fast rule can be laid down that the second F.I.R. cannot be registered in respect of different version given by the other party — Held: in a case where aggrieved party brings the version that true facts have been suppressed and occurrence did not take place in the manner, as alleged in the previously lodged F.I.R, then it is the duty of the S.H.O  to register 2nd  F.I.R. Kh. M. Naheem & 4 others v. Justice of Piece & 5 others 2014 SCR 1049 (K) PLD 1997 Kar. 119, 2001 SCMR 1556 & PLD 2005 SC 297, rel.
  58. —Section 154 Cr.P.C—FIR—provisions are mandatory in nature—every information relating to the Commission of cognizable offence, if furnished orally or written to an office incharge of a police station shall be reduced to writing by him— the purpose of registration of case is to set the law into motion and to obtain first hand spontaneous information in order to exclude possibility of fabrication etc. Muhammad Nazir vs Justice of Peace & others 2018 SCR 273 (A)
  59. Ss. 154, 156 and 170, Cr.P.C. (part v) — procedure for registration of case in a cognizable offence and investigation — under section 154, every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer Incharge of a Police Station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction and be read over to the informant and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing, shall be signed by the informant.  Under section 156 any officer Incharge of a Police Station may investigate any cognizable office without the order of Magistrate. After duly completion of investigation, a report under section 173 has to submit to the Magistrate concerned. The S.H.O. is empowered to register a case in a cognizable offence and investigate the same. Shan Muhammad v. Muhammad Younas & 4 others 2014 SCR 183 (A)
  60. Section 156 — successive investigation—appropriateness of — Held: that law does not debar to reinvestigate the matter even after completion of investigation and submission of final report under section 173,Cr.P.C., however, the powers of reinvestigation are not unguided. It is not on the sweet-will of the investigating officer to re-investigate the matter whenever he desires. Further held: The police can carry out fresh investigation and submit its report to the Court, but such practice cannot be approved in every case. In some cases, the superior Courts disapproved the practice of reinvestigation on the ground that mostly the reinvestigation is carried out on the request of influential persons for obtaining favourable reports. Tahir Rasheed & 8 others v. The State & another 2016 SCR 1059 (A) 2006 SCMR 373 and 2002 P.Cr.L.J. 1585 rel.
  61. Section 156 — Successive investigation — Held: that although the successive investigations to be discouraged by the Superior Courts, but at the same time, the Superior Courts are of the view that if some important or credible material is collected by the police which is necessary to be placed before the Court to arrive at a just conclusion then there is no bar on the fresh investigation of the case. Tahir Rasheed & others v. The State another 2016 SCR 1059 (B) 2002 P.Cr.L.J. 1585 rel.
  62. Instead of acting upon the opinion of police with regard to the innocence of the accused at the time of occurrence, both the Courts below should have considered the F.I.R.; statements made by the eye-witness u/s 161 of Cr.P.C., the plea raised by the accused Riaz Ahmad Khan during the investigation and the evidence produced by him in defence and the opinion of the police. Case remanded to the trial Court. Sardar M. Nazir Khan v. Javed Iqbal & others 1995 SCR 378 (C)
  63. S. 161 — Contention that there are discrepancies between the eye witnesses — Statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C., renders the case of prosecution doubtful — Held: Not tenable because eye-witnesses have been named in the F.I.R. which was promptly recorded — Held further: Even the belated recording of statement would not help the accused — Thus the discrepancies do not make the prosecution case doubtful. A. Rashid and others v. A. Ghaffar and others 2001 SCR 240 (M)
  64. S. 161 — Statement under section 161 Cr.P.C is not a substantial piece of evidence — Same can be used by the defence to bring out the truthfulness of a particular witness. Rukhsar Ahmed & 3 others v. The State & another 2005 SCR 205 (C)
  65. S. 161 — Statements of witnesses are to be recorded only once and there is no justification under law to record their statements again — Second round for recording of statements of complainant or eye-witnesses by Investigating Officer is not recognized by section 161 — Although supplementary statements can be recorded but as far the eye-account of occurrence is concerned, once a witness has made a statement in narrative form, his subsequent statement in clear contradiction of his first version cannot be taken up. Arshad Mahmood & another v. The State & another 2010 SCR 75 (E)
  66. —Section 161—delay in confessional statement— without reason—Silence of alleged eye witnesses for considerable time–credibility of witness looked with serious suspicion—   Appreciation of evidence—Belated statement of witness recorded under section 161. Cr. P.C., — The silence of alleged eyewitness for a considerable time cannot be ignored lightly— The statement was not recorded at the relevant day rather on the next day of the occurrence— No plausible explanation in this regard has come on the record, whereas, under law the credibility of a witness is looked with serious suspicion if his statement under section 161, Cr. P.C. is recorded with delay without offering any reason. Muhammad Younas  v. The State & others 2019 SCR 149 (B)
  67. —section 161—statement of witnesses—recorded with considerable delay without explanation of delay—The statements of the witnesses under section 161, Cr.P.C. have been recorded after a lapse of a considerable time and under law unexplained delay cannot be ignored lightly. Muhammad Idress & 2 others v. State through AdvocateGeneral & 11 others  2020 SCR 200 (H)
  68. —Section 161, Cr.PC—recording of statements of prosecution witnesses under section 161, Cr.PC—without any explanation regarding five days delay in recording of statement of witness who was family member of complainant—Held: reduces its value unless and until it is explained rendering justifiable reasoning. Malik Zaffar v. Rashid Hussain Shah & others 2022 SCR 1489 (H) 2020 SCMR 1049; 1996 SCMR 155; 2020 SCMR 986 rel.
  69. — section 161 & 162 — Azad Penal Code, 1860 — section 302 — murder — extra judicial confession — trial Court relied solely on accused statement made during police custody — held: it is vital to note that relying upon such statements obtained during police custody, is impermissible under law — Muhammad Saeed versus The State & 12 others 2023 SCR 1006   (D)
  70. S. 161(3) — Police Officer may reduce into writing any statement made to him in the course of an examination — And if he does so he has to make a separate record of the statement of each person whose statement he records — This fact would not mean that prosecution story is completely tainted. Arshad Mahmood & another v. The State & another 2010 SCR 75 (F)
  71. S. 164 — Confession — Evidentiary value of — Whether retracted or unretracted, judicial or extra-judicial. Zahurat  v. M. Rahim Khan and another 2003 SCR 496 (D) PLD 1964 S.C. 813 and PLJ 2001 F.S.C. 89 discussed.
  72. S.164. — Mandatory requirements for recording the statement — Held: that two things are mandatory while recording the statement under section 164, Cr.P.C., the requisite questions should be made to the accused and after recording the same, certification should be made at the bottom of the statement.  Muhammad Babar v. State through Advocate General 2014 SCR 1585 (D)
  73. S.164. — If delay occurs in recording the statement of accused — its effects — contention of the learned counsel for the convict-appellant was that the convict-appellant was arrested on 15.09.2003 and his statement under section 164, Cr.P.C. was recorded after a considerable delay — Held: As admittedly at the time of recording the statement he was not in police custody and it was up to the accused whenever he desired, his statement was recorded. Further held: — There is no bar under law to record the statement under section 164, Cr.P.C. within the stipulated period. Muhammad Babar v. State through Advocate General 2014 SCR 1585 (E)
  74. Section 164 — delay in recording statement — consideration in bail matter — brings case with in further inquiry — The alleged statement under section, 164, Cr.P.C has been recorded after a period of two weeks’ time. Held: without any deeper appreciation, ordinarily, the statement recorded after such a considerable delay coupled with the defence version of being result of torture, are also at bail stage considered to be the factors bringing the case within the ambit of further inquiry. Jahangir Khan v. Tanveer Hussain Shah 2015 SCR 1349 (A) NLR 1981, P.Cr.L.J 1668 &1993P.Cr.L.J 1669 rel.
  75. —Section 164—confessional statement— recorded under pressure—the statements which have been got recorded under the pressure of the police, cannot be read against the accused. Abdul Qayyum & others v. The State & others 2019 SCR 105 (F) 
  76. —Section 164—the statement recorded under section 164, when retracted by the deposer, then strong corroboration and extraordinary care is required for awarding conviction. Abdul Qayyum & others v. The State & others 2019 SCR 105 (F)
  77. —Section 164—confessional statement—must not only be voluntary but must be trust worthy too—Statement can be relied upon for recording conviction, if the same is recorded within the parameters of the principles laid down in the statutory provision. Yasmin Ashraf &others vs Abdul Rasheed Garesta &others 2018 SCR 661 (K)
  78. —Section 164—Confessional statement—appreciation of–none of the witnesses deposed that the statements under section 164, Cr. P.C. were recorded in the police custody or they were tortured by the Police— witnesses got their statements recorded before the Magistrate voluntarily— although, there are minor discrepancies but these discrepancies are not fatal for the persecution case. Yasmin Ashraf &others vs Abdul Rasheed Garesta &others 2018 SCR 661 (K)
  79. —Section 164—confession—recording of— two mandatory requirements have to be fulfilled while recording confession i.e. (i) requisite questions should be made to the accused; and (ii) after recording the statement the verification should be made at the bottom of the statement by the Magistrate. Moeen Nasim v. The state & another  2022 SCR 855 (C)
  80. —Section 164—retracted judicial confession—, retraction made from the statement cannot make the whole case doubtful— under law the retracted confessional statement is admissible in evidence if the same has been made voluntarily with free consent. Moeen Nasim v. The state & another  2022 SCR 855 (D) PLD 1995 Karachi 112 ref.
  81. — Section 164, Cr.PC—confessional statement— principle for appreciating of—Held: it is a well settled principle of law that the confessional statement must not only be voluntary but must be trustworthy too. Jahangir Khan & others v. Safia Tanveer & others 2022 SCR 1541 (J)
  82. Ss. 167 and 173 — Under section 167 it has been laid down that when any person is arrested and detained in custody and it appears that investigation cannot be completed within the period of 24 hours, fixed by section 61 and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well founded, the officer incharge of the Police Station or the police officer making the investigation if he is not below the rank of Sub-Inspector shall forthwith send to the nearest Magistrate a copy of the entry in the diary and shall at the same time forward the accused to the said Magistrate — Similarly section 173 Cr.P.C. starts with the wording that “every investigation under this chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay.” The words “without unnecessary delay” used in section 173 Cr.P.C. have clear nexus with the words “24 hours” used in section 167.— There may be the cases where because of unavoidable circumstances the police may be granted reasonable time for completion of investigation but the investigation cannot be allowed to continue for an indefinite period. Fazal-ur-Rehman v. S. M. Hanif Bukhari and others1996 SCR 145 (A)
  83. S. 169 — Courts are not bound by ipse dixit of police — The trial Court rejected the appllication filed by the appellant for summoning the accused who was given benefit of section 169 Cr.P.C. simply on the ground that it was pre-mature and after recording the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2, the question of summoning the accused-respondent would be considered. This view of the trial Court was affirmed by the Sharait Court. Held: This approach to the proposition by the trial Court and Shariat Court is wholly incorrect. The investigating agency, no doubt, is empowered to place any of the accused in column No.2 of Challan, on the basis of material collected by it, but at the same time, the requirement of law is that material should be sufficient enough for giving the benefit of section 169 Cr.P.C to an accused. The Courts of law are duty bound to apply their own judicial mind and come to a definite conclusion as to whether an accused placed in column No.2 of Challan by the police should be summoned or not for  facing the trial. The Courts are never bound by the ipse dixit of the police. From the material placed on record the Courts are always required to form their independent opinion by proper application of the judicial mind. The practice to follow the suggestions made by the police and to concur with their view blindly is always undesirable — The order recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the Shariat Court suggests that both the Courts below followed the conclusion arrived at by the Police, which is not at all in consonance with the law. Sardar Muhammad Nazir Khan v. Javed Iqbal & others 1995 SCR 378 (B)
  84. The Court is not bound by the opinion of police officer expressed by him in his report u/s 173. On the contrary the Magistrate may, by relying on material furnished in the report take cognizance of a case against the person whom the police officer believed to be innocent. Jamshed Khan and 4 others v. The State & 3 others 1999 SCR 134 (A)
  85. S. 173 — Report by police — Subsequent report — Order was passed by Tehsil Criminal Court and not by Magistrate — Case found false and concocted by Tehsil Criminal Court. Mirdad Khan v. Zahir Shah and 3 others 2000 SCR 344 (A)
  86. S. 173 — Reinvestigate of case by police — There is no bar to the reinvestigation of a case by police although they have submitted an earlier report — The police is fully competent to reinvestigate and to submit a challan on the basis of subsequent reinvestigation. Mirdad Khan v. Zahir Shah and 3 others 2000 SCR 344 (C)
  87. S. 173 — Police report — Tehsil Criminal Court concurred with the report of police but neither discharged the accused nor cancelled the challan — Police can reinvestigate the case and submit the report. Mirdad Khan v. Zahir Shah and 3 others 2000 SCR 344 (E)
  88. S.173 — Power of police to reinvestigate the case is unlimited — The Magistrate or Court not expected to blindly follow the investigation under-taken by the police as the ipsi dixit of police is never binding on a magistrate or a Court. Mirdad Khan v.Zahir Shah&others2000 SCR 344 (G)
  89. S. 173 — Trial Court’s observation that, in view of its previous order dated 26.11.1997, it could not proceed against the accused, illegal — It was enjoined upon the trial Court to look into the fresh material and to apply its judicial mind in order to proceed or not to proceed against the accused. Mirdad Khan v. Zahir Shah and 3 others 2000 SCR 344 (I)
  90. S. 173 — The police after investigation can submit a report to struck off the case — A Magistrate if agrees to the report keeping in view the investigation made on the basis of available material can dismiss the complaint. M. Rasheed v. M. Manzoor and 9 others 2003 SCR 152 (A)
  91. S. 173 — It is a settled proposition of law that the Magistrate is not bound by the report submitted by the police and he may not agree with the conclusion reached by the investigating officer. Sabir H. & others v. A. Karim & another 2004 SCR 119 (A)1997 SCR 125, PLJ 1996 SC(AJK)60 rel.
  92. S. 173 — There are expressed and implied inconsistencies between different clause of sec. 173 and sections regulating the trial under Cr.P.C besides different provisions of Islamic Penal Laws Act, 1974 — Besides implied repugnancies, the expressed repugnance is manifest between sub-section (4) of sec. 173 Cr.P.C  Sec. 214-A and 265-C of Cr.P.C. State v. Hakam Deen 2005 SCR 374 (L)
  93. S. 173 — The wisdom of legislature to introduce sub-section (5) appears to be based on decades old problem which the litigant public had faced in the Courts by hanging for indefinite period for the fate of their cases — Sub section (5) of S. 173 in fact appears to have been introduced to further the ends of justice by providing an opportunity of early disposed of cases — In Chap. XX and sub -section (5) of S. 173 has been applied and adapted in public interest which must be adhered to in letters and spirit. State through Adv. General v. Hakam Deen & others 2005 SCR 374 (AA)
  94. S. 173 — Subsequent challan — It is evidence which has to be seen while accepting or rejecting the subsequent challan or report — Held: It is in fact material or fresh material which has to be look into by the trial Court along with evidence of first report. Javaid Iqbal & 2 others v. The State 2006 SCR 339 (A)
  95. (i)         Police can reinvestigate a case and in this respect it has unlimited powers. (ii)        The Police can file supplementary Challan even if the trial in the original Challan has commenced or its trial is nearing completion. (iv)       The Magistrate can take cognizance or refuse the same after applying his judicial mind, even if the Police has reported otherwise. (v)        Once cognizance has been taken, it can be withdrawn at any time during proceeding. (vi)       It can acquit the accused at any stage of proceedings or trial.
  96. (vii)      There is no provision in the Cr.P.C. which provides filing of more than one Challan. Any supplementary Challan is nothing but an opinion of police along with some fresh material placed on record so that the trial Court may reach to definite conclusion. It is only the Court which has to venue the truth from the chaff of falsehood.(viii)    The trial Court can consider any fresh material even as a defence version, provided the same is allowed under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Javaid Iqbal & 2 others v. The State 2006 SCR 339 (C)
  97. S. 173 — Subsequent challan — The investigating agency has lawful authority to reinvestigate a case and file supplementary or altogether a new challan — A subsequent report can filed in supersession of earlier report — Police Officer can do so on his own initiative or on direction by Police Officers — There are number of judgments where a subsequent or second challan has been placed before the Court in respect of same crime — Trial Court can proceed side by side and decide the case according to the version which merits with it. M. Mushtaq and 2 others v. M. Arshad and 6 others 2008 SCR 166 (A)
  98. Sectio 173 — supplementary challan — withdrawal of earlier challan — whereas, the Court has already taken the cognizance on the earlier challan — ipsi dixit of the Police — Mere deletion of the names of two prosecution witnesses is no ground for filing subsequent challan as it is otherwise prerogative of the prosecution to examine the witness of its own choice — SHO concerned tried to dictate the Court to take the cognizance on the supplementary challan, whereas, the Court has already taken the cognizance on the earlier challan, such like practice is unwarranted under law. Held: It is settled principle of law that ipsi dixit of the police is not binding on the Courts. Further held: The earlier challan shall remain in field and the trial Court can take into consideration both, earlier and subsequent challans, and decide the case according to the version which merits with it. The application for withdrawal of earlier challan submitted by the police is rejected. Tahir Rasheed & 8 others v. The State & another 2016 SCR 1059 (C)
  99. When a report under section 173 (1) is filed by Police Officer before competent Court, the Police Officer, besides completing and complying with other formalities is obliged under sub-section (5) of section 173 to produce witnesses of the case before Magistrate — Who shall bind such witness for appearance before him or some other Court on the date fixed for trial — This obligation is on Police Officer who is Incharge of Police Station where the case is registered — The trial Court has nothing to do with it and it does not relate to trial procedure — The purpose is to satisfy and ensure that Officer Incharge does have the witnesses in support of the report he is filing in the Court and Magistrate can bind them for their appearance at the time of trial of the case by Court and nothing beyond that — This provision is analogous to section 217 Cr.P.C. State through Advocate General v. Hakam Deen & 15 others 2005 SCR 374 (C)
  100. S. 173(4) — Copy of report forwarded by Police Officer under sub-section (1) can be furnished to the accused on his application and subject to payment, unless the Magistrate for some special reasons thinks fit to furnish it free of cost — U/S 241-A  and 265-C, the documents mentioned theirin shall be supplied free of costs to the accused not later than 7 days before the commencement of the trial —  Similar are the rules of criminal trial, 1948 — These rules are binding — Repugnancies have to be kept in mind by the Courts while trying and deciding the cases. State through Advocate General v. Hakam Deen & 15 others 2005 SCR 374 (M)
  101. Provisions of section 173(5) — Finds place in chapter XIV which relates to “information to the Police and their Power to investigate.” — It begins with section 154 under which information in cognizable cases is given to the Incharge of the Police station and ends with “the enquiry by Magistrate into cause of death” — All the sections in between relate to inquiry, investigation, recording of statement by the Police — Police Officers Powers to require the attendance and examination of witnesses, powers to record confessional statement, search, arrest and release of accused diary of proceedings in investigation, report of Police Officer to the Court, report in suicide cases and inquiry by Magistrate into cause of death — No provision under this Chapter relates to procedure of trial of cases by the Court. State v. Hakam Deen & 15 others 2005 SCR 374 (A)
  102. S. 173(5) — The Magistrate is not authorized to record the statement of any such witness — He is to bind him — Whether binding authorises him to take personal or surety bond is not visualized by the provision — In absence of binding nature of action, how can the failure to appear be punished, is also not visualized. State through Adv. General v. Hakam Deen & others 2005 SCR 374 (F)
  103. Chap. XX read with S. 28 of Islamic Penal Laws (Enforcement) Act — Procedure of trial of murder cases is provided — S. 173 after insertion of sub-section 5 provides that investigation agency while filing a case in the Court has to produce the proposed witnesses and the Court is bound to fix specific dates for recording their statements so that the trial can be concluded within a reasonable time. Muhammad Mushtaq and another v. State & another 2007 SCR 479 (C)
  104. S. 173(5) — Contains that where an officer incharge of the Police Station forwards a report under sub-section (1) he shall along with the report produce the witness in the case except the public servant and the Magistrate shall bind the witness for appearance before him or some other Court on the date fixed for trial — It is not mandatory to summon the witnesses — The basic object of issuing of summons is to procure the attendance of the witnesses — The statement of the witness was recorded who was present in Court in some other case — No provision of law has been violated — The conduct of trial Court is applicable — The present appeals are just a subterfuge for prolonging the litigation. Asia Begum v. Shahzab & another 2008 SCR 390 (A)
  105. S. 173 — Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 353, 186, 337-A, 337-F & 506 — Azad and Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), S.42 — Assault or criminal force to deter public servant in discharging public function; causing Shajjah and Ghayar Jaifah and criminal intimidation — Police report — Scope — Case was registered against appellant/accused and Police after necessary investigation submitted report under S.173,Cr.P.C. for cancellation of the case — Tehsil Criminal Court, while disagreeing with the opinion of the Police, summoned the accused and fixed the date of hearing — Appellant/accused challenged said order of the Tehsil Criminal Court by way of filing revision petition which was dismissed — Validity — Police under S. 173,Cr.P.C. after investigation, had to submit the report in the Court of competent jurisdiction — Police had no jurisdiction to hold a person innocent or guilty — Only the Court had the jurisdiction to declare a person innocent or guilty of the offence — Court was not bound by the ipse dixit of the Police — Before passing an order on the report of Police, the Magistrate had to examine the record and from the opinion, whether the Police report was correct; and the request of Police for cancellation of the case, was genuine or not — If the Magistrate would reach to the conclusion after perusal of the record that the Police had reached to the correct conclusion after investigation that the case was false, then he had to cancel the case — If however, the Magistrate would reach to the conclusion that accused appeared to be connected with the crime; and there was sufficient material for trial of the case, then he would summon accused for trial — Courts were not bound by the opinion of the Police, but it had to form its independent opinion on the basis of material brought before it — Tehsil Criminal Court, was not bound by the report submitted before it by the Police, had correctly issued process for summoning the accused for trial. Tahir Mahmood v. State 2012 SCR 1
  106. S. 173 — 190 — Magistrate is not bound by the report submitted by the police — Magistrate may not agree with conclusion of investigating officer — Cognizance of case by Magistrate u/s (B) in spite of police report. M. Yunus and another v. Malik M. Nawaz and others 1997 SCR 125 (A)
  107. —Section 174—intent and purpose of— three eventualities are provided under the provision for investigation—the officer-in-charge of a police station or some other police-officer specially empowered so, on receiving information that a person (i) has committed suicide, (ii) has been killed by another, or by an animal, or by machinery, or by an accident, or (iii) has died under the circumstances raising a reasonable suspicion that some other person has committed an offence, shall immediately give intimation thereof to the nearest Magistrate empowered to hold inquest. Muhammad Nazir vs Justice of Peace & others 2018 SCR 273 (A)
  108. —S.174—purpose and intent—the purpose of investigation under this section is only to ensure that no offence has been committed in connection with the death of a person when the cause of death is unknown. Muhammad Nazir vs Justice of Peace & others 2018 SCR 273 (A)
  109. —Section 174, Cr.PC—Inquest report—column No.12— murder case—Type of arm not specifically mentioned, only “Fire Arm Weapon” is mentioned—violation of mandatory provision of section 174—the weapon mentioned in FIR and recovered was ‘Kalashnikov’, but in column No. 12 of inquest report, only “Fire Arm Weapon” was mentioned—Held: violation of mandatory provisions of section 174, Cr.PC. Mere mentioning of “Fire Arm Weapon” instead of specifically mentioning “kalashnikov” in the inquest report is indicative of fact that at time of preparing the inquest report, this fact was not known the eyewitnesses that which weapon was used during the occurrence, it also falsifies the story of alleged eye witness and supports the version of the defense that the FIR has been registered after due deliberation at belated stage. Malik Zaffar v. Rashid Hussain Shah & others 2022 SCR 1489 (E) 1971 P.Cr. LJ 257 rel.
  110. –Ss. 174 and 176—intent and purpose of inquiry/investigation—the purpose of investigation u/s 174 inquiry or u/s 176 into the course of death— only to ensure that no offence had been committed in connection with the death of a person and such investigation/inquiry cannot be carried out for the purpose to determine the crime weapon used in commission of offence or seat of injuries —the inquiry/investigation on can only be allowed if the cause of death is shrouded in mystery. Muhammad Nazir vs Justice of Peace & others 2018 SCR 273 (A)
  111. Section 197, Cr.P.C and section 132, Cr.P.C — provisions — repugnancy to Islam — the provisions of section 197,Cr.P.C which provide protection to the Judges and public servants against prosecution, have been declared against the injunctions of Islam by the Federal Shariat Court in the case reported  as PLD 1989 FSC 84 and the judgment of Federal Shariat Court is affirmed by the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case  reported as  PLD 1992 SC 72 — the provisions of section 132, Cr.P.C., wherein the protection has been provided to the Magistrate or officer-in-charge of the Police Station against prosecution are analogous to section 197, Cr.P.C which provide protection against prosecution without prior sanction of the Government — the Court while fully endorsing the view formed by the Courts in the cases PLD 1989 FSC 84 and PLD 1992 SC 72, advised the Government to bring suitable amendment in sections 132 and 197, Cr.P.C. Kh. M. Naheem & 4 others v. Justice of Piece & 5 others 2014 SCR 1049 (F & G)
  112. Section 202 — scope of — under section 202, the Magistrate is empowered to satisfy himself before issuing process to the accused to hold an inquiry for the purpose to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the complaint — For the said purpose, he has to scrutinize the contents of the complaint, the nature of the allegation and the material in support of the accusation, so that the accused nominated in the complaint may not be victimized or unduly harassed. The main purpose of section is to find out the truth of the allegations made in the complaint M. Mumtaz v. A. Rehman & 5 others 2016 SCR 140 (B) 2000 SCMR 1904 ref.
  113. S. 204 — Warrant or summons issuance of — Trial Court had discretion to issue either warrant or summons in warrant cases — Normally discretion cannot be interfered with. Rangeel Ahmed Butt v. Zooni and 5 others 1998 SCR 18 (A)
  114. S. 205 — Deals with exemptions for initial appearance and not during trial while section 540-A was enacted to meet the legal necessity of exemption of personal attendance during the inquiry or trial where two or more accused or before the Court — If there are sufficient reasons to be recorded that anyone or more of such accused is or are incapable of remaining before the Court, if such accused is represented by a Pleader, the Court can dispense with his attendance and proceed with such inquiry or trial in absence — S.353 provides that all evidence shall be taken in presence of the accused unless the personal attendance is dispensed with — The provisions of law by implication empowers the Court to dispense with personal appearance  of the accused — The Court while granting such exemptions has to apply its mind and pass an order keeping in view the facts and circumstances involved. Muhammad Ashraf v. The State 2003 SCR 506 (A)
  115. Ss. 205, 353, 540-A — Personal attendance can be dispensed with in suitable cases — There is no restriction on the Court that personal attendance can be dispensed with only if the accused appears before the Court. Muhammad Ashraf v. The State 2003 SCR 506 (B)
  116. The provision in committal proceedings was nicely acted upon as all other provisions spreading from sections 206 to 220 were compatible with it — The statements of the witnesses were recorded by Magistrate  — If a case triable by Sessions Judge was made out, the accused was charged and committed, and if not, he was discharged — In case of charge, the Magistrate used to get bond executed only from those witnesses whom he deemed necessary, not every one. State through Advocate General v. Hakam Deen & 15 others 2005 SCR 374 (E)
  117. S. 217-A difficulty was felt that witnesses do not appear at trial as used to be during committal proceedings — So this provision was introduced without making necessary amendments in other corresponding provisions of the Code — It caused difficulties causing more harm to parties  particularly to witnesses — Witnesses were subjected to agony of being dragged thrice — Once before Investigating Officer u/s 161, Cr.P.C. then before the Magistrate u/s 173 and then appearing for evidence before trial Court — It deterred the witnesses to forth come — Hence, its application became practically impossible — Thus it was never acted upon and in spite of being on the statute book, it is practically a redundant provision. State through Adv. General v. Hakam Deen & 15 others 2005 SCR 374 (D)
  118. S. 242 — The formal charge was put to the accused-persons u/s 242 Cr.P.C. to know whether they admit the charge or deny it — The accused respondents do not feel that they have been prejudiced by putting the charge to them u/s 242 Cr.P.C. — The complainant has challenged this part of proceedings conducted by the trial Court without any lawful justification — Held: That the learned Chief Justice of the Shariat Court was justified in dismissing the revision petition whereby recording of statements by the trial Court u/s 242 Cr.P.C. was challenged. Riasat Hussain v. The State and 2 others 2003 SCR 117 (B)
  119. S. 242 — If the proceedings conducting under this section are not framed according to the farmate — its effect — one of the requirements while conducting the proceedings under S. 242, Cr.P.C., is to provide an opportunity to the accused to state as to whether he wants to say anything in defence against him, and he is not at liberty to take any plea which he likes. Held: The main object of this proceeding is commencement of the trial of the accused. Further held: As the basic object is fulfilled and if the same is not framed according to the formate no prejudice is caused to any party. Further held: The statements recorded under section 242, Cr.P.C. in this case are not fatal and the trial could not be vitiated on the ground of technicalities. Ali Muhammad & another v. Guftar & 3 others 2014 SCR 1625 (A) PLD 1993 Lah 459.  rel.
  120. Section 242 — main object of — The main object of the proceedings prescribed under supra section is to determine whether; the accused pleads guilty to the charge or demands to be tried — This provision provides an opportunity to the accused to state anything in his defence and give explanation to the charge framed against him. Ch. M. Rafique v. Rehmat Ali 2015 SCR 485 (A)
  121. Section 242 — Requirements in framing the change — one of the requirement — is to bring the nature of charge — after framing the charge an opportunity is provided to the accused to set anything in his defence and he is at liberty to take any plea which he opts. Held: The main requirement in framing the charge is that the accused must know about the charge under which he has to face the trial. Another requirement of the above said section is to reduce in writing the statement of the accused in the words which he has stated. Ch. M. Rafique v. Rehmat Ali & another 2015 SCR 485 (B)
  122. Section 242 — statement recorded under section 242 — accused pleads guilty voluntarily — its effect Held: Court can act upon the same and convict him without recording the prosecution evidence. Ch. M. Rafique v. Rehmat Ali & another 2015 SCR 485 (C) PLJ 1978 Cr.C 74  rel.
  123. Ss. 242 & 537 Cr.P.C. — Section 242 is mandatory provision — its non-compliance has rendered the whole proceedings as nullity — departure from the mandatory provision of procedure occasions prejudice and injustice to the accused — Held: the omission would not be curable under section 537 Cr.P.C. Muhammad Rafique v. Aurangzeb & another 2015 SCR 974 (C)
  124. Redundancy apparent — Witnesses are to be produced before the trial Court “when the accused does not plead guilty or the Court in its discretion does not convict him on his plea,” u/ss. 244 or 265-F of Cr.P.C, — irrespective of the fact whether the witnesses are produced before the Magistrate and he binds them or not u/s 173(5) Cr.P.C — Moreover, if the accused is not charged, question of production of witnesses does not arise whether Magistrate binds them or not. State through Advocate General v. Hakam Deen & 15 others 2005 SCR 374 (G)
  125. S. 249-A Cr.P.C. was made part of Cr.P.C. to authorise a Magistrate to acquit an accused person at any stage if the charge is groundless. Sher Alam  v. The State and others 1998 SCR 331 (B)
  126. S. 249-A — The trial Court was not justified in law to invoke the power u/s 249-A to pass order of acquittal in favour of the accused merely on the ground that co-accused has paid Rs. 400,000/- as ‘Diyyat’ to the legal descendants of the deceased. M. Siddique v. M. Ghafoor 2003 SCR 282 (A)
  127. S. 249-A — Is not designed for quashment of proceedings where the challenge is made on the basis that the charge is groundless on merits — This section is enabling provision giving power to Magistrate/Tehsil Court of Criminal Jurisdictional after hearing prosecution and accused to give finding that charge is groundless or that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence — Where Court is reasonably convicted that a criminal charge could not be sustained, going on trial is not necessary but charge could not be said to be groundless within the meaning of section 249-A if reasonable opportunity is not provided to prove the allegations — Recording of prosecution evidence is not a condition precedent for acquitting an accused u/s 249-A Cr.P.C. — A Magistrate may deal with an application any time irrespective of fact whether the charge has been framed or not — Nothing will prevent the Magistrate where a charge has not been framed or where a charge has been framed but no material evidence recorded from acquitting the accused, if he considers that there is no prima facie case against the accused — If material produced before the Court involved appreciation of appraisal by the Court and its truth could not be tested unless it was brought on record and was subjected to cross-examination, in that case question of acquitting accused before framing of charge or recording of evidence would not arise. Saeed Ahmed v. The State 2003 SCR 314 (A)
  128. Section 249-A — purpose and scope — section was enacted to ensure the speedy trial of the criminal cases and to save the people from agony of the trial. The Magistrate is fully competent to pass the acquittal order while assigning reasons where the charge is groundless and there is no possibility of conviction.  M. Ismaeel Khan v. Sajaad Hussain & 14 others 2014 SCR 442 (A)
  129. S. 249-A, Cr.P.C. — application for acquittal of accused — for exercise of powers recording of evidence is not necessary — trial Court can acquit the accused at any stage even if charges are not framed.  No legal bar or requirement that application can only be moved after recording of evidence. Words ‘at any stage’ denote that application can be filed even after prosecution evidence has been recorded or while exercise of recoding of evidence is going or when exercise is over. Muhammad Ismaeel Khan v. Sajaad Hussain & 14 others 2014 SCR 442 (B)
  130. S. 249-A, Cr.P.C. — the power under this section can be exercised at any stage during the pendency of trial which initiates after submission of report under section 173, Cr.P.C. Muhammad Ismaeel Khan v. Sajaad Hussain & 14 others 2014 SCR 442 (C)
  131. S. 249-A — power of the Court to acquit any accused at any stage of the proceedings — Held: It is settled principle of law that under Section 249-A, the Court has ample power to acquit any accused at any stage of the proceedings. It does not impose any clog or bar on recording the evidence or framing of the charge — Further held: these powers are subject to some conditions and without fulfilling the conditions, an order of acquittal cannot be passed, while exercising powers under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. M. Asif Siddique v. A. Hamid & others 2014 SCR 867 (A)
  132. S. 249-A — the word “at any stage” used in this section denotes the wisdom of the legislature to — save the innocent people from agony of trial — Held: if at any stage of the trial, the Court comes to the conclusion that the charge is groundless and there is no possibility of conviction of the accused, then the evil should be nipped in the bud even prior to framing of the charge and proceedings against the accused ordered to be dropped.  It can either be at initial stage, after taking cognizance or middle stage, after recording some proceeding or even at later stage. Muhammad Asif Siddique v. Abdul Hamid and 7 others 2014 SCR 867 (B)
  133. S. 249-A — the application u/s 249-A can be moved at any stage and no impediment exists in the way of trial Court to acquit the accused, however, these powers are guided by law and the trial Court while passing the order under the said provision has to adhere the same. Muhammad Asif Siddique v. Abdul Hamid and 7 others 2014 SCR 867 (C)
  134. S. 249-A — the trial Court has power to acquit the accused at any stage of the proceeding, however, before passing such order, it has to form the opinion on the basis of the material available, i.e. ,i)          FIR,ii)         Statements of witnesses recorded u/s 161, Cr.P.C., iii)        Medico-legal reports, and; iv)        Recoveries etc. Where there was no probability of conviction of the accused and the Court satisfied on the basis of the material referred to above that a charge as groundless then it can pass the acquittal order of an accused after recording the reasons with speaking order u/s 249-A. Muhammad Asif Siddique v. Abdul Hamid and 7 others 2014 SCR 867 (D)
  135. S. 249-A — acquittal order without looking into material brought on record by the prosecution and without adopting the proper procedure for acquitting the trial is illegal and is liable to be set aside. Muhammad Asif Siddique v. Abdul Hamid and 7 others 2014 SCR 867 (F) 2000 MLD 220 rel.
  136. S. 249-A — the acquittal order u/s 249-A can only be passed after recording the reasons and discussing the factual material which is the part of the record. Muhammad Asif Siddique v. Abdul Hamid and 7 others  2014 SCR 867 (H) NLR 1983 Cr.L.J. 363 &1988 P.Cr.L.J. 1071 ref.
  137. S. 249-A — power of the trial Court — the powers u/s 249-A, can only be exercised by the trial Court in aid of justice and such powers had to be exercised with due care ad caution and in case there was possibility of receipt of evidence sufficient to warrant conviction, then the power was not to be exercised merely on artificial presumption. M. Asif Siddique v. A.Hamid 2014 SCR 867 (I)
  138. S. 249-A — the trial Court has acted in careless manner and the order of the acquittal has been passed without examining the material and adopting the coercive method in procure the attendance of the witnesses — held: the Presiding Officer/trial Court has to explain his conduct. Muhammad Asif Siddique v. Abdul Hamid and 7 others 2014 SCR 867 (J)
  139. —Section 249-A—acquittal—subsequent challan —challan presented in the Court —a number of witnesses cited in the calendar of witnesses—In such state of affairs, the justice demands that the evidence should be examined and evaluated by the Court concerned. Muhammad Ayub v.State & others  2019 SCR 162 (B)
  140. — Section 249-A—APC—sections 327, 327 & 34—acquittal of —plea of alibi—accused attributed specific role—trial court misread the evidence—moreover the people of locality submitted affidavits with regard to plea of alibi but the executor of the affidavits were not produced as witness—if they had filed affidavits, the accused should have produced them before Court as a witness for getting their statement recorded in defence—High Court rightly set aside order of acquittal. Sheikh Aslam Versus Gul Ejaz Ahmed & another 2021 SCR  669 (A & B)
  141. —Section 249-A—Scope and object of— this provision of  criminal law is an exception to the normal course of proceedings— the trial Court can acquit the accused at any stage of the proceedings—the intent behind the provision is to provide speedy remedy to the accused and to spare the offender rigors of full trial if  Court finds that the charge is groundless and prosecution is not likely to succeed— the powers under this provision of law should be exercised in a judicious manner— the trial Court cannot acquit the accused  in a slipshod manner. Mumtaz Ali Khaksar & others v. Muhammad Farooq 2022 SCR 132 (A)
  142. —Section 249-A—scope of — the Court has got ample powers u/s 249-A to acquit any accused at any stage of the proceedings— even there is no bar on recording the evidence or framing of charge–if at any stage of trial, the Court comes to the conclusion that the charge is groundless and there is no possibility of conviction then the accused can be acquitted. Arshad Iqbal v. Muhammad Azad Khan &others 2022 SCR 560 (A)
  143. —section 249-A and section 561— scope and import of section explained —- quashing of proceedings — prompt remedy and relief to avoid unfounded charges at any stage of trial— Upon examining the statutory provision (ibid), it is evident that every Court, whether civil or criminal, possesses inherent powers to administer complete justice in the absence of an express provision in the procedural law governing its operations. The section 249-A, Cr.PC merely reinforces this principle. With this provision, the accused now has a prompt recourse in the original jurisdiction to seek immediate relief from unfounded charges, without having to pursue the same remedy under section 561-A Cr.P.C, which is exclusively available with the High Court and may require travel to a distant locale for redressal. This section deviates from the norm that acquittal follows a full trial. It represents a compromise between the societal interest and the rights of the individual offender. The objective is to spare the offender the rigors of a full trial if the Court determines, at any stage, that the charge lacks merit and the prosecution is unlikely to succeed. Moreover, the phrase “at any stage” used in section 249-A Cr.PC does not hinge on the recording of prosecution evidence. A party can seek acquittal at any point during the proceedings, and there is no legal impediment or requirement that the application for acquittal must be made only after the evidence of all witnesses has been recorded. Instead, the phrase “at any stage” signifies that the application under section 249-A Cr.PC can be lodged even while evidence is being recorded. The State vs Khalid Hussain Rathore & 10 others 2024 SCR313 (O) 1985 SCMR 257, [1985 PSC 143], [PLJ 1984 Cr.PC 22] ref.  
  144. Ss. 265-A to 265-H, 241 to 247 — Provide a detailed and self-explanatory procedure for just and fair trial, are mandatory in nature and have to be complied with in letters and spirit and any breach thereof vitiates the trial. Hakam Deen v. State & others 2005 SCR 314 (S), 2006 SCR 120 (R)
  145. Ss. 265-B, 265-C — The obligation of the Court in both the sections is couched by the word “shall” for observing procedure, supplying the copies and commencing the trial “not later than 7 days before commencement of the trial”. — It is incumbent and mandatory for the Court to strictly follow the procedure laid down for trial of cases — The stage of charge would arise only when the copies are supplied to the accused in accordance with the provisions — The proceedings for trial of the accused after framing the charge can commence only when the Court is satisfied after perusing the Police report and all other documents — The charge shall be read over and explained to the accused. Hakam Deen v. State & 16 others 2005 SCR 314 (C)
  146. S. 265-C — The first step which the Court is to take in a case instituted upon the Police report is to furnish the copies of the documents. Hakam Deen v. State & 16 others 2005 SCR 314 (B)
  147. S. 265-C — Provisions of S.265-C which are similar to the other provisions of the Chapter, so far as the right of the accused is concerned, are mandatory and any violation thereof vitiates the trial. Held: Argument that no prejudice is caused to accused, dispelled. Hakam Deen v. State & 16 others 2005 SCR 314 (I)
  148. S. 265-C — The first step which the Court is to take in a case instituted upon the Police report is to furnish the copies of the documents filed with Police report. Hakam Deen v. State and 15 others 2006 SCR 120 (B)
  149. The production of evidence by prosecution is a step after the statement of accused charging him with the offence, is recorded — Unless the statement of accused under section 265-D or 242, Cr.P.C. is recorded, the evidence of prosecution cannot be called — If the prosecution is ordered to produce the evidence even before recording the statement of accused and charging him, it would definitely mean that Court is predetermined  to convict him, and he is presumed to be guilty — As against the presumption of innocence and  the Court is set to follow a procedure of its own choice, not that which is ordained by law — The question of calling of evidence of prosecution would not arise at all if after examining the accused the Court is of the opinion that there is no ground for proceeding with trial of accused — If the Court on the plea of his pleading guilty convicts the accused, the evidence of prosecution in that case also would not be required if the Court is satisfied by admission of accused. Hakam Deen v. State and 15 others 2006 SCR 120 (F)
  150. S. 265- E (2) — If accused pleads guilty, the Court shall record the plea and may convict the accused thereon — However, the Court is not bound or obliged to convict the accused even if he pleads guilty — It is discretionary with a Court to convict him or not on this plea as the words used “and may in its discretion convict him thereon” are clear enough to suggest that it is the discretion of the Court. Hakam Deen v. State & 16 others 2005 SCR 314 (D)
  151. Chapter XX or XXII-A — Ensures a fair trial not only for the accused but also to the prosecution as well as for complainant — The provisions have dispelled the age old impression that the accused is special child of law — The Court is given a discretion under sub-section 2 of S.265-F to summon any person who appears to the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case and able to give evidence for prosecution — The regulatory provisions are not for the accused only but for the prosecution and complainant as well — These ensures that justice should be done between all the parties before the Court — The right of all the parties for fair trial is ensured — Any departure from any of the provisions would imbalance the system and prejudice any of the parties — Non-observance or breach of any of the provisions itself amounts to prejudice the interest of the party who complains of its non-compliance. Hakam Deen v. State & 16 others 2005 SCR 314 (H)
  152. Notwithstanding the duty of Prosecutor to produce the evidence in support of the case, the trial Court is duty bound to summon any person likely to be acquainted with the facts of the case to give evidence for the prosecution under sub-section (2) of S. 265-F whether he is cited by the police as a witness or not.  State through Adv. General v. Hakam Deen & 15 others 2005 SCR 374 (H)
  153. Chapter XX or XXII-A of Cr.P.C. ensures a fair trial not only for the accused but also to the prosecution as well as for complainant — The provisions in Chapters have dispelled the age old impression that the accused is the special child of law — The Court is given a discretion under sub-section (2) of section 265-F to summon any person who appears to the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case and able to give evidence for the prosecution — These ensure that justice should be done between all the parties before Court i.e. the complainant, who moved the machinery of law, the investigating agency who conducted the investigation, the prosecution who conducts the prosecution and the accused who is the ultimate sufferer or winner, as the case may be — Any departure from any of the provisions would imbalance the system and prejudice any of the parties — Non-observance or breach of any of the provisions itself amounts to prejudice the interest of the party who complains of its non-compliance. Hakam Deen v. State and others 2006 SCR 120 (H)
  154. —Sections 265-F and 540—Scope of—trial Court ordered for correction in the name of eye witnesses and summoning it—order challenged— on appeal this Court:- held: —The legislature has vested the trial Court with vast powers to meet suck like eventualities under section 265-F, Cr.P.C. For proper appreciation, sub-section (2) of said section is reproduced as under: (2) The Court shall ascertain from the Public Prosecutor or, as the case may be, from the complainant the names of any persons likely to be acquainted with the facts of the case and to be able to give evidence for the prosecution, and shall summon such persons to give evidence before it.”        Expressly, the trial Court is empowered to determine and ascertain the names of persons who are acquainted with the facts of the occurrence. Same like, under the provisions of section 540, Cr.P.C. the Court is also vested with the powers to summon any person as witness if its evidence appears to be essential for just decision of the case, at any stage of the trial or proceedings. The order of the trial Court is well reasoned and speaking one. The powers vested in the trial Court under the above referred statutory provisions to ascertain the names of the person acquainted with the facts of the case or to summon any person, are of such wider scope that the Court while exercising the same may accept such like applications and order for summoning of any person as witness. The word “any person” does not confine to a person included in the report under section 173, Cr.P.C. Imran Ishaq v. The State & another 2017 SCR 672
  155. S. 265-F(1) — “If accused does not plead guilty or where the Court does not convict him on his pleading guilty, the Court shall proceed to hear the complainant, if any, and take all such evidence as may be prescribed in support of the prosecution”. Hakam Deen v. State 2005 SCR 314 (E)
  156. S. 265-F(2) — The Court is at liberty “to call any person likely to be acquainted with the facts of the case and to be able to give evidence for prosecution if the Court deems fit after ascertaining it from the Public Prosecution or the complainant”. — The Court is not bound to record the statement of only those witnesses who are listed in the calendar of witnesses but to arrive at a just conclusion, the Court can go beyond that — However, it has to ascertain the same from the Public Prosecutor or complainant, that summoning of any such witness does not cause delay or defeat the ends of justice.  Hakam Deen v. State & 16 others 2005 SCR 314 (E)
  157. Ss. 265-B, 265-C — Reveal that the obligation of the Court in both the sections is couched by word “shall” for observing the procedure, supplying the copies and commencing the trial “not later than 7 days before the commencement of the trial” — The words do not accept any ambiguity that it is incumbent and mandatory for the Court to strictly follow the procedure laid down for trial of the cases —The stage of charge under sections 265-D and  265-E would arise only when copies are supplied to the accused — The proceedings for trial of accused after framing the charge can commence only when the Court is satisfied after perusing the police report and all other documents that a ground is made out for proceeding against the accused — The charge shall be read over and explained to the accused under section 265-E. Hakam Deen v. State and others2006 SCR120 (C)
  158. S. 265-E — If the accused pleads guilty, the Court shall record the plea and may convict the accused thereon — However, the Court is not bound or obliged to convict the accused even if he pleads guilty — It is discretionary with a Court to convict him or not on this plea as the words used “and may in its discretion convict him thereon” are clear enough to suggest that it is the discretion of the Court. Hakam Deen v. State and 15 others 2006 SCR 120 (D)
  159. S. 265-F(1) — If the accused does not plead guilty or where the Court does not convict him on his pleading guilty, the Court shall proceed to hear the complainant, if any, and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution under sub-section (2) of Section 265-F, the Court is at liberty “to call any person likely to be acquainted with the facts of the case and to be able to give evidence for prosecution, if the Court deems fit after ascertaining it from Public Prosecutor or the complainant” — The Court is not bound to record the statements of only those witnesses who are listed in the Calendar of witnesses — But to arrive at a just conclusion, the Court can go beyond that — However, it has to ascertain the same from the Public Prosecutor or the complainant, as the case may be, subject to general provisions that summoning of any such witness does not cause delay or defeat the ends of justice. Hakam Deen v. State and 15 others 2006 SCR 120 (E)
  160. S. 265-K — Words ‘at any stage’ — The power to acquit the accused can be exercised by the trial Court even before the charge is framed against him and also without hearing the complainant or other side. Muhammad Yaseen v. Doctor Zafar Iqbal and 3 others 2004 SCR 338 (B)
  161. Section 265-K, Cr.P.C. empowers the Court to acquit an accused at any stage of the proceedings irrespective of the fact whether evidence has been recorded or not — Even an accused can be acquitted by the Court under section 265-K Cr.P.C. before framing the charge. Held: The words “at any stage” means time from the day when the report under section 173 Cr.P.C. is submitted before the Court. Further held: The Court has powers to acquit the accused at any stage of the case on the application of an accused and after hearing the prosecutor and the accused by recording reasons if considers that there is no probability of the accused being convicted for any offence. M. Munir Awan v. Ehtesab Bureau 2011 SCR 407 (A,B)1993 SCMR 523, 2004P.Cr.LJ. 1071rel.
  162. Section 265-K Cr.P.C. — If the Court reaches to the ultimate conclusion that if the whole evidence is recorded then too there is no likelihood of the accused being convicted, than the Court may acquit the accused at any stage of the proceedings. M. Munir Awan v. Ehtesab Bureau 2011 SCR 407 (C)
  163. Section 265-K, Cr.P.C — empowers the Court to acquit an accused person at any stage of the proceedings, if the Court is of the opinion that if all the evidence, which is proposed to be produced by the prosecution, is admitted as correct then too, there is no chance of conviction of the accused for the offence he is charged with. Kh. Zia Ahmed v. AJ&K Ehtesab Bureau 2015 SCR 681 (C)
  164. دفعہ   323۔۔۔مقدا ر دیت۔۔۔سزائے        دیت۔۔۔دیت ک کم ا ز کم     حد   مقرر ہے۔۔ ۔مقرر   شدہ      حد        سے زیادہ ک سزا کا    تعی عدالت ک صوابدید       پ ہے۔۔۔جو ملزم ا و          ر ورثاء فریقین ک مالی مدد             ک مدنظر ر        ک کر کیا جائے گا۔۔۔سز  اکے  تعی کے لئے چاند ی  ک معیار بنایا گیا ہے  ج ک ادائیگی بصور ت مالیت چاند ی  تعی سے ہوتی ہے۔۔۔حکومت ک ذ  مہدا ر ی ہے کہ و ہ  ہ سا ل یکم جولائی یا دیگر کسی مناسب تاریخ  ک بذریعہ مشتہرگی نوٹیفکیشن د ر سرکار ی گزٹ چا ند ی کے نرخ کا  تعی کرے۔۔۔دفعہ 323 ک رو  سے سزائے د یت قطعی  متعی نہ  ہے بلکہ  حتم  تعی کا معاملہ عدالتی صوابد  ید پہے۔)صفحہ Masood Ahmed v. Riasat & 6 others 2020 SCR 146 ( ب
  165. دفعہ 323۔۔۔سزائے دیت۔۔۔ اطلاق۔۔۔قرا ر دیا گیا کہ معاملہ ہذا میں ج سال سزا دیت د ی گئ۔۔۔اس سال رائج چاند  یکے نرخ کے مطابق ہی دیت ک مالیت کا  تعی کیا جائے گا۔۔۔)صفحات Masood Ahmed v. Riasat & 6 others 2020 SCR 146
  166.  ( دS. 340(2) — If at all statements of the accused persons have not been recorded under section 340(2) Cr.P.C. no prejudice has been caused to the accused — When their statements under section 342 Cr.P.C. were recorded then they were asked to lead any evidence in defence they can do so. Nanni Sultana v. Tanveer Ahmad & another 2007 SCR 317 (D)
  167. S.340 (2) — contention of the convict-appellant was that, right of defence was not provided to the convict-appellant as he was not given the option to get his statement recorded under section 340 (2), Cr.P.C. —Held: There is no requirement of law to specifically mention the relevant provision, i.e., 340 (2), Cr.P.C while examining the accused under section 342, Cr.P.C. Muhammad Babar v. State through Advocate General 2014 SCR 1585 (F) 2007 SCR 317 rel.
  168. Ss. 340(2) and 342(4), Cr.P.C. and S.28, I.P.L., 1974 — S.342(4) contained that no oath shall be administered to the accused — There was no restriction on administration of oath to accused —Subsequently Islami Tazirati Qawanin Nifaz Act, 1974 was enacted in AJ&K — For the first time a power was given to the Court to record statement of accused on oath — It was entirely the discretion of Court to record the statement of an accused on oath — The Court was also authorised to use this statement against the  accused — S. 28 I.P.L. clearly lays down that the entire power was given to the Court — Subsequently when S. 340(2) was enacted a right was given to accused person to record his statement on oath —  Prior to it was entirely the prerogative of the Court to record the statement of accused on oath or not — While recording the statement under section 342 Cr.P.C., the Court asks the accused whether he wants to adduce any evidence in defence, then the requirement of S. 340(2) Cr.P.C. stands fulfilled — It is entirely upto the accused person to state on oath or not. M. Khurshid Khan v. M. Basharat & another 2007 SCR 1 (N)
  169. S. 342 — Non compliance with the provisions of section 342 Cr.P.C. is fatal and renders the trial illegal. In the statement under section 342 Cr.P.C. one of the accused respondents was asked a question which has never been the case of the appellant and was not asked the question which ought to have been asked — The failure to ask the questions according to the evidence renders the conclusion of the trial Court un-reasonable and illegal. M. Sadiq v. R. M. Nasim 1996 SCR 215 (E)
  170. S. 342 — Question of guilt or innocence of the accused-appellant cannot be decided without giving him an opportunity to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him as deposed by the prosecution witnesses — Neither the trial Court nor the Shariat Court considered the grave illegalities in the examination of the accused under section 342 Cr.P.C. while passing the conviction and sentences of the accused. Muhammad Aslam v. The State 2002 SCR 244 (A)
  171. S. 342 — Examination — Motive — proof of — If a piece of evidence is not put to an accused in his examination either the case may be remanded for re-examination or the same may be excluded from consideration — Instead of remanding the case it is excluded from consideration in this case. Abdul Rashid and 3 others v. Abdul Ghaffar and 5 others 2001 SCR 240 (B)
  172. S. 342 — Provisions are mandatory in nature and if the incriminating material is not put to accused u/s 342 Cr.P.C. the same cannot be read against the accused; in such an eventuality either that piece of evidence is to be excluded from consideration or the case is to be remanded to the trial Court for re-examining the accused. Fazal Ellahi v. Muhammad Yaqub and 17 others 2003 SCR 234 (A)
  173. S. 342 — All the possible material brought on record in evidence against the accused persons should be put to them for their explanation — They should not be left to guess the material which can be made basis for convicting them — Mere putting of general type of questions is not sufficient as provisions of section 342 Cr.P.C. are mandatory — Omission of any material question putting to accused vitiated the trial. Nuzhat Bibi v. Shabbir Hussain & 2 others 2006 SCR 58 (A)
  174. S. 342 Cr. P.C. — When statement of appellant was recorded under section 342 he did not produce any evidence in defence, even he did not state before the Court that his statement may be recorded on oath, therefore, the requirements of section 340(2) have been fulfilled. Muhammad Khurshid Khan v. Muhammad Basharat & another 2007 SCR 1 (P)
  175. S. 342 — Contention that after recording statement of accused-respondent under S. 342, Cr.P.C., a stamp was affixed while it was enjoined upon the trial Court to record its note has no substance — The stamp contained the same wording which were to be recorded by the trial Court in its note — It shall make no difference. M. Khurshid Khan v. M. Basharat & another 2007 SCR 1 (V)
  176. Section 342 — Incriminating material — not put to the accused — effect of — Held: according to the celebrated principle of law, any incriminating piece of evidence which has not been put to an accused for explanation cannot be read against him for passing the conviction order. Imran Khan & another v. Sarfraz alias Pallo & 3 others 2014 SCR 1564 (D)
  177. S. 342 — If recording of the statements are against the spirit of the provision 342, Cr.P.C. — its effect —  This section is based on the principle involved in the maxim, Audi Altram Partam,i.e., no one should be condemned un heard. This section gives a valuable right to the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances in the prosecution evidence appearing against him and while providing him the full chance to offer his defence to establish his innocence, such right cannot be denied. Held:  The recording of the statements against the spirit of the provision of section 342, Cr.P.C., amounts to denied from the right of defence available to the accused which is against the principles of natural justice. Ali M. v. Guftar & others 2014 SCR 1625 (B) 2001 SCR 286 rel.
  178. S. 342 — its requirement — The requirement of this section is that each piece of evidence and the circumstance having an incriminating affect against the accused in relation to offence, examined under section 342, Cr.P.C., Held: For doing the needful a fair opportunity must be provided to accused and his attention must be drawn towards each and every incriminating material to enable him to explain the same. Ali M. v. Guftar & 3 others 2014 SCR 1625 (C) 2001 SCR 240 rel.
  179. S. 342 — If the statement under section 342, Cr.P.C is not recorded in accordance with law — The same is deviation from the said provision — This situation has also been conceded by the complainant — In these circumstances, — no other option except to remand the case to the trial court for re-examination of the accused. Ali M. & another v. Guftar & 3 others 2014 SCR 1625 (D) 2014MLD 44 and 2003 SCR 234 rel.
  180. —Section 342— incriminating pieces of evidence are required to be put to the accused u/s 342 Cr. P.C.—, if same cannot be used against him. Muhammad Younas  v. The State & others 2019 SCR 149 (B)
  181. —Section 342—scope and purpose of— basic theme of recording of statement u/s  342, Cr.P.C., is based on principle of audi alteram partem—the accused should be heard not only what is prima facie proved against him but on every circumstance appearing in evidence against him—however, as the statement of an accused recorded u/s 342,Cr.P.C has to be accepted or rejected in totality and where the prosecution evidence is found to be reliable and the exculpatory part of such statement is established to be false and excluded from consideration then the inculpatory part of such statement may be read in support of prosecution’s evidence. Raja Iftikhar Ahmed  & others v. Ehtesab Bureau & others 2022 SCR 53 (A)
  182. —Section 342— High Court has relied on a punchaitnama neither tendered in evidence nor put to the convict while recording statement u/s 342, Cr.P.C—under law placing reliance on such an evidence not put to the accused amounts to condemn unheard—the accused should be heard not only what is prima facie proved against him, but on every circumstance appearing in evidence against him. Muhammad Javed  v. Muhammad Jamil & another  2022 SCR 705 (C&D)
  183. — section 342 — murder — examination of accused — requirements of — all possible material brought on record in evidence against accused should have been put to him for fair administration of justice — it is against the norms of justice that an accused be convicted on the basis of evidence not put to him — evidence and questions should be properly and clearly put to the accused to make sure that he is aware of the case against him for the purpose of fair trial. Muhamad Bashir & others versus Muhammad Naveed Abbas & others 2023 SCR 1152 (F) 2001 SCR 286 & 2003 SCR 234 ref.
  184. Section 342 — all the incriminating evidence is required to be put to the accused if the same is against him — if any piece of such evidence is not put to the accused then the same cannot be used against him — incriminating pieces of evidence not put for explanation, cannot be read against accused for passing conviction order Ghulam Sarwar vs Ehtesab Bureau & others 2024 SCR 171 (A&B) 2019 SCR 149 rel. —section 342—report of chemical examiner—non-putting to accused—non-putting of report of chemical examiner to the accused was held as mere irregularity, in circumstances— Contention: report of chemical examiner was not put to the accused, hence, cannot be considered and as per settled norms the material not put to the accused cannot be used against him, therefore, whole proceedings may be declared null and void—Held: that the trial Court has recorded the statements of the custodian of the parcel and witnesses who were present at the time of recovery, from their statements the safe transmission of the Parcel 1 to the Chemical Laboratory is proved. Thus, the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant that the report of the chemical examiner was not put to the accused, hence, cannot be considered against him, is devoid of any force and cannot be given due weightage, especially when the authenticity of the report is proved through cogent evidence. It can be mere an irregularity and not illegality, but it will not affect the merits of the case. Even otherwise, forensic report is sufficiently detailed to conclusively establish narcotic character of the contraband. The argument is otherwise not available to the appellant as he never disputed the nature of the substance being attributed him. The argument was repelled in circumstances. Arshad Mehmood vs The State 2024 SCR338 (C)
  185. S. 342(4) — Pertains to statement of accused which contained that no oath shall be administered to an accused — Subsequently Islami Tazirati Qawanin Nifaz Act, 1974 was enacted — Power was given to the Court under section 28 of the Act to record the statement of accused on oath — It was entirely the discretion of the Court to record the statement of accused on oath but subsequently when section 340(2) was enacted a right was given to accused to record his statement on oath — S. 340(2) should be interpreted in such a manner that it should remain harmonious and consistent with section 28 of the Islami Act — S. 342(4) says that no statement of the accused shall be recorded on oath — Accused shall not be compelled to state on oath — Under section 340(2) right was given to accused to record his statement on oath. Nanni Sultana v. Tanveer Ahmad 2007 SCR 317 (B)
  186. S. 344 — Remand to judicial custody — Period of — S. 344 fixes no period of remand by Sessions Judge — Condition of 15 days only applicable to Magistrate. Ghulam Nabi Saleem Chishti v. State and another 1997 SCR 45 (A)
  187. S. 345 — See Azad Jammu and Kashmir Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Act, 1985, S. 17(4). Muhammad Mushtaq v. Abdul Rehman 2012 SCR 279 (A)
  188. Section 345 (6) — compromise — widow and daughter of the deceased, voluntarily entered into compromise and the trial Court while finding the compromise genuine acquitted the accused after fulfillment of all the legal requirement.  No objection regarding the valuation of the land was raised by the respondents in the trial Court at the time of process of compromise. Held: when both the parties admitted the compromise as genuine, the trial Court was not left with any other option except to acquit the accused under section 345(6), Cr.P.C. Muhammad Riaz v. Mst. Kishwar Bibi & 5 others 2015 SCR 498 (G)  PLD 1991 Lahore 347 rel.
  189. Sections 356 & 360 — Statement of witnesses in a criminal case are to be recorded separately and there is no concept in law to record joint statement as has been done by the trial Court. Muhammad Sarwar and another v. The State 2000 SCR 435 (D)
  190. — section 360 — evidence — denial of correctness — duty of presiding officer — section 360 (2) provides that if the witness denies the correctness of any part of evidence when the same is read over to him, the magistrate/sessions Judge may, instead of correcting the evidence, makes a memorandum, thereon of the objection made in it by the witness and shall add such remarks as he thinks necessary Adnan Kashif & another versus Muhammad Altaf & others 2023 SCR 641 (A)
  191. Delay — Accused facing trial under sections 364-A and 302 read with S.34 APC. — He sought bail on merits which was denied by all the Courts — Bail on statutory grounds also refused — An application u/s 561 Cr.P.C. moved before the Shariat Court was rejected — Inordinate delay in the prosecution of process of the Court — Appeal to Supreme Court was disposed of directing the trial Court to complete the trial of the case within next two months from the receipt of judgment. Muhammad Asif v. The State and another 2001 SCR 573 (A)
  192. —Section 364(3), Cr.PC—requirements for recording confessional statement of accused by Magistrate—Held: according to section 346(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the statement of the accused is not recorded by the Magistrate himself, he is bound to writ and sign his own certificate and if the Magistrate is unable to make memorandum, he shall record reason of such inability. Jahangir Khan & others v. Safia Tanveer & others 2022 SCR 1541 (L)
  193. —Section 364(3) —confessional statement of accused— report of the Magistrate, as admitted by the Magistrate, made in derogation of section 364(3), Cr.PC, and was recorded in custody of police cannot be relied upon. Jahangir Khan & others v. Safia Tanveer & others 2022 SCR 1541 (M) 2016 SCMR 274 rel.
  194. S. 367 — Deals with contents of the judgment — The judgment has to be restricted within the parameters of law — Trial Court appears to have rewritten the law which is beyond the scope of every Court and Judge — It is an appeasement and flattery not becoming of Judge to write — The portion of judgment expunged. Hakam Deen v. State & 16 others 2005 SCR 314 (BB)
  195. S. 367 — Deals with the contents of judgment — The judgment has to be restricted within the parameters of law — The trial Court appears to have rewritten the law which is beyond the scope of every Court and Judge — The portion of the judgment expunged. Hakam Deen v. State and 15 others 2006 SCR 120 (Y)
  196. — Section 367(2) — Azad Penal Code, 1860—section 302–conviction and sentence— recording of— trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused by imposing death and life imprisonment but failed to specify that under which subsection of section 302, APC the punishment is being awarded— section 302, APC provides for punishment as ‘qisas’ and ‘tazir’ but the trial Court failed to mention whether the same is being awarded as ‘qisas’ or ‘tazir’—according to section 367(2) Cr.P.C. it was bounden duty of the trial Court to have specified the relevant subsection of section 302, APC — nothing should have been left to presumptions— the requirement of section 367 has to be followed by the Courts. Muhammad Rafique & v. & others v. Muhammad Yasir & others  2022 SCR 235 (A)
  197. —Section 367(2) — under subsection 2 of section 367 Cr.P.C., it is mandatory for the Court to specify the offence and the Section of PC or any other law under which the accused is convicted and the punishment to which he is sentenced. Muhammad Rafique & v. & others v. Muhammad Yasir & others  2022 SCR 235 (A)
  198. Ss. 375 & 376 authorise the Shariat Court/ High Court to direct further inquiry or take additional evidence or confirm or annul order of conviction. M. Alam v. The State 2009 SCR 458 (C)
  199. S. 377 — No sentence of death can be confirmed nor a new sentence of death can be passed unless the Shariat Court is composed of two Judges. M. Alam & another v.The State 2009 SCR 458 (G)
  200. S. 377 — The sentence of death or Qisas has to be confirmed under the signatures of two Judges — A murder case necessarily requires to be heard by two Judges — As any murder case in appeal may result in death sentence, even if acquitted by the trial Court or any death sentence or reference for its confirmation may result in acquittal or confirmation, hence every such case has to be heard and decided by at least two Judges. M. Alam & another v. The State 2009 SCR 458 (D)
  201. Section 377, Cr.P.C. read with section 374, Cr.P.C. and section 31 IPL. — Confirmation of the sentence of death, Qisas or Hadood by the Shariat Court — It is mandatory to hear the case and signing of judgment by at least two Judges. CLARIFICATION: In criminal appeals No. 15, 16 of 2005 and 2, 3 of 2007 through a consolidated judgment titled Muhammad Alam and another vs. The State, reported as 2009 SCR 458 while interpreting the codal provision on the subject of confirmation of capital punishment in para 7 held that “sentence of death or Qisas has to be confirmed under the signature of two Judges which in other words means that a murder case necessarily requires to be heard by two Judges”. — In para 11 held that “accept appeals and remand the cases to the Shariat Court with the direction to the learned Chief Justice to constitute two members bench when the case relates to murder or Qisas” — On the strength of wisdom gained from the arguments of the members of the bar and after minute perusal of the judgment in juxtaposition with the codal provisions the Court found that the applied phraseology of the judgment in the paras 7 and 11 doesn’t strictly express the spirit of codal provision — While analyzing Sections 377,374 Cr.P.C. and 31 IPL, the Court held that only in case of imposition of sentences of death, Qisas and Hadood by Courts of District Criminal Jurisdiction the case has to be submitted to the Shariat Court for confirmation. The phraseology of section 377 of Cr.P.C. is clear and comprehensive that only in a reference instituted for confirmation of sentence of death, Qisas or Hadood or in a case if the Shariat Court passes one of these sentences as a new sentence, the hearing of the case and signing of the judgment by the at-least two Judges of the Shariat Court is mandatory, whereas, in all other cases hearing by two Judges of the Shariat Court is not the requirement of law — The flaws in the judgment handed down in appeals No.15,16 of 2005 and 2,3 of 2007 titled Muhammad Alam & another Vs. The State reported as 2009 SCR 458 stand removed and clarified. Jawad Ayub v. Sadaqat Hussain & another 2011 SCR 263 (A, B & C)
  202. S. 382-B — While calculating the period of imprisonment awarded to the appellant, the time spent by him in the Police custody and jail till the date of announcement of judgment of the trial Court shall be deducted from the period of imprisonment. Mian Talib v. The State 1992 SCR 120 (B)
  203. S. 382-B — Counsel for the convict contended that benefit should be extended to the convict — Counsel for the State did not point out any justification for denial of benefit mentioned under section 382-B to the convict — Held: Benefit has to be extended to the convict. Shabbir Ahmad v. The State and another 1997 SCR 206 (I)
  204. S. 382-B — Convict-respondent shall be entitled to the benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C. — The period which the spent in lock up during the trial of the case shall be deducted from his sentence. Zahir Hussain Shah v. Shah Nawaz Khan & 3 others 2000 SCR 123 (I)
  205. Section 382-B — Benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C.  is discretionary with Court — Question of giving or refusing benefit depends upon circumstances of each case. Muhammad Mumtaz Hussain and another  v. Muhammad Arshad and 2 others 2001 SCR 231 (C)
  206. S. 382-B — The statutory benefit under section 382-B extended to convict. Badar Shehzad & another v. The State & another 2007 SCR 218 (L)
  207. S. 382-B — It is duty of the Court to consider whether statutory benefit arises out of the facts of the case — If yes, it must be given. Raja Shahid Nawaz v. Liaqat Ali & 3 others 2009 SCR 88 (A) 2007 SCR 218, 2000 SCR 124 and 1997 SCR 206 rel.
  208. S. 382-B — The accused was once acquitted by the Shariat Court — Which is reversed by the Supreme Court — In the circumstances of the case — It appears a fit case in which the benefit of S. 382 must be allowed. Raja Shahid Nawaz v. Liaqat Ali & 3 others 2009 SCR 88 (B)
  209. S. 382-B — Review petition allowed — Held: Petitioner shall be given the benefit of S. 382-B while construing the sentence awarded against him. R. Shahid Nawaz v. Liaqat Ali 2009 SCR 88 (D)
  210. S. 382-B — Appeal filed by Muhammad Yaqub and other convict-appellants accepted to the extent that sentence of Qisas converted to life imprisonment — Sentences passed against other convict-appellants shall run concurrently — Held: They shall be entitled to the benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C. Muhammad Yaqub and 4 others v. The State & another 2009 SCR 104 (E)
  211. Section 382-B — the golden principle of law — it is clear that the deduction of the period of custody for extending benefit of the whole period of custody according to the provision of section 382-B, Cr.P.C., is mandatory requirement of the administration of justice. Hence, while extending the benefit, the Court cannot exercise its discretion by making any reduction in any such period of custody. Held: the judgment of the learned Shariat Court for extending benefit from the date of re-arrest of the petitioner is not according to law. Sain M. v. The State 2015 SCR 339 (H)
  212. —section 382-B—and rule 53(d) of Pakistan Army Act Rules, 1954—object of both provisions and discretion—–the object of section 382-B, Cr.P.C., or section 53(d) Pakistan Army Act, Rules, 1954, is to compensate the convict for the delay caused in the consideration of the trial and the Court in appropriate cases, while exercising discretion may refuse to grant the protection concerning the period spent by the convict as under trial prisoner, however, discretion must be exercised judiciously on sound judicial principles. The Field General Court Martial & another vs Khani Zaman & others 2018 SCR 1037 (B)
  213. —Section 382-B—benefit of—it is mandatory for the Court to extend the benefit of section 382-B to the convict—if a person who remains under custody before his date of conviction, by not giving benefit of deduction of such period will amount to cross the limit of actual punishment. Syed Kamran Hussainshahv.     State & another 2022 SCR 365 (Q)
  214. — Section 382-B— benefit of—-murder— conviction— life imprisonment awarded and High Court maintained conviction but no order with the reference to the provisions of section 382-B, Cr.P.C made— keeping in view the overall circumstances of the case, the benefit of the section 382-B, Cr.P.C. was liable to be extended to the convict— benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C. extended. Moeen Nasim v. The state & another  2022 SCR 855 (H)
  215. S. 403 — No man’s life or liberty shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence on the same set of facts. Mirdad Khan v. Zahir Shah and 3 others 2000 SCR 344 (F)
  216. —section 403, — person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence— Principle of autrefois acquit— principle of double jeopardy—Appeal against acquittal, filed before the Shariat Appellate Bench of the High Court, subsequently, withdrawn—effect of—acquittal order of respondent had attained finality, after withdrawn of appeal—trial Court re-instigated matter against the acquitted respondent, in disregard of section 403, Cr.PC—Held: It is an admitted position that initially the learned trial Court conducted the trial of the respondent, herein, and acquitted him. Thereafter, an appeal against the acquittal order of the respondent, herein, was filed before the Shariat Appellate Bench of the High Court, and was subsequently withdrawn, meaning, thereby, the acquittal of the respondent, herein, had attained finality. Consequently, the respondent stands protected from retrial for the same offence by virtue of the principle of autrefois acquit enshrined in Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Pursuant to this principle, an individual is shielded from prosecution twice for the same offence. Once an individual has undergone trial by a competent Court for an offence and has been acquitted, if such acquittal remains unchallenged, the individual is not susceptible to retrial for the same offence. Regrettably, the trial Court has erroneously instigated proceedings against the respondent, herein under the mistaken belief that the District Criminal Court Neelum had also passed the order regarding the respondent’s acquittal. Appeal dismissed and judgment of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the High Court maintained. Fehmida Bibi vs Muhammad Tufail & 2 others 2024 SCR 331(C)
  217. S. 403(1) — “Nemo debt bis vexari” — This section is an amplification of the well known maxim of law “nemo debt bis vexari”. This principle does not rest on any doctrine of estoppel but embodies the well established rule of common law that a man may not be put twice in peril for the same offence — Punishment twice for the same offence is not justified. Before this section can be invoked the following three conditions must be satisfied:- That the accused has been already tried for the offence charged against him;
  218. That the trial was held by a Court of competent jurisdiction; andThat there was a judgment or order of acquittal or conviction. Noorullah v. Mst. Phullan & another 1995 SCR 396 (A)
  219. S. 403(1) — No one shall be punished or put in peril twice for the same matter but the pre-requisite is that a person who has been tried once should have been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction and in case of conviction or acquittal he shall not be liable to be tried again for the same offence. Habib Bank Limited v. Zulfiqar Ali Malik and 2 others 1999 SCR 501 (A)
  220. Section 403 (1) — Prohibits the second trial for an offence during the course of existence of conviction or acquittal of a person as the case may be in consequence of final adjudication of such an offence by a Court of competent jurisdiction — Held: If a person was tried for an offence by the Court of competent jurisdiction, he cannot be tried for the same offence. Muhammad Riaz v. Mst. Kishwar Bibi & 5 others 2015 SCR 498 (D) 1981 SCMR 1008 rel.
  222. Section 404 — right of appeal — on right except provided under Cr.P.C or any other law — according to the statutory provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code as applicable in Azad Jammu & Kashmir, Chapter XXXI deals with the appeals. Under the provisions of Section 404, Cr.P.C. no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force. Thus, it is clear that according to the nature of the proceedings and order of the Sessions Judge, the same is not appealable. Muhammad Younas v. Inhabitants/Public at large 2015 SCR 903 (A)
  223. S. 417 — Cr.P.C. not applicable to the criminal proceedings in the Supreme Court. It is only the Supreme Court Rules which are applicable — The petition for leave to appeal could be filed by the complainant within 30 days from the date of order sought to be challenged. Suleman Khan v. Muhammad Hanif & others 1993 SCR 301 (A)
  224. S. 417-Appeal against acquittal-in bail matters this Court would only interfere in the discretion exercised by the Courts below if it is perverse or violative of settled principle of law. Mst. Jamila Begum v. Ghulam Hussain 1994 SCR 62 (A & C)
  225. S. 417 — Amended by adding sub-section 2 (A) — It is provided that any person aggrieved by order of acquittal may file an appeal against acquittal order — On the aforesaid analogy after the death of complainant the legal representatives can continue proceedings. Talib Hussain and 5 others v. Dawood and 5 others 2003 SCR 135 (B)
  226. —subsections (2) and (3) of section 417—limitation for appeal against acquittal by complainant in complaint cases is sixty days—Held: subsection (2) read in conjunction with subsection (3) of section 417 of the Cr.P.C, which pertains to acquittal appeals in complaint cases, confers the right of appeal solely to the complainant within sixty days, subject to the condition of obtaining special leave for this purpose. The State vs Khalid Hussain Rathore & 10 others 2024 SCR 313 (K)
  227. S. 417 read with Chap. XXXI — Acquittal appeals — In Azad Jammu and Kashmir the relevant law is I.P.L. and acquittal appeal is filed under section 25 I.P.L. — Procedure for summoning of respondents and disposal of appeal is provided in sections 422 and 423. Muhammad Younis v. Yasir Ayub & 2 others 2009 SCR 228 (A)
  228. S. 417 — Appeal against acquittal — Principle — to interference with the — acquittal order — Held: Law is almost settled on the point, that once acquittal order has been passed after due appreciation of evidence, there must be strong and overwhelming reasons to interfere with the same. In this regard, the superior Courts have laid down the principles of law in respect of the powers of the Courts to convert the acquittal into conviction. Further held: The parameters for interference in the appeal against acquittal and conviction are different as in the case of acquittal, the presumption of double innocence of the accused is attached to the order of acquittal. R. Zamin Abbas & another v. Sultan Mobashar Saidain & others 2014 SCR 1678 (A) 2002 SCMR 713
  229. S. 417 — Appeal against acquittal — Supreme Court, in case of acquittal can only interfere with if — it comes to the conclusion that the acquittal order is fanciful, perverse, arbitrary and resulted into miscarriage of justice. Raja Zamin Abbas & another v. Sultan Mobashar Saidain & 2 others 2014 SCR 1678 (B) 2009 SCR 237 & 2014 SCR 351, rel.
  230. —Section 417—APC—section 305 appeal against acquittal—-right of— murder case  an appeal against acquittal can be filed by the State/ the complainant by special leave of the Court/ a person aggrieved—State not filed any appeal against acquittal— the appellant before High Court being a complainant, failed to obtain special leave to appeal under section 417 (2) to challenge the order of acquittal– at the time of filing of appeal before the High Court the legal heirs of deceased were alive  the provisions of section 417(2-A) concedes a right of appeal in acquittal to a person aggrieved  the person whose legal right is injured may be treated as aggrieved. Liaqat Ali & another v. Muhammad Asghar & others 2022 SCR 695 (A & b)
  231. —Section 417—APC—section 305—murder cases— appeal against acquittal—right of— in murder cases, a person aggrieved’ means the Wali of the victim or State— u/s 305(a), APC the Wali of victim is the person who is entitled to inherit victim   the interpretation of said provisions cannot be stretched to include in the definition of Wali a person who claimed to have inherited right of compromise possessed by Wail— An heir of a person is understood to be a person who is entitled to inherit the property of the deceased at the time of death  Held: at the time of filing of appeal before the High Court the father and widow of the deceased, being primary legal heirs, were aggrieved and in their presence the appeal by any other person, not competent. Liaqat Ali & another v. Muhammad Asghar & others 2022 SCR 695 (C & D) 2011 SCR 431 rel.
  232. —section 417(1) and 492—appeal in case of acquittal—only Public Prosecutor competent to file appeal—power of the Govt. to appoint Public Prosecutor—Advocate General is Public Prosecutor—Additional Advocate General and the Assistant Advocate General are excluded from the meaning of  Public Prosecutor— It may  be state d here that the statutory provision of law referred to by the learned, counsel for the appellant Section 417 (1) Cr.P.C , is fully applicable which clearly  manifests that for the purpose of filing appeal the Government can only appoint the Public prosecutor and as per scheme of the Additional Advocate-General or Assistant Advocate-General do not come within purview of the public prosecutor within the meaning of section 417 (1), therefore, it can safely be said that the learned High court has committed no il1egllity while interpreting the provisions of sections 417 and in para 492, Cr.P.C. in the  impugned judgment while holding that the appeal on behalf of the State against the acquittal order can only be filed by the Public Prosecutor, whereas,  the Additional Advocate-General is excluded from the meaning of Public Prosecutor according to statutory provision (supra). State v. Rustam Khan & others 2017 SCR 1028 (A)
  233. —section 417(1), Cr.PC and Article 157 of the Limitation Act, 1908—acquittal appeal by State—Limitation for filing appeal—appeal on behalf of the State, the correct legal position is that the limitation period for filing an appeal under section 417(1) Cr.PC is six months, as prescribed by Article 157 of the Limitation Act, 1908. It may be observed here that the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1908 in the proceedings conducted under Criminal Procedure Code had been a debate since decades. There had been a divergent opinion regarding the applicability of the Limitation Act in the proceedings conducted in Cr.PC. The State vs Khalid Hussain Rathore & 10 others 2024 SCR 313 (L) Mohammad Ibrahim v. Coppi Lal, 1958 AIR 691 AIR 1958 (Andra Pardesh) 230 and AIR 1957 (Allahbad) 500; AIR 1075 (Andra Pardesh 406 ref.
  234.  —section 417(1) and Article 157 of the Limitation Act, 1908—appeal against acquittal under subsection (1) of section 417- –no limitation provided—question as to period of limitation — all the appeals against acquittal covered by subsection (1) of section 417 Cr.P.C will continue to be governed by Article 157 of the Limitation Act. This legal position regarding the limitation period remains unchanged even after the addition of subsection 2A to section 417 Cr.P.C, which grants the right to appeal within thirty days to an aggrieved person. The State vs Khalid Hussain Rathore & 10 others 2024 SCR 313 (J)
  235. —section 417(1)—appeal in case of acquittal—held: the Provincial Government may in any case direct the public prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court. The State vs Khalid Hussain Rathore & 10 others 2024 SCR313 (A)
  236. —section 417(1)—-Article 157, the Limitation Act, 1908— limitation for filing acquittal appeal under subsection (1) of section 417, Cr.PC—no specific limitation period is prescribed under the amended provision regarding appeals against acquittal under subsection (1) of section 417 Cr.P.C thereby leaving it regulated by Article 157 of the Limitation Act, 1908, [which is six months]. The State vs Khalid Hussain Rathore & 10 others 2024 SCR 313 (H)
  237. —-section 417(2A)—limitation for filing appeal against acquittal—passed by a Court other than High Court— acquittal passed  before recording evidence under  section 265-K Cr.P.C.—- or after recording evidence under section 245 Cr.P.C.—  in both cases, is 30 days—-While meeting the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant In appeal. No.27 of 2016 that Imitation provided under section 417 (2-A), Cr.P.C., is not applicable In the appeal against the acquittal  order passed under section 265-K, Cr.P.C., it may be observed here that only section 417 (2-A). Cr.P.C., provides limitation for filing appeal against acquittal order of any court other than High which is 30 days. It does not make any difference that the person it acquitted of the charge without recording evidence under, section 256-K, Cr.P.C, or after recording section 245, Cr.P.C. In each case, section 417. (2-A) Cr. P.C., provides limitation for filing appeal against the acquittal order which is 30 days. Argument repelled and appeal declared as time-barred. State v. Rustam Khan & others 2017 SCR 1028 (B)
  238. —section 417(2-A) —limitation for filing appeal against acquittal— 30 days limitation—section 417(2-A) Cr.PC imposes a 30-day limitation for filing appeals against acquittal orders passed by any Court other than the High Court. It is irrelevant whether the acquittal occurs without evidence being recorded under section 265- K or after evidence recorded under section 245 Cr.P.C; in both scenarios, section 417(2-A) mandates a 30-day limitation period for filing an appeal against the acquittal order. The State vs Khalid Hussain Rathore & 10 others 2024 SCR 313 (F)
  239. —section 417—appeal in case of acquittal— provisions of section 17, regarding limitation for acquittal appeal fall into three categories —the right [of appeal] delineated into three distinct categories for the purpose of limitation. Firstly, pursuant to subsection (1) of Section 417, of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, the authority to direct the public prosecutor to pursue such legal recourse before the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal rests exclusively with the State for which no specific period of limitation is stipulated under section 417 Cr.P.C. Secondly, under subsection (2), in cases where an acquittal order is issued in response to a complaint, the option of filing an appeal against such order in the form of special leave to appeal is conferred solely upon the complainant, who must avail this remedy within sixty days from the date of the acquittal order, as stipulated in subsection (3). Lastly, with the addition of subsection (2A) to section 417 Cr.P.C, the right to appeal against an acquittal order, whether original or appellate, is extended to a person aggrieved by such order, who may exercise this remedy within thirty days. It is evident from the foregoing analysis, that the specified limitation periods of sixty days and thirty days respectively apply only to those criminal acquittal appeals filed by the “complainant” or “person aggrieved” respectively. The State vs Khalid Hussain Rathore & 10 others 2024 SCR 313 (G)
  240. Section 419 — appeal before High Court — competency of — acquittal appeal — copy of the impugned order obtained by unconcerned person i.e alien to proceedings —  under Section 419, the memo of appeal shall be accompanied by the copy of the judgment or order appealed against and the copy means, a certified true copy — acquittal appeal was filed by Regional Manager Utility Stores, Jehlum Valley, Muzaffarabad — Copy of the judgment has been obtained by Stores In-charge, Utility Stores Bagh — It is nowhere mentioned that what sort of concern the Stores Incharge has  got with the case — the person, who obtained copy is an alien to the proceedings, as such the copy annexed with the memo of appeal cannot be termed as a copy of the judgment as required under law. Regional Manager Utility Stores v. Babar Iqbal 2016 SCR 773 (A & B) 2005 SCR 211& 255 rel.
  241. S. 422 — Reveals that notice of appeal is mandatory to the appellant or his counsel — If appeal is filed by accused and relevant officer as the Provisional Government may appoint in this behalf shall be heard before disposal of appeal — The second part of the section deals with appeal under section 411-A(2) and section 417 — Which provides that if appeals are filed then like notice shall be given to the accused — Present appeal has been filed under section 25 — The appeal under section 417 shall be read as section 25 I.P.L. M. Younis v. Yasir Ayub & 2 others 2009 SCR 228 (B)
  242. S. 422 Cr. P.C. — Provides issuance of notice for service to the accused in an appeal filed against acquittal and under section 423 the appeal shall be decided after hearing the accused. Muhammad Younis v. Yasir Ayub & 2 others 2009 SCR 228 (D)
  243. S. 423 — Deals with disposal of appeal — When record of lower Court is received the Court shall decide the appeal after hearing the appellant or his pleader and Public Prosecutor in case of appeal under section 411-A(2) or Section 417 — It is settled law that criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for non-prosecution —- It has to be decided on merits — If an appeal has been filed by a convict-appellant and he deliberately disappears or does not appear in the Court or his counsel is absent — Then the Court can decide the appeal after hearing the Public Prosecutor or if he does not appear then the Court is competent to decide the appeal on merits. M. Younis v. Yasir Ayub & 2 others 2009 SCR 228 (C)
  244. S. 423 & and 428 — The Court is not bound to remand the case after setting aside the sentence and conviction of the concerned accused; because the remand under section 423 Criminal Procedure Code for de novo trial must be avoided as far as possible. M. Sarwar v. State 2000 SCR 435 (B)
  245. Ss. 423, 426, 428, 338 & 439 Cr. P.C — The High Court is vested with the revisional jurisdiction to exercise its powers conferred on a Court of appeal by sections 423, 426 and 428 or on a Court by section 338 — Revisional jurisdiction is conferred upon superior Courts to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law or irregularity of procedure resulting in some undeserved hardship to the individuals — Whether the interest of justice requires interference for correction of manifest illegality or prevention of gross miscarriage of justice in revisional jurisdiction can be exercised by the High Court — If the order of trial Court is patently by illegal and in violation of the provisions of the Act under which it is acting, the High Court is not debarred  from exercising its powers to set at naught the orders passed by the trial Court — If a person is booked for alleged commission of offences under the Ehtesab Bureau Act and the order passed by the trial Court is patently illegal or against the provisions of the said Act or if there be a simple complaint against an accused under the provisions of the said Act but if the charge is groundless or no prima facie case is made out against the accused he is being kept in custody for indefinite time, the doors of the High Court by exercising its powers under section 439 Cr. P.C. are not closed. The State & another v. Javed Iqbal 2001 SCR 1 (I)
  246. S. 426 — At the stage of bail by exercising the powers under section 426 Cr.P.C. the appellate Court has no more powers vested in a Court under section 497 Cr.P.C. Abdul Khaliq v. Jehangir & another 1999 SCR 330 (B)
  247. S. 426 — Initial presumption of innocence in favour of accused — It is substantially dislodged upon his conviction by a competent Court — Person convicted of a non-bailable offence by a competent Court would not be entitled to be enlarged on bail normally by the appellate Court except in circumstances mentioned in section 426 Cr.P.C. Abdul Khaliq v. Jehangir & another 1999 SCR 330 (E)
  248. S. 426 — Grant of bail after conviction — Deep appreciation of the prosecution evidence and the attending circumstances, particularly the, alleged discrepancies in the injury sheet, inquest report and most-mortem report, could not be made basis for releasing the convict-respondent on bail at this stage, the said aspect of the case could be duly considered only at the time of the disposal of the appeal by the Shariat Court — While releasing person on bail after suspending his conviction and sentence u/s 426 Cr. P.C. the Court is apt to make observations consciously or unconsciously with regard to the merits of the case which is not proper — This Court has held in a number of cases that the bail after conviction, especially in a murder case is a rare phenomenon which should be only resorted to in exceptional circumstances and not as a matter of routine. Ahmad Din & 2 others v. Muhammad Tazeem & another 2002 SCR 195 (A)
  249. S. 426 — Applies to convict persons — Sub-section (1) empowers the appellate Court to suspend execution of sentence when the convicted person is in confinement, to grant bail pending an appeal — The pre-requisite for exercise of jurisdiction is the existence of an appeal — Appellate Court is competent to suspend the sentence and enlarge accused on bail pending hearing of his appeal if it appeared to it that there were strong grounds to show that his conviction was not liable to be sustained — If appellate Court feels that the interests of justice require the convicted person to be enlarged on bail during pendency of appeal, it can allow him bail after recording reasons in writing. Intizar Hussain Shah v. Zarda Begum & another 2004 SCR 117 (A)
  250. S. 426 — Powers conferred upon appellate Court to suspend the sentence, pending the hearing of appeal, are not wider than the powers to release a person on bail during the trial because when a person is convicted then he shall not be entitled to avail the benefit of initial presumption of innocence —When a person is convicted, then he has to prove before the Court that prima facie the sentence awarded to him by the trial Court shall be set aside — Held:  While considering an application for suspension of sentence, the discretion has to be exercised judicially by considering the relevant facts without commenting on merits of the case — If the contentions require consideration of merits, the appellate Court should refrain from entertaining such contentions — Held further: The Court cannot enter into re-appreciation of evidence which could be considered at the time of hearing of appeal. Ch. M. Riasat v. M. Asghar& another 2010 SCR 1 (G)
  251. S. 426 — See AJK Supreme Court Rules, 1978, O. XXIII, R.2. Ehtesab Bureau, AJK through Deputy Chief prosecutor, Headquarter, Muzaffarabad v. Ghulam Sarwar 2013 SCR 720 (B)
  252. S. 426 r/w S. 337-A(1), A.P.C. — Seeking suspension of sentence and release on bail — Short sentence — Held: Sentence awarded to petitioner was only two years — Petitioners had already served 14 months’ imprisonment which is substantial part of impugned sentence — There was no likelihood of fixing the appeal for hearing in near future — Impugned sentence suspended. SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE — (Short sentence) Petitioner had already served 14 months out of 2 years’ R.1. Impugned sentence was suspended. Yasar Arfat and another v. The State and others 2013 SCR (SC AJ&K) 9 and 429 2007 SCMR 1844, PLJ 1997 Cr.C. (Lah.) 658 Ref.
  253. —section 426—Suspension of Sentence—Suspension by Court of revision— on condition of payment of amount of Arsh i.e. Rs. 840,134/-, not reasonable—amounts to decision of appeal, finally—order of suspension modified—- condition of payment of Arsh waived—petitioner ordered to be released on bail— The petitioner is aggrieved from the impugned order to the extent of the condition attached for the release of the petitioner after payment of the amount of Arsh. Admittedly, an appeal against the conviction ordered and sentence awarded to the petitioner is subjudice before the High Court and is not fixed for arguments, through which the punishment of payment of Arshhas also been challenged. Imposition of such a condition for payment of Arshamount of Rs. Rs. 840,134/-, for releasing him on bail, appears to be unreasonable, which amounts to decide the appeal finally. Even the learned Additional Advocate-General and Mr. ShahzadShaffi Awan, advocate, counsel for the complainant, were unable to justify such condition. In this scenario, we intend to accept this revision petition, while modifying the judgment of the High Court, in the result of which, the condition for payment of Arshis waived. The petitioner shall be released on furnishing bail bond as ordered by the High Court. Muhammad Sagheer vs State & others 2018 SCR 1090 (A)
  254. —Section 426—suspension of sentence and grant of bail on medical grounds—charge of murder— applicant convicted and sentenced to 10 years RI—not denied from the other side that the applicant is suffering from severe heart disease, he cannot walk and brought in the Court on a wheel chair—not claimed by the other side that the applicant has ever misused the concession of bail—Keeping in view the heart ailment— apparent condition and reports produced, the sentence awarded suspended till decision of appeal and accused released  on bail. Muhammad Khalil Khan v. The State & another  2019 SCR 614 (A)
  255. — Section 426 — suspension of sentence — mere absconsion is not the conclusive proof of guilt of an accused — it is only a suspicious circumstance which may be considered at the time of final hearing of appeal. Dilawar Siddique vs The State & others 2024 SCR 68 (C)
  256. S. 426(1-a)(C) indicates that the Court is required to release the convict person on bail if he has been punished with imprisonment for life of  imprisonment exceeding 7 years and his appeal has not been decided within a period of two years of his conviction. Abdul Ghafoor v. Muhammad Ajaib Khan and another 2007 SCR 460 (E)
  257. — Section 426 — suspension of sentence — convict awarded 10 years imprisonment — he already served out 9 years one month and 28 days imprisonment — substantial portion of sentence was served out — held: when appeal is not in sight for final arguments and the only role attributed to the convict is that he raised lalkara and gave danda blows in the head of deceased — sentence suspended in circumstances. Muhammad Nazir versus The State & 06 others 2023 SCR 680 (A) 2008 SCR 100
  258. —Section 426(1-A)(c)—section 302 and 109, APC–suspension of sentence—grant of bail on statutory ground —a convict earns a statutory right for suspension of sentence and grant of bail when the delay in the disposal of appeal not occasioned by convict-appellant or by an act or omission of convict or any other person acting on his behalf—convict should not be previously convicted or a person who in the opinion of the Court is hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or is accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Nazim Shaheen &  others v. Adalat Khan & others 2022 SCR 594 (A)
  259. —Section 426 (1-A) (c) Suspension of sentence on statutory ground— if the appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the convict who has filed an application for suspension of sentence on the ground of statutory period is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal and has acted in a desperate manner his application for suspension of sentence and bail can be refused. Nazim Shaheen &  others v. Adalat Khan & others 2022 SCR 594 (A)
  260. —Sections 426 (1-A) (c)—sections 302 and 109, APC–allegation of conspiracy of murder — at the stage of extending benefit u/s 426)1-A)(c), Cr.P.C, it cannot be said that the convict is not entitled to bail by declaring him hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal— in giving circumstances the role ascribed to the convict-to the effect that whether he hatched conspiracy for commission of murder can be looked into by the 1st  appellate Court while deciding the main appeal pending before it. Nazim Shaheen &  others v. Adalat Khan & others 2022 SCR 594 (A)
  261. Ss. 426, 497, 498 — Respondent was convicted by the Distrcit Court of Criminal jurisdiction under sections 302/34 A.P.C. and sentenced to 14 years R.I. along with punishment of ‘diyyat’ in the sum of Rs.3,49,968/- an appeal was filed before the Shariat Court — Application for the suspension of sentence was also moved — The accused was released on bail on medical ground — The order was challenged before the Supreme Court — Medical certificate shows that convict-respondent developed backache followed by weakness of both legs and loss of voluntary control over urine and bowl — It is no doubt settled law that presumption of innocence after convection is dislodged but the principles governing bail as provided under sections 497, 498 Cr. P.C. are also attracted while dealing with section 426 Cr. P.C. Naseem Akhter v. Zafar Ali 2003 SCR 134 (A)
  262. No appeal was pending as such the question of bail u/s 426 does not arise — Appellant could approach under sections 497 & 498 Cr. P.C. but not under section 426 Cr. P.C. from the Court which has become ‘functus officio’ as no appeal remained pending with it. Intizar Hussain Shah v. Zarda Begum & another 2004 SCR 117 (B)
  263. — Section 426 — 302/34 APC — 10 years’ imprisonment – — suspension of sentence — grant of bail — a firearm injury at right hand of complainant is levelled against convict/appellant — medical report shows that injury is caused by blunt weapon — the appeal against conviction order is pending in High Court and there is no likelihood of its disposal in near future — appellant is behind bars since one and a half year — all these facts are sufficient to justify the appellants’ release on bail. Dilawar Siddique vs The State & others 2024 SCR 68 (B)
  264. S. 426(1-A) r/w Ss. 302(B), APC & S. 13, A. O. — Impugned conviction/sentence of imprisonment of life — Suspension — Seeking release on bail — Statutory ground — Appeal was still pending before Shariat Court for last more than three years — Appeal of convict-respondent had not been decided within a period of two years, therefore he had a right to move Appellate Court for suspension of sentence — Respondent-convict had his rightly ordered by Shariat Court to be released on bail after suspension of impugned sentence — Criminal appeal dismissed. SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE — (Statutory ground) In instant case appeal of respondent-accused was pending before Shariat Court for last more than three years. Impugned imprisonment for life was correctly suspended. Supreme Court dismissed appeal. Habib–ur–Rehman Chaughtaie Versus Habib–ur–Rehman and another 2013 SCR (SC AJ&K) 1212
  265. S. 428 — Additional evidence — Where the statement of witnesses was recorded but the same was found deficient due to failure of cross-examination or for some other reason, the case was treated to be that of ‘additional evidence’ under section 428, Cr.P.C. and the trial Court was directed to re-examine such a witness and submit the statement so recorded to the appellate Court so as to enable it to dispose of the appeal. Muhammad Sarwar and another v. The State 2000 SCR 435 (A)
  266. Ss. 428 and 540 — Witnesses were initially served through bailable and non-bailable warrants and lastly the prosecution was given numerous opportunities to produce the witnesses on its own responsibility —  Evidence was closed and accused was acquitted of the charge — No remedy against the closure of evidence was availed by the prosecution — Prosecution applied for production of additional evidence but no ground was agitated necessitating the permission for the production of additional evidence — No doubt sections 428 and 540 Cr. P.C. vest the appellate Court with vast powers to allow the additional evidence provided the requirement laid down in the aforesaid provisions are fulfilled. Muhammad Ibrahim v. Abdul Rashid and others 1995 SCR 301 (A) PLD 1977 Lah. 1103, PLD 1952 F.C. 71, referred and relied.
  267. S. 432 — Only the Presidency Magistrate can seek the opinion of the High Court on any question of law which arises in the hearing of case pending before him — District Magistrate could not be regarded as Presidency Magistrate — Identity of the accused is not a question of law. Sanaullah Raja v. Muhammad Shafi and 2 others 1997 SCR 149 (H)
  268. Ss. 435, 439 & 561-A Cr.P.C. — The High Court is possessed with inherent powers to check abuse of process of a Court which is extensive in its application and section 439 Cr.P.C. does no circumstances its such jurisdiction — The words “noting in this Code” have been intentionally used by the law-makers to widen the scope of section 561-A Cr.P.C. — The powers possessed by the High Court under sections 435/439 Cr.P.C. do not impinge, curtail or limit, in any manner whatsoever, the powers under section 561-A Cr.P.C. — Powers under sections 435/439 Cr.P.C. are independent and jurisdiction can be exercised under section 561-A Cr.P.C. — Powers under sections 435/439 Cr.P.C. are independent and jurisdiction can be exercised under section 561-A Cr.P.C. to prevent the abuse of process of Court or to secure the ends of justice. The State & another v. Javed Iqbal 2001 SCR 1 (J)
  269. Section 439(4)(B) — section 439-A. — High Court — criminal revision — against order of Session Judge issued under 439-A — Criminal PLA — dismissed — in the instant case the learned Sessions Judge has already passed order while exercising revisional jurisdiction under the provisions of Cr.P.C. According to the provisions of Clause ‘b’ of sub-section 4 of section 439, Cr.P.C. the High Court cannot entertain any proceedings in revision petition in respect of which the order has been passed by the Sessions Judge under section 439 -A, Cr.P.C. Thus, it is obviously clear that before the High Court according to the nature of the case, neither the remedy of appeal nor revision in such circumstances is available. Petition for leave to appeal dismissed. Muhammad Younas v. Inhabitants/Public at large 2015 SCR 903 (B)
  270. Ss. 439, 491, 498 and 561-A — It is now a settled principle of law that the jurisdiction of superior Courts, if, is intended to be ousted, should be through express and definite provisions and not through mere implications — Considering the language in which the section is couched, the High Court, in exercise of its inherent powers under section 561-A Cr.P.C. its supervisory jurisdiction, under section 498 Cr.P.C. its revisional jurisdiction under section 439 Cr.P.C. and its jurisdiction under section 491 Cr.P.C. can allow the bail if the ends of justice, in its view, so demand. The State & another v. Javed Iqbal 2001 SCR 1 (H)
  271. Section 465 — procedure for trial of lunatic — under statutory provisions, the powers has been vested in the Court of Sessions and the High Court to determine the fact of unsoundness of mind and incapability of the accused to defend his case — The words “appears to the Court” are of vital significance. Held: If from some record or attending circumstances, it appears to the Court that an accused person who is brought before the Court is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, then it is incumbent upon the Court to adopt the procedure laid down in law and conduct an enquiry into the unsoundness of mind of the accused. Nasir Mehmood v. The State & others 2015 SCR 551 (A)
  272. Section 465 — its scope — the provisions of section 465, Cr.P.C are mandatory in nature and omission to observe the provisions thereof would vitiate the conclusion and the result reached thereon— The section confers the power upon the Court by using the words “appears to the Court” for determining the fact that the accused is of unsound mind — Held: the question of unsoundness of mind of an accused is to be decided  by the Court from the attending circumstances, attitude, behaviour of the accused and the medical record if any, and if from the attending circumstances, the accused appears to the Court to be of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, the Court in the first instance shall try such fact of unsoundness of mind and incapability to defend the case and after determination of such fact shall proceed in the matter. Nasir Mehmood v. The State & others 2015 SCR 551 (B)1990 PCr.LJ 210 & AIR 1971 SC 1638 rel.
  273. S. 476 — Perjury — The Court has to hold an inquiry under section 476 Cr. P.C., after giving notice to the person who allegedly made the perjury as to why a complaint should not be made against him — No such occasion arose in the instant case — Furthermore, it is for Court concerned to see as to whether perjury has been committed or not. Farooq Ahmad Khan & 2 others  v. Azad Govt. & 3 others 2002 SCR 14 (C)
  274. Ss. 476, 195 — If any of the offences committed under section 195 Cr. P.C. — Concerned Court should proceed under section 476 Cr. P.C. — The question as to whether it is expedient to file complaint is to be resolved by the Court concerned. Abdul Rashid Khan v. Hassan Jan and 7 others 1998 SCR 135 (A)
  275. Application of the provisions of sections 488 and 489 — in Pakistan, Chapter XXXVI of the Criminal Procedure Code was omitted by Ordinance No.XVII of 1981.  In the Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Criminal Procedure Code remained adapted since 1948, however, for the first time in the year 2001, through the Ordinance, all the subsequent amendments made in the Pakistan from time to time were adapted and this Ordinance was subsequently replaced by Act, XIII of 2001.  Resultantly, Section 488, Cr.P.C., which was omitted through the Amendment Act, 1981, also became redundant in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir —subsequently, the Adaptation Act, 2001 was also repealed and substituted by Act VII of 2002 in which clearly the application of the provision of Section 488 Cr.P.C. is saved — it is clarified that Section 488, Cr.P.C., is applicable and enforced in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir. However Section 489 Cr.P.C. is no more applicable. Abdul Khaliq v. Sidra Khaliq & 3 others 2014 SCR 280 (G)
  276. S. 491 — The Court has to determine whether any person is in an illegal detention or not — Whenever it is alleged that detenue has been detained improperly and without his/her will the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition. Shaukat v. M. Sharafat Khan 2008 SCR 574 (A)
  277. S. 491 — Whenever the High Court deems fit or it is of the opinion that a person is in illegal or improper custody or is detained without his or her will the Court may order for his production in the Court — So that the detenue be dealt with in accordance with law — The underlying principle in a writ of habeas corpus petition is to ensure the production and well being of a person who is in illegal custody and who has to be brought before the Court — If the High Court after hearing the detenue reaches on the conclusion that person/detenue is in illegal custody, it has to order for setting him/her at liberty. Shaukat v. Muhammad Sharafat Khan & another 2008 SCR 574 (B)
  278. S. 491 — It is incumbent upon the High Court to consider whether the application is maintainable or not as well as the bona fide of petitioner has to be looked upon — While determining the bona fide it has to be seen in particular facts of a case particularly when the alleged detenue is a child or a woman and relation of petitioner with detenue woman — The Court has to carefully examine the relation with the person, so no one is permitted to abuse the process of law — Whenever it thinks fit that power to summon a person is in discretion of the High Court and the discretion must be exercised judiciously and with due care and caution. Shaukat v. M. Sharafat Khan & another 2008 SCR 574 (C)
  279. S. 491 — In the case of woman and children the stranger has no right to file application under section 491 Cr.P.C. — This principle is applied with greater force in a case where allegations are levelled against the private person having illegally detained persons who are minors or women. Shaukat v. Muhammad Sharafat Khan & another 2008 SCR 574 (D)
  280. Further held: In case of women and children, the stranger has no right to file application under section 491 Cr.P.C. Kafeel Ahmed v. Superintendent of Police 2015 SCR 1186 (B) 2008 SCR 574 ref.
  281. Section 491, Cr.P.C — appellant claims that he has entered into marriage with detenu — He relied on Nikah Nama and statement of detenu recorded under section 107, Cr.P.C, — F.I.R., has been registered under sections 10, 16, 19, ZHA and 14, EHA against the appellant and detenu — Held: he is not entitled for filing application under section 491, Cr.P.C. Kafeel Ahmed v. Superintendent of Police 2015 SCR 1186 (A&C)
  282. Ss. 491 & 561-A, Cr.P.C. — Recording of statement — It was fundamental duty to record the statement of the petitioner when she was produced before the Court to ensure whether she was in illegal confinement. Safeena Bibi v. Zahoor Ahmed 2006 SCR 411 (A)
  283. U/Ss. 491 & 561-A, Cr. P.C.  a Court can only set at liberty the detenue — High Court has two-fold jurisdiction under sections 491 & 561-A, Cr. P.C.(I) to deal with a person within its appellate criminal jurisdiction and (ii) to set him at liberty if he is illegally or improperly detained — If a person is minor the Court may make over his custody to the guardian and if he is major the Court is to set him at liberty — The High Court on an application under section 491 & 561-A, Cr. P.C. can only set a person at liberty and cannot pass any other order. Safeena Bibi v. Zahoor Ahmed 2006 SCR 411 (B)
  284. —Section 491—interim constitution Act, 1974—Section 4—Right No.5—Habeas corpus—nature and extent—Powers of High Court— when the matter is brought in the notice of the High Court that any person is illegally and improperly detained in public or private custody within its territorial limits, the Court may order that such person be brought before it, and after hearing such person if it reaches the conclusion that such person is in illegal custody, it shall set such person at liberty. Right No.5 of the fundamental Rights guaranteed the liberty of a citizen— the proceedings u/s 491 Cr.P.C before the High Court are meant to secure release of person from illegal or improper custody or confinement and not for depriving of his/her liberty. Mehnaz Kousar v. Mst. Munir Begum & others 2017 SCR 116 (A)
  285.             —Section 491—offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Act, 1985—sections 16 and 19—alleged detenue on bail—sent by High Court to Darul-Aman—effect of— Held: detenue was sent by High Court to Dar-ul-Aman— She was not in illegal custody or confinement rather she was on bail granted by the Court of competent jurisdiction without imposing any condition—it is only the Court having jurisdiction, which may impose any condition while granting a bail to an accused—held the High Court has no jurisdiction to pass such order while exercising powers vested in it u/s 491 in presence of a valid bail granting order. Mehnaz Kousar v. Mst. Munir Begum & others 2017 SCR 116 (B)
  286. Ss. 496, 497 & 498 — Orders relating to liberty of citizens are passed in routine — Any person against whom a case is registered can seek concession of bail from the competent Courts — Courts are expected to exercise their jurisdiction with care and caution U/SS 496, 497 & 498 Cr. P.C. Nasim and 2 others v. Ehtesab Bureau AJ&K 2004 SCR 274 (A)
  287. Section 495 — Prosecution of criminal case on behalf of State — Government is only the authority to grant permission for conducting prosecution — Under section 495, Cr.P.C., the Government is only the authority to grant permission for conducting prosecution of the criminal cases before the Courts of Magistrate — Without permission, no one can conduct prosecution of criminal cases on behalf of State. Held: It is the basic duty of the Government to conduct the prosecution of criminal cases. Further held: Unless specifically by any statute or instrument the person or officer authorized, no other person can conduct the prosecution of criminal cases on behalf of the State or Government. Ehtesab Bureau v. Rashid Ahmed Katal & 4 others 2011 SCR 512 (C & D)
  288. S. 497 — Bail before arrest-cancellation of-guide-lines for pre-arrest bail-violated-bail cancelled. Mst. Fazlan Bibi v. Abdul Latif & another 1994 SCR 59 (A)
  289. S. 497 — Bail — A person who is sick or infirm can be granted bail under 1st proviso of Section 497 — The purpose and intent of proviso appears to be that it equally applies to a person who is named as a principal accused. Inayat Ullah v. The State and another 1997 SCR 139 (A)
  290. S. 497 — The principles governing the grant of bail and cancellation of bail substantially stand on a different footing — Once a bail is granted by a Court of competent jurisdiction it must be shown satisfactorily that the discretion exercised by it was either perverse or violative of fundamental principles governing the bail matters or that which could not have been exercised at all in the circumstances of the case. Inayat Ullah v. The State and another 1997 SCR 139 (B)
  291. S. 497 — Bail — Reasonable ground for — Since life imprisonment cannot be awarded under section 324 and 337-APC the case against the appellant does not fall in prohibition clause — Bail refused by the trial Court as well as by the Shariat Court keeping in view the circumstances of the case including the gravity of the allegations against accused — This Court decline to interfere. Muhammad Arif v. The State 1997 SCR 223 (A)
  292. S. 497 — Words “Criminal” and “dangerous” — Meaning of — Held: Words should be read in ordinary meaning. Naeem Akram Khan v. Mumtaz ahmed and another 2002 SCR 409 (A)
  293. S. 497 — “Criminal” and “dangerous criminal” — Recovery of pistol, belongings of the deceased from accused and his conduct of filing report — Held: Clearly shows that accused is a “dangerous criminal”. Naeem Akram Khan v. Mumtaz ahmed and another 2002 SCR 409 (B)
  294. S. 497 — Bail — Rejection of — Whether the accused is ‘hardened’, ‘desperate’ or ‘dangerous’ criminal or not, is to be ascertained from the circumstances of the particular case finding of the trial Court that accused is prima facie, a ‘dangerous criminal’ were based on correct appreciation of law — Bail and personal bonds cancelled. Naeem Akram Kh. v. Mumtaz Ahmed 2002 SCR 409 (C)
  295. S. 497 — While considering a bail matter of an accused involved in a non-bailable offence, if there is reasonable grounds for believing that he is guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, he shall not be released on bail unless the case is covered by any of the provisios under sub-section (1) of section 497, Cr.P.C. — To form an opinion, the Court has to look into F.I.R., the statements of the prosecution witnesses recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. and the other incriminating material collected by the prosecution, including any plea of the accused — But if it appears to the Court at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial, as the case may be, that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence but there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, the accused shall be released on bail under sub-section (2) of section 497, Cr.P.C. Khalid Hussain v. Kala Khan 2003 SCR 522 (A)
  296. S. 497 — If any person accused of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained, he may be released on bail but he shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life provided the accused person is under the age of sixteen years or any woman or any sick or infirm person — However, under sub-section (2) of section 497 Cr. P.C. if it appears at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial as the case may be, that  there is no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence but there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, the accused shall be released on bail. M. Asif v. M. Ilyas and another 2004 SCR 554 (A)
  297. S. 497 — Bail grant of — Simple injury caused with double edge sharp cutter — Bail can be refused that the matter is covered by bar contained in S.497 — If material collected by prosecution during investigation an accused is connected with the commission of offence punishable with death or transportation for life — He can be released on bail only if his case falls within the exceptions contained in the said provision. Sajid v. Wazir Hussain & another 2006 SCR 55 (A)
  298. S. 497 — Contains the words that “accused may be released on bail” — It is entirely the discretion of the Court to allow bail or not — The law does not convey that where the bail application is moved then it must be disposed of despite the fact that the trial has been concluded — Where the trial is concluded the Courts usually decline to consider the bail application and always prefer that the case should be decided finally so that the lower Courts should not gather any impression. Masood Ahmed v. The State & another 2007 SCR 131 (B)
  299. S. 497 deals with a case which is still pending or in which trial has not been completed — The discretion vests in the Court to enlarge an accused on bail if he is detained or before the Court in a non-bailable offence but it further provides that such person shall not be released if reasonable grounds appear to believe that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment or imprisonment for 10 years — Except the conditions laid down in the sections an accused-convict person can be released by the Court but at the same time the provisions are not absolute and the Court can look into the facts of the case and record its findings for or against the accused-convict. Abdul Ghafoor v. Muhammad Ajaib Khan and another 2007 SCR 460 (F)
  300. S. 497 — Bail — In almost all bail cases the provisions of section 497 are to be considered, which, among others include reasonable grounds to connect the accused with offences punishable with death or transportation of life or for an imprisonment exceeding 10 years period — Respondents have been charged of an offence involving Qisas and one of legal heirs of the deceased has waived his right of Qisas — The trial Court in such like eventualities can record 14 years rigorous imprisonment if the case is found to be one of fisad-fil-ardh  This stage is, however, still subject to the findings of trial Court after perusal of record and evidence of the prosecution and consideration of defence version, i any. It cannot, at all, be held at this stage that the respondents have been charged of a case punishable for 14 years imprisonment on the basis of fisad-fill-ardh .Kabul Hussain v. Shaukat Hussain & 3 others 2010 SCR 290 (A)
  301. Amended s. 497 Cr.P.C. — amended section reveals that such accused who is involved in the offences punishable with death, is detained for a continuous period exceeding 2 years and the trial has not been completed and in the opinion of Court, delay in the trial has not been occasioned by an act or omission of accused or any other person acting on his behalf, shall be released on bail. A further proviso has been added that previously convicted offenders for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or person who in the opinion of Court is a hardened, desperate, dangerous criminal or accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life shall not be entitled for concession of bail on the ground of delay. Farzana Imtiaz v. Tariq Hussain & another 2014 SCR 149 (B)
  302. Section 497, Cr.P.C. — Bail on the ground of statutory delay — cancellation of bail — contention that the accused falls in the category of hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal — under amended Section 497 Cr.P.C , accused shall be released on bail if trial has not been concluded within a period of 2 years and delay has not been occasioned on his part but hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal will not be entitled to bail — Courts are empowered to make tentative assessment of evidence and determine whether the accused falls in the category of hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal or not. Held: there may be reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation of life but it is not necessary that on the basis of such grounds the accused is also a hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal. Further held: mere cause of death by firing is not sufficient for declaring an accused as a hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal. Farzana Imtiaz v. Tariq Hussain 2014 SCR 149 (C) PLD 1990 SC 934, 1998 SCR 146, 2001 SCR 1, PLD 1986 Peshawar, 92 and 1996 P.Cr.L.J. 22 ref.
  303. Section 497, Cr.P.C. — bail — cancellation of — from the material placed before the Court it appears that there is no enmity between the parties. Occurrence was not pre planned, it took place when parties were negotiating over the sale/purchase of motorcycle. Altercation started. Deceased was done to death by firing. The act of accused does not appear to be that of hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal. Farzana Imtiaz v. Tariq Hussain & another 2014 SCR 149 (D)
  304. Section 497 — bail — the Court may release on bail any person, accused of non-bailable offence but the accused shall not be so released if there appears reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or 10 years.  Under section 497(2) Cr.P.C. the Court at any stage of the inquiry or trial may release the accused in non-bailable offence if there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt. Asjad Mahammod v. The State & another 2014 SCR 173 (A)
  305. Section 497 Cr.P.C. — bail — grant of — argument that the case does not fall under the prohibitory clause, held: is not convincing as nobody can claim bail as a matter of right.  Each case has its own peculiar facts and circumstances. Manzoor H. v. Ghulam Abbas & another 2014 SCR 424 (B)
  306. Section 497 — Although the ground of further inquiry depends upon the peculiar facts of each case, however the Court has ample powers even to refuse the bail application in the offences which do not fall under the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C. Liaquat Hussain v. The State & another 2015 SCR 441 (A)
  307. Section 497 — bail on statutory grounds — Scope — Under proviso, if the trial is not concluded within a period of two years in the cases involving death sentence and delay is not occasioned due to the act of accused or any other person acting on his behalf then the accused is entitled for concession of bail— A further proviso has been added that if the accused appears to the Court to be a dangerous, hardened and desperate criminal, he shall not be released on bail. Karamat Hussain v. Khalid Mehmood & others 2015 SCR  1177 (A)  Irfan and another vs. State through AdvocateGeneral and another (Criminal Appeal No.7of 2013, decided on 26th September, 2013), 1998 SCR 146, 2000  SCR  1, 2014  SCR 750 & 2014 SCR 934.  ref. 
  308. Section 497 — bail on statutory grounds — cancellation of — There is general allegation of firing against all the 12 persons — No specific role or such act which may create fear in society is attributed towards the accused (herein) on the basis of which it can be said that the accused respondents are hardened and desperate criminals. Karamat Hussain v. Khalid Mehmood & others 2015 SCR 1177 (B)
  309. In non-bailable offences — It is not absolute rule that the bail in non-bailable offences cannot be granted to an accused.  If from the tentative assessment of the material brought on record, it appears that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence but the sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt appear then the Court may release such accused on bail under section 497, Cr.P.C. Liaquat H. v. The State 2015 SCR 441 (B)
  310. Bail in non-bailable offences — if sufficient grounds appear for further inquiry — after tentative assessment of the evidence — if some doubts are arising into the guilt of an accused — Held: it is not absolute rule that the bail in non-bailable offences cannot be grated to an accused. if from the tentative assessment of the  material brought on record, it appears that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence but the sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt appear then the Court may release such accused on bail under section 497, Cr.P.C. — Further held — in the case falling under the prohibitory clause, the Court after tentative assessment of the evidence if comes to the conclusion that prima facie some doubts are arising into the guilt of an accused, the Court is empowered to exercise its discretion in favour of the accused and may release him on bail. Liaquat Hussain v. The State & another 2015 SCR 1544 (C)
  311. Bail — injuries not on the vital part of the body — The punishment for causing such an injury as shown in the medical report is three years’ imprisonment and offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C. — bail up held. M. Arshad v. M. Younis 2016 SCR 512 (B)
  312. Section 497 — grant or refusal of bail — The grant or refusal of bail in cases punishable with death or imprisonment for life or for 10 years must be determined judiciously having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The provisions of Section 497, Cr.P.C. are not punitive in nature regarding the offences punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for ten years, as there is no concept of punishment before judgment under law. Sudheer Shah alias Kala Shah v. The State and another 2016 SCR 1653 (A)
  313. Section 497 — Word & Phrase — The word/phrase contained in Section 497 ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe is of high import and meaning, requiring the prosecution to show to the Court of law that it is in possession of sufficient material/evidence, constituting ‘reasonable grounds’ that the accused has committed an offence falling within the prohibitory limb of Section 497, Cr.P.C. Sudheer Shah alias Kala Shah v. The State and another 2016 SCR 1653 (B)
  314. Section 497, — bail on statutory grounds — 33 witness in the case — more than two years has been passed — the statement of only 7 witnesses has been recorded — no delay on the part of the accused — Held:  accused entitled for concession of bail. A. Qayyom v. State 2016 SCR 647 (A)
  315. Section 497 — Bail in non-bailable offence — when any person accused of a non-bailable offence is brought before the Court, he may be released on bail but he shall not be so released if there is a reasonable ground for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or for ten years. Abdul Qayyom v. State & another 2016 SCR 647 (B)
  316. Section 497, Cr.P.C. — section 302, APC — Bail — grant of — Section 497 provides that any person accused of non bailable offence — may be released on bail but he shall not be so released, if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or for 10 years. An offence under section 302, APC, is punishable to different sentences including the death sentence which falls in the prohibitory clause and under the proviso if his case appears to be one of further inquiry, the accused may be released on bail. Farzana Imtiaz v. Tariq Hussain & another 2014 SCR 149 (A)
  317. Section 497 — bail grant of — offence u/s 302, APC falls in the — Prohibitory clause — If the Court reaches the conclusion that the case of accused falls in the ambit of further inquiry then the Court may release him on bail. Abdul Qayyom v. State & another 2016 SCR 647 (C)
  318. Section 497, — bail on statutory grounds — proviso — In the cases where the sentence is of life imprisonment or death and the trial is not concluded within two years and delay has not been caused due to accused or any person acting on his behalf, the accused has a statutory right to be released on bail. The only embargo placed in the proviso is that a person who is dangerous, hardened and desperate criminal, shall not be released on bail. Abdul Qayyom v. State & another 2016 SCR 647 (D) Irfan and another vs. The State and another, (Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 2013, decided on 24th September, 2013), 1998 SCR 146 & 2000 SCR 1 rel.
  319. Section 497 Cr.P.C — bail on statutory grounds — grant of — No direct evidence — The witness, a near relative of the deceased  and an inhabitant of the locality — Humanely, it is not possible that when two persons have been murdered and the witness remains silent and does not disclose the offence to anybody or not states that he is the witness of any event leading to the occurrence — Held: The testimony of such witness is not beyond the doubt and cannot be believed in ordinary circumstance — For the sake of arguments, if the statement of this witness is believed, then too, it cannot be said that the accused appellant is a dangerous, hardened and desperate criminal — bail granted. Abdul Qayyom v. State & another 2016 SCR 647 (E)
  320. —Section 497—bail—offences under section 418,420 and 489-F—cancellation of—disputed amount—admitted—accused on bail—the Court held: Ishtaq Ahmed vs Muhammad Ayoub & others 2018 SCR 552 (A)
  321. —Section 497—APC—-Section 298—ATA—section 31— bail— cancellation of—Held: the alleged offences are bailable in which the punishment provided under law is 3 years—in such like case, the grant of bail is a right and not the grace. Parveen Akhtar Chaudhary v. Rifat Rani & others  2022 SCR 714 (A) PLD 1995 SC 34 rel
  322. — section 497 — Azad Penal Code, 1860, section 302 — bail — grant of — according to contents of FIR, accused-appellant along with the co-accused fired at deceased and specific active role is attributed — prima facie, reasonable ground for believing that accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment of 10 years — the provisions of section 497 (1), Cr.PC are attracted which imposes an embargo to release the accused on bail — the benefit of section 497 (2) Cr.PC can be given when there is an ambiguity in the role attributed to the accused — u/s 497 (2)  Cr.PC, if it appears to an officer or Court at any stage of investigation, inquiry or trial, as the case may be, that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed non-bailable offence, but there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into  his guilt, the accused shall, pending such inquiry, be released on bail — no such eventuality is available, which may make the case one of further inquiry and bring the case in the ambit of section 497 (2) Cr.Pc. Ahmed Basharat versus State & another 2023 SCR 1026 (C) 2017 YLR 1238
  323. S. 497 & 498 — Powers of High Court — Bail — In the instant case even it has also not been mentioned “notwithstanding the provisions of sections 497 and 498 Cr.P.C. the powers of High Court in granting bail to an accused person have been ousted” — It has simply been mentioned that “no Court except Ehtesab Court, shall have jurisdiction to grant bail to any person accused of any offence under this Act” — The language employed in the section is, in our view, clear manifestation of the fact that the Legislature never intended the meanings as has been suggested by the learned Chief Prosecutor Estesab Bureau — This shows that the ouster of jurisdiction enjoyed by a Court of equal or parallel jurisdiction appears to have been intended by the law makers. The State & another v. Javed Iqbal 2001 SCR 1 (G)
  324. S. 497, 498 — Any person accused of any non-bailable offence shall not be released on bail if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life unless the case is covered by any of provisions of sub-section(1) of section 497 — Accused involved in a non-bailable offence shall be released on bail at any stage of investigation, inquiry or trial, if there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence but there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt under sub-section (2) of section 497. Abdul Qayyum v. Adalat and 3 others 2002 SCR 552 (A)
  325. In this case the accused-respondents were tried and ultimately acquitted by a Court of competent jurisdiction of the charges levelled against them under sections 497, 498, 109, Penal Code. In the private complaint filed by the appellant the incident alleged against the accused respondents is the same which took place in the year 1977. The charges levelled against the respondents are almost similar and inter-linked to those which were levelled in the year 1977 with the exception of one charge — Held: The accused-respondents cannot be vexed twice for the same incident or the occurrence for which they were tried by a competent Court of law and were ultimately acquitted. Noorullah v. Mst. Phullan & another 1995 SCR 396 (B)
  326. S. 497(1) fourth proviso — The question as to whether an accused is hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal is to be seen in light of the circumstances of each case, i.e.(I) the motive for murder, (ii) the part which each of the accused played in the completion of the offence, (iii) prima facie evidence in support of the incriminating act attributed to the accused persons, and (iv) the effects of the act of the accused on the family of the victims and on the society at large — Considering the acts attributed to the accused-appellants along with other principles, we are of the opinion that in view of the different strings of the prosecution story which, prima facie, implicates the accused-appellants with the commission of offence of murder of five innocent persons, it cannot be said that the acts attributed to them are such that they are not desperate or dangerous criminal persons within the meaning of fourth proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. M. Aziz v. The State 2000 SCR 1 (A)
  327. 497(1) — Proviso 1 — Bail grant of — Persons sick and under age of 16 years — Under provision 1 to sub-section (1) of Section 497, Cr.PC the Court may direct that a sick or infirm person or a person under the age of 16 years be released on bail and if from the record the Court reaches at the conclusion that the sick or infirm person is suffering from such an ailment, the treatment of which is not possible in the judicial lock up then the Court may release such person on bail. But if from the record the Court reaches at a different conclusion that a person is not suffering from such an ailment or treatment of such person is possible without releasing him on bail then the Court may refuse to release him on bail of course keeping in view the circumstances and facts of the case. Akhtar Hussain & another v. The State and another 2010 SCR 455 (A)
  328. S. 497(1), third proviso — bail on statutory grounds — disentitlement from bail — on statutory ground — Held: that the hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal is not entitled to get the concession of bail on statutory ground of delay in conclusion of the trial. Shuakat Aziz & another v. Ansar Ali and another 2014 SCR 934 (A)
  329. S. 497(1), fourth proviso — bail on statutory grounds — grant of.  Mere allegation that accused was involved in heinous offence does not disentitle him to bail on the statutory grounds, which conferred upon him a right to be released on bail. Shuakat Aziz v. Ansar Ali 2014 SCR 934 (D)
  330. S. 497(1), fourth proviso — bail on statutory grounds — delay in trial — discretionary powers of the Courts — the word ‘shall’ used in the proviso — makes it obligatory for the Courts to grant the bail to an accused where the trial is not concluded in the specify period and the accused is not responsible for such delay.  However, an embargo has been placed that the accused previously convicted for an offence of death or imprisonment for life, hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal shall not be released despite the fact that the trial is not concluded within the statutory period. In the absence of these elements the Court must exercised its discretionary powers in a judicial manner. The Courts are not supposed to exercise their discretion in arbitrary manner. Shuakat Aziz & another v. Ansar Ali and another 2014 SCR 934 (F)
  331. S. 497(1), 3rd proviso — bail — on statutory ground — delay in conclusion of trial — the right of an accused to be enlarged on bail — is a statutory right — according to the — said provision the right of bail has been given to an accused if the trial could not be concluded within the stipulated period of two years, subject to some conditions imposed therein. The right of an accused to be enlarged on bail under 3rd proviso to section 497, Cr.P.C. is a statutory right which cannot be denied or defeated under the discretionary power of the Court to grant bail. Subaedar Muhammad Azam v. Imran Hussain alias Mani & 2 others 2014 SCR 953 (A)
  332. S. 497(1), 3rd proviso — bail — the right of an accused to get bail under 3rd proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. is not left up to the discretion of the Court but is controlled by that provision. Subaedar Muhammad Azam v. Imran Hussain alias Mani & 2 others 2014 SCR 953 (B)
  333. S. 497(1), 3rd proviso — bail on statutory grounds — delay in trial — conditions for refusal of bail under the said provisions — enlargement on bail of an accused can be refused — if the delay caused is attributed to the accused. It can also be refused if the case of the accused falls in the conditions imposed therein, i.e. if he is hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal and if a case falls in above said three terms, the bail can be refused in spite of the fact that the trial could not be concluded within the stipulated period. Subaedar M. Azam v. Imran H. alias Mani  2014 SCR 953 (C)
  334. S. 497(1), 3rd proviso — bail on statutory grounds of delay in trial — Important factors — for giving the benefit of said provision — the manner of occurrence, contents of FIR and accumulative effect which comes on the record are important factors which are also kept in mind while giving the benefit of above said provision of law. Subaedar Muhammad Azam v. Imran Hussain alias Mani & 2 others 2014 SCR 953 (H)
  335. Section 497 (I) — Bail on the statutory ground — Held: After going through the above said provisions, it appears that there is no ambiguity that bail can only be refused on the grounds, mentioned therein, otherwise, bail cannot be withheld. Iftikahr Mehmood v. State & another 2015 SCR 1060 (C)
  336. —Section 497 (1) 4th proviso—hardened, desperate, and dangerous criminal— the manner of commission of offence is very much necessary to be considered while declaring an accused as hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal. In the case in hand, prima facie the manner of commission of offence was very unbecoming and inhuman which created panic, fear and insecurity to the general public— the main accused, who initially inflicted a blow by a screwdriver on the head of the deceased. Thereafter, he constantly beaten the deceased along with co-accused, and when the deceased was seriously injured they thrown him from the vehicle— Both the accused acted in a brutal manner and their case is fully covered under the 4th proviso to sub-section 1 of section 497, Cr.P.C. Thus, the accused are not entitled to get the bail on the statutory ground. Muhammad Farooq v. The State & another 2017 SCR 491 (A)  2014 SCR 934 rel.
  337. S. 497(2) (as amended) third proviso — Bail — Grant of — Accused-appellants filed appeal that they may be released on bail because they had been in confinement for more than two years — Held: Third proviso had not become operative law because the Ordinance has not been published in Official Gazette — Appellant has no legal right for grant of bail. M. Tariq Khan v. The State 1997 SCR 318 (K)
  338. S. 497(2) (as amended) — Bail — Ordinance through which third proviso to section 497 Cr.P.C. was sought to be added was not promulgated and thus never assumed force and effect of an Act of Assembly — Held: There is no law in force under which bail can be granted. Muhammad Tariq Khan v. The State and another 1997 SCR 318 (I)
  339. S. 497 (2) — Bail — Grant of — Further inquiry — Held: It is yet to be determined whether complainant party was aggressor or the accused — Bail granted. Nazir Ahmad Khan & 3 others v. State 1998 SCR 95 (F)
  340. S. 497(2) — Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324/337/34 — Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), S.42 — Attempt to commit qatl-e-amd, causing Shajjah, common intention — Appeal against grant of bail — Scope — Respondent/accused, who was nominated in the F.I.R., had been attributed a single pistol shot, which hit the appellant/complainant at his right leg, which was non-vital part of the body — Allegation of firing against co-accused was not found correct, which had made the case one of further inquiry — Medical report revealed that the injury was “Jurh Ghair Jaifah Hashimah”, which was not punishable with death or transportation for life, but the punishment provided for such an injury was five years imprisonment — Case, in circumstances, did not fall under the prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C. — Deeper appreciation of evidence at bail stage was not warranted; and only a bird eye view had to be taken — If the Court while granting bail had not violated the principles laid  down for grant of bail, its cancellation was not proper — Once the bail had been granted, for its cancellation, there must be strong and exceptional grounds/reasons — In the present case, it was yet to be determined as to whether the case of accused fell within purview of S. 324, P.P.C. or not which was to be decided at the time of trial by the Trial Court; which had not yet commenced — Investigation of the case, was already complete and respondent/accused was no more required for further investigation — Cancellation of bail at such a stage, would not serve any useful purpose — No illegality or irregularity was found in the order passed by the Shariat Court, while extending the concession of bail to the accused — Appeal against order granting bail to accused, was dismissed, in circumstances. Waqar Aslam v. Zargham Haider Shah 2012 SCR 38  Tariq  Bashir and 5 others v. The State PLD 1995 SC 34; Abdul Khaliq v. State and another 2010 SCR 402; Raja M.Irshad v. M. basher Goraya and others 2006 SCMR 1292; Suba Khan v. M. Ajmal and 2 others 2006 SCMR 66  and Ehtesab Bureau, Azad Jammu and Kashmir v. Muhammad Hanif Shaikh and another 2004 PCr. LJ 996 rel.
  341. S. 497(2) — Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 337-A/337-E/ 337-F(vi)/ 452/427/147/148/149 — Shajjah, Ghayr-Jaifah,  Munaqqilah, house trespass, mischief, rioting, common object — Bail, grant of — Further inquiry — Contention of counsel for accused that according to statutory provision, alleged injury fell under the provision of Ss. 337-E, 337-F, P.P.C., providing punishment of 7 years, found support from the statute — Punishment provided by law for alleged offence, was not 10 years — If the alleged offence, did not fall within prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C., the general principle, was bail not jail — Case of accused did not fall within the prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C. — F.I.R. was not promptly lodged — Prosecution witnesses had not shown any reaction despite attack on female members of their family —- More than 5 persons according to prosecution version with preplanning and having common intention, raided their house, but except the arm facture of an old lady, no other single bruise had been caused to any other family members — Such factors had made the case of accused one of further inquiry — Accused against whom the allegation of commission of offence was levelled in which the maximum punishment did not fall within the prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C. was also entitled to bail, unless extraordinary compelling circumstances would make the case for refusal of bail — Case of accused was not of such a nature in which the concession of bail could be refused — Accused was behind the bars since last more than 5 months, but not a single witness had been produced by the prosecution before the Trial Court — Accused was admitted to bail, in circumstances. Abdul Razzaq v. State 2012 SCR 325
  342. Section 497(2) — pre-requisite in the grant of bail — The pre-requisite in the grant of bail by virtue of section 497(2), Cr.P.C., is that the Court must be satisfied by the opinion expressed by the police that reasonable grounds are available to believe that accused was not guilty of the offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Zaheer Ahmed v. Ibrar H.  2014 SCR 1667 (I)
  343. Section 497 (2) — Bail grant of — If the Court finds that two essential conditions contained in section 497 (2), Cr.P.C., are satisfied, the accused shall become entitled as of right to bail. Held: when an accused person becomes entitled as of right to bail under section 497(2), Cr.P.C., bail cannot be withheld on the ground of practice because, the latter is relatable to exercise of discretion while the former is relatable to the exercise and grant of right. Liaquat Hussain v. The State & another 2015 SCR  441 (D) PLD 1989 SC 585 & Muhammad Arif Vs. Babar & another (Criminal appeal  No. 76 of 2012, decided on 4.2014  rel.
  344. Section 497 (2) — bail — power of Court — further inquiry — prohabitory clause — case one of further inquiry — under the purview of section 497, Cr.P.C. Held: the ground of further inquiry depends upon the peculiar facts of each case. Further Held: the Court has ample powers even to refuse the bail application in the offences which do not fall under the prohibitory clause of section 497. Liaquat Hussain v. The State & another 2015 SCR 1544 (B)
  345. Section 497 (2) — two essential conditions — if satisfies the Court, the accused shall become entitled as of right to bail — Held: when accused person becomes entitled as of right to bail under section 497(2) bail cannot be withheld on the ground of practice because, the latter is relatable to exercise of discretion while the former is relatable to the exercise and grant of right. Liaquat Hussain  v. The State & another  2015 SCR 1544 (F)  PLD 1989 SC 585 & Muhammad Arif Vs. Babar & another (Criminal appeal No. 76 of 2012, decided on 4.2014 rel.
  346. S.497(2)(1), Proviso, r/w S. 302/34, A.P.C. — Occurrence of murder — Role of lalkara — Bail matter —Tentative assessment of accused — In F.I.R. only allegation of lalkara to do away with other companion of deceased had been levelled against accused-respondent — No other active role had been attributed to accused-respondent — Allegation of lalkara for purpose of bail would fall within scope of providing lalkara and make a case of further inquiry — Statements of two PWs had allegedly been recorded in Trial Court — Shariat Court had released accused-respondent on bail on ground of advance age — Even from appearance accused-respondent looked to be a person of advance age and felt difficulty in walking — Shariat Court had exercised discretion in a legal fashion not in accordance with rules governing bail matters — Appeal was dismissed by Supreme Court. BAIL — (Lalkara) In instant occurrence of murder, mere allegation of Lalkara was assigned to respondent-accused. Bail was rightly granted by Shariat Court, Supreme Court dismissed appeal. State through Adv. General v. M. younas and others 2013 SCR 92 (B)
  347. S. 497 (2), 498 — Bail granted by the Courts below — The discretion exercised by the learned Sessions Judge and the Shariat Court cannot be interfered with. Muhammad Yunus and another v. Malik Muhammad Nawaz and 5 others 1997 SCR 125 (E)
  348. S. 497(4)(as amended) r/w S.41 of the Interim Constitution Act — Sub section (4) of section 5 of General Clauses Act is clearly in consistent with the Constitution and must be ignored — The Ordinance does not have the force of law when it is signed by the President but takes effect from the date of its promulgation. M. Tariq Khan v. The State and another 1997 SCR 318 (J)
  349. No appeal was pending as such the question of bail u/s 426 does not arise — Appellant could approach under sections 497 & 498 Cr. P.C. but not under section 426 Cr. P.C. from the Court which has become ‘functus officio’ as no appeal remained pending with it. Intizar Hussain Shah v. Zarda Begum & another 2004 SCR 117 (B)
  350. S. 497 r/w Ss. 406, 408, 409, 420, 468, 469, 471, APC. — Appellants allegedly misappropriated amount of account holders who gave the same to them for depositing into their respective accounts but instead of depositing amount, they embezzled the amount and issued deposit slip with their signatures — Bail plea in Supreme Court — Documentary evidence — Tentative assessment of record — Handwriting Expert’s report was in affirmative which itself negated version of appellants — One of accused-appellants had deposited partial amount in cash during investigation which was also one of supporting factors of alleged guilt — Material collected by prosecution which prima facie connected accused with commission of alleged offence was sufficient to believe that they had committed offence in question which fell under prohibitory clause — Due to act of appellants, confidence of general public was badly shaken — Bail after arrest refused. BAIL — (Misappropriation) Malik Mudassar Hayat v. The State 2013 SCR 854 (A)
  351. S. 497(5) r/w Ss. 302/34/109, APC — Occurrence of murder — F.I.R. — Matter of cancellation of bail in Supreme Court — Allegation of Lalkara — Tentative assessment of material/record — None of PWs in their statements recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. had attributed any role to said respondent-accused — Mere presence on spot was attributed to respondent — Even alleged Lalkara was not specifically attributed to said respondent nor specific wordings were alleged that Lalkara was made in specific words to do away with life of deceased or any such other words — Mere allegation of Lalkara could not be made a ground for cancellation of bail — There was no evidence of pre-planning or pre-concert that accused respondents made a planning for committing crime — Alleged occurrence appeared to be one of sudden fight — In absence of any evidence in respect of planning, question of vicarious liability did not arise — Trial Court as well as Shariat Court had correctly observed that there was no reasonable grounds to connect accused with crime in question — Criminal appeal dismissed/cancellation of bail after arrest refused. CANCELLATION OF BAIL.  — (Lalkara)
  352. [Bail could not be cancelled merely on ground of Lalkara. Supreme Court dismissed appeal]. [Shoaib Anwar Versus Malik Muhammad Iqbal and 5 others 2013 SCR (SC AJ&K) 1195 (C)
  353. Provisions of section 498 Cr. P.C. are subsidiary and ancillary to section 497 Cr. P.C. — Courts while passing orders u/s 498 are bound to look into the restrictions contained in the provisos to S.497 Cr. P.C. — Mere fact that any person accused of an offence for which punishment of death, life imprisonment or imprisonment exceeding 10 years can be recorded, would not be sufficient to deprive his liberty — Courts have to consider reasonable grounds at a higher pedestal than mere suspicion and allegation before depriving an accused person from his liberty — If reasonable grounds are not available and the grounds which exist need further inquiry the case will fall u/s 497(2) in which bail cannot be withheld as of punishment — If pre-arrest bail is granted at an earlier stage and later on material connecting accused person with the offence becomes available the indulgence of the Court can be craved for cancellation of bail u/s 497(5) Cr. P.C. — Trial Court can be moved even for cancellation of bail if the concession of bail allowed is violated by the accused person in any manner — Held: That the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no merit that after allowing bail the High Court had lost the jurisdictional competence to certain the application seeking cancellation of bail of the petitioner. Nasim and 2 others v. Ehtesab Bureau  AJ&K  2004 SCR 274 (B)
  354. S. 498 — Bail — Court at the stage of deciding question of bail. Held: Need not enter upon a detailed appreciation and examination of evidence — Question however, cannot be decided in vaccuum and Court has to look at the material available and form an opinion as to whether accused is prima facie connected with commission of offence of murder or not — If the Court comes to the conclusion that there is a prima facie case that the refusal of bail is a rule and grant of bail is an exception. M. Arshad & another v. M. Mushtaq and 5 others 2003 SCR 192 (A)
  355. S. 498 — Bail — Counter version — The counter version or the subsequent version in the subsequent challan should be of equal substance or of some truth but mere counter version or mere subsequent challan having no substance or appearing to be fake and fictitious, on the face of it, cannot be a ground for further inquiry and the release of accused on bail. Muhammad Arshad & another v. Muhammad Mushtaq and 5 others 2003 SCR 192 (D)
  356. —S. 498—pre-arrest             bail—concept      of—High          Court         or Court of Sessions(District Criminal Court) in any case, wherein right to appeal on conviction has been provided or not, may grant any person bail— powerof High Court or Court of Session are discretionary through which extra ordinary relief is granted to accused who apprehends imminent arrest—normally such discretion exercised judiciously cannot be recalled by the revisional or appellate Court. Muhammad Rashid vs Muhammad Israr & others 2018 SCR 397 (A)
  357. —S. 498—pre-arrest bail—grant of— main consideration for grant of pre-arrest bail is whether prosecution is motivated by malice so as to cause irreparable injury to citizen’s reputation, liberty, apprehension of harassment and undue humiliation by means of unjustified arrest— powers cannot be exercised in routine rather these can be exercised very sparingly where element of mala fide is patent—any good ground for post-arrest bail may be no ground for pre-arrest bail. Muhammad Rashid vs Muhammad Israr & others 2018 SCR 397 (C)
  358. — section 510 — evidence in murder case — reports of experts — handwriting expert not cited as witness and objection that report of expert is not worth consideration — u/s 510 Cr.P.C. besides report of other experts, the report of handwriting expert may be used as evidence without calling the said expert as witness — the Court may summon and examine the expert — report put to the convict u/s 342 Cr.P.C. — he admitted but did not make request for summoning of witness to cross examine — the objection cannot be entertained at this stage — at the stage of trial, defence was eligible to raise such like objection or file any application u/s 510 Cr.P.C. for summoning the expert to cross examine the same. Tanvir Ahmed Bhatti v. State & others 2023 SCR 514 (C)
  359. Section 512 — scope and purpose of — the purpose of proceedings under section 512, Cr.P.C., is that where there are no chances of the accused being found in near future and the evidence is likely to be destroyed, then it becomes necessary to record proceedings u/s 512 against the absconding accused and the evidence so recorded shall be preserved. Strict proof is required about absconsion of accused for bringing in motion the proceedings u/s 512, Cr.P.C.  For recording evidence u/s 512, Cr.P.C. in absence of the accused, it is necessary that the Court shall be satisfied that the accused has absconded. Muhammad Iqbal v. Allah Ditta & another 2014 SCR 461 (A)
  360. S.514 – forfeiture of surety bond — The system of releasing the accused on bail is of importance to the administration of justice, but overall circumstances of a case are to be kept in mind while deciding the question as to what extent the forfeiture of amount be realised from a surety — Appellants did not make any effort in procuring the appearance of the accused — If undue leniency is shown in a case where the sureties are related to the accused persons or they acted out of benevolence, this would encourage the abscondence of the accused persons and frustrate the very purpose for which the surety bonds are required in bail cases. 1995 SCR 141 (A) Soofi Muhammad Shafi Baig Vs. Robkar Adalat (Cri. Appeal No. 17 of 1992 decided on 28.11.1992), 1990 SCMR 227, PLD 1963 SC. 47, Faiz Alam VS. Robkar Adalat (Cri. Appeal No. 9 of 1993 decided on 26.5.1993) referred and relied.
  361. S. 514 — Forfeiture of surety bond — A person who stands surety for any accused person is bound by law to deposit the total amount of surety bond if the same is forfeited and the Court orders for its deposit in the Govt. treasury — The judicial discretion has to be exercised keeping in view the law. Muhammad Ayub  v.  Muzaffar Khan and another 2004 SCR 547 (A)
  362. S. 514 — Forfeiture of bond — Violation of S. 514 was committed by the trial Court — Court has to forfeit the bond on the day when the accused violated the condition of bond — In the present case neither a warrant for the attachment or sale of movable property issued nor the Court was satisfied that penalty cannot be recovered by such attachment or sale, sent the petitioner behind prison without following section 514(3) and (4) — Under section 514(4) an accused person can be sent to civil jail for a term which may extend to six months, but in the instant case the petitioner was sent to jail for unlimited period — Both the trial Court and the Shariat Court ordered that he shall remain in jail till realisation of the amount — Both the Courts illegally detained the appellant without any reasonable justification — Thus, the orders of the District Criminal Court and the Shariat Court are hereby set aside. Ch. Jameel Qayyum v. State 2008 SCR 108 (B)
  363. —S. 514– forfeiture of bond—recovery of bond amount—accused absconded—bond forfeited— Court may call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof or to show cause why it should not be paid. If sufficient cause not shown and the penalty not paid— the Court may proceed to recover the amount by attachment and sale of movable property—(Gist)   —For an offence u/s. 489-F. APC, appellant stood surety for the accused. The accused absconded the trial Court forfeited the bond. Notice was issued and after hearing the trial Court ordered for confiscation and recovery of an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- instead of 1,50,000/- High Court dismissed the appeal—Appeal by leave before the Court for further reduction of amount on the  ground that appellant stood surety on humanitarian ground. Held that:- “a tendency has developed in the society that after being released on bail, the accused often abscond, therefore, leniency in the matters of recovery of bond amount is not warranted”. Muhammad Munir v.        Robkar Adalat through Advocate General 2017 SCR 20
  364. — Section 514 — bond forfeited — absconded convict surrendered—held: the liability of sureties discharged—orders regarding forfeiture of surety bonds set aside. [Hadayat Khan & another versus State 2021 SCR 384 (A)
  365. S. 524 — Surety bond — Forfeiture of — Balance must be kept between too much ‘severity’ and too much ‘leniency’ — It depends on the circumstances of each case — Forfeited amount has already been reduced by the trial Court thus there is no reason to reduce the forfeited amount any further. Faizullah Khan & another v. Robkar-e-Adalat & another 1998 SCR 36 (A)
  366. S. 526 — Transfer of case — Issuance of notice is not mandatory — Want of notice does not amount to an illegality but certainly it does amount to impropriety. Dil Muhammad v. Muhammad Hanif 2004 SCR 72 (A)
  367. S. 526 Cr.P.C. — Transfer of criminal case by Shariat Court — A criminal case can be transferred by the Shariat Court if it finds that a fair and impartial inquiry or trial cannot be held in any criminal Court from one Court to another — This section may tend to general convenience of parties or witnesses or that such an order is expedient for the ends of justice. Amir Zaman & 2 others v. The State & another 2007 SCR 357 (A)
  368. Section 526 — application for transfer of the case — contention that as the impugned orders do not relate to disposal of a criminal case — Hence, limitation for filing of criminal PLA not applicable — Held: Admittedly, a criminal case under sections 406/34 APC is under trial — The accused-petitioner moved an application for transfer of the case from the Court of judicial Magistrate Mirpur to any other criminal Court of any other District. Such like applications are entertainable under the provision of sections 526 of the Cr.P.C.  Thus, it is a matter incidental and ancillary to a criminal case. For the purpose of filing the petition for leave to appeal, it will fall within the class of criminal cases. Anwar Hussain v. Usman Qamar & 2 others 2016 SCR 1452 (A)
  369. S. 526 (1)(E) — This provision provides that if ends of justice so require, a case can be transferred for trial from one Court to another Court and such a transfer can be ordered not only from one Criminal Court to other Criminal Court of equal jurisdiction but also of superior jurisdiction. Muhammad Mahroof Khan v. The State & 4 others 1996 SCR 141 (A)
  370. S. 539-B — The local inspection can be ordered by the Judge or the Magistrate at any stage of inquiry, trial or proceedings under section 539-B if it is necessary in his opinion for the purpose of properly appreciating the evidence — However, it can be done after due notice to the parties — It is the sole prerogative of the Court seized with the matter to hold local inspection and does not require the application by anybody — Nor can the objection of anybody deter the Court from holding the local inspection if, “it is in his opinion necessary for the purpose of properly appreciating the evidence” — He can form his opinion when the evidence is perused by him or such evidence is brought to his notice during arguments which necessitates the local inspection to enable it to appreciate the evidence. M. Shafiq v. M. Mahfooz & 7 others 2008 SCR 123 (A)
  371. —section 539-B, Cr.P.C—local inspection— A plain reading of the provision of section 539-B, Cr.P.C leaves no ambiguity that the local inspection is the sole discretion of the Court and the same is permitted only for the purpose of proper appreciation of the evidence in the case, which may be helpful to explain any point in the evidence. Irshad Ahmed v. The State & 2 others 2019 SCR 856 (A)
  372. S. 540 — Is intended to enable the Court to get at the truth as the ascertainment of truth is the primary duty imposed upon a Judge and he is not absolved to perform that duty merely because of technicalities — The Court has plenary powers for summoning a person as witness or re-examining any person at any stage if such evidence appear essential for just determination of controversy — This section gives wide discretionary powers  to a Court to examine any witness as a Court witness or to re-examine a witness for cross-examination — This discretion would not arbitrary, vague and fanciful — It should be exercised for the safe administration of justice in a judicious manner — Every party should be treated fairly without putting the other party in a disadvantageous position — No prejudice is caused to accused or undue advantage is given to prosecution — Court must guard against exploitation of this power by parties. M. Iqbal v. Sharafat  2003 SCR 148 (A)
  373. S. 540 — A Court may at any stage of inquiry, trial or other proceedings under this Code, summon any person as a witness or examine any person in attendance or to recall and re-examine any person already examined if his evidence appears essential to the just decision of the case — The provision of law consists of two parts, first part is discretionary and second is mandatory — The section gives unrestricted power to the Court to call evidence at any stage provided it is satisfied that it is essential for a just decision — The power reserved to the Court to call witness at any stage including to close of a case is intended to be used very sparingly and in emergent cases — The Court cannot use these powers to advance the cause of prosecution or that of the defence — The discretionary powers should be involved only to meet the ends of justice. G. Farid v. M. Shafique 2003 SCR 509 (A)
  374. S. 540 — Empowers the Court to summon any person as a witness or examine any person though not summoned as a witness and recall or re-examine any person when his evidence appears essential for the just decision of the case — The basic object of section 540 Cr.P.C. is to ascertain the truth for reaching at a proper conclusion. Azmat alias papu v. Mst. Nisa Begum 2007 SCR 67 (A) 2002 P.Cr.L.J. 614 rel.
  375. S. 540 — The primary duty of a Judge is to ascertain truth — He cannot be absolved from his duty merely on the basis of some technicality — The basic object of the enactment of law, rules and creation of Courts is to administer justice — Justice could not be administered without ascertaining the truth. Azmat alias Papu v. Mst. Nisa Begum 2007 SCR 67 (B) 2002 P.Cr. L.J. 1501 rel.
  376. S. 540 — The investigation agency, the counsel, the parties and witnesses are mere instruments for revealing truth for reaching at a proper conclusion and just decision — S. 540 is basically meant for recording statement of such person who can help the Court in reaching a just decision of the case — The powers under S.540 can be invoked in order to sift something which could not be brought on record either due to negligence of parties or due to their intentional act. Azmat alias papu & 3 others v. Mst. Nisa Begum & 2 others 2007 SCR 67 (C)
  377. —Section 540— empowers  the  Court  to  summon  and examine any person as a witness, re-call or re-examine  any  person  already  examined provided  that  the  same  is  essential  to  reach the  just  decision  of  the  case.  The said section confers wide discretionary powers on the Court in this regard; however, the Court is bound to examine or re-examine any person as a witness if his evidence appears to be essential for just decision of the case.  The discretion should be exercised judiciously and it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful. Nazir Hussain v. Muhammad Aslam Mir & 7 others 2017 SCR 499 (A)  2015 P.S.C. Crl. 63 & 2003 SCR 509 rel.
  378. —Section 540—reveals that at any stage the Court may exercise its powers for the ends of justice. Nazir Hussain v. Muhammad Aslam Mir & 7 others 2017 SCR 499 (B)
  379. —Section 540, Cr.P.C.—summoning of witness to re- examine—object of—stated—to ensure no failure of cause of justice or due to failure of either party, ambiguity crept in statement of examined witness — the object underlying section 540, Cr. P.C, is that it may not cause failure of justice or account of mistake of either party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of witnesses examined from either side; determinative question is whether certain evidence is essential for reaching a just conclusion of the case? Section 540 Cr. P.C, is general in nature which applies to all proceedings, trials, inquiries under Cr. P.C and empowers the code to summon any witness at any stage of inquiry or trial however discretion conferred upon the Court should be exercised judiciously as wider the power the greater the necessity for application of judicial mind. Munir Ahmed v. Kaleem Abbasi & others 2022 SCR 992 (B)
  380. — section 540 — re-examination of witness — Powers of Court — first part of statutory provision is discretionary whereas the second is mandatory — according to part one, it is discretion of the Court to summon any witness suo-moto or on application, whereas under second part, power to summon, examine, recall or re-examine any witness, is to be exercised if his evidence appears to be essential for just decision of case — solitary purpose behind this exercise is to find out truth, so that no innocent may be punished — if it appears essential to the Court that evidence is necessary for just decision, it would be obligatory under second part of statutory provision, for a Court to examine such witness ignoring technicalities and formal objections — the Court has to keep balance while exercising such powers that no party should be allowed to fill-up the gaps. Afaq Khan v. The State & others 2023 SCR 98 (A)
  381. — section 540 — re-examining of witnesses — purpose of — the Court is empowered to summon a person or re-examine a person already examined, at any stage of proceedings to call out the nuggets of truth from evidence, if such evidence appears essential for just determination of controversy involved in the matter — the legal provision extends wider discretionary powers to Court to examine any witness as a Court witness or summon a witness for cross examination for safe administration of justice — the basic object of law is that every party should be treated fairly without putting the other party in a disadvantageous position — Court should ensure that no prejudice is caused to the accused nor undue advantage is given to prosecution — the power must not be exercised to advance the case of prosecution or defense — Court must guard against exploitation of this power by the parties who had ample opportunity to produce evidence within their knowledge and must not put one of the parties in a position of advantage Faheem Afsar versus Muhammad Khursheed & another 2023 SCR 1063 (A)
  382. — section 540 — application for resuming of witnesses on the ground that the counsel who cross-examined witnesses was not authorized — accused has taken stance that he had not signed ‘vakalatnama’ — Court observed, if the stance of the accused is admitted even then under settled law; any defect or omission in signing ‘vakalatnama’ is mere an irregularity, which does not vitiate the proceedings — non-signing of ‘vakalatnama’, being a technical fault cannot be made basis for re-opening of matter nor on the ground, the witnesses can be recalled — technical approach which defeat justice, should not be permitted — accused in person appeared along with ‘x’ advocate, who cross examined the witnesses on behalf of accused and did not object, rather impliedly accepted him as his counsel. Faheem Afsar versus Muhammad Khursheed & another 2023 SCR 1063 (B)
  383. S. 540-A — Exemption from personal appearance — Conditions for — There are two conditions for exemption from personal appearance — First that the accused should be “before the Court” and the second that “incapable of remaining before the Court” — An absconding accused cannot claim any benefit  under this section — Grant or refusal of personal exemption from personal appearance is entirely the discretion of the Court — The discretion must be exercised judicially — Where the discretion has been properly exercised it should not be interfered with. Aziz Bi v. Fazal Hussain & another 2007 SCR 141 (A)
  384. S. 540-A — Exemption from personal appearance — Rule — While considering the application for exemption from personal appearance two things are to be considered — Firstly there should be two or more accused before the Court and secondly, if the Judge or Magistrate is satisfied that one or more of accused is or are incapable of remaining before the Court — The wisdom behind the rule of exemption from personal appearance is that when there is a large number of accused in a case and any one of them intentionally or unintentionally is absent, the trial will be delayed and the accused, who are present in the Court will suffer due to no fault of them — The said provision is to be interpreted in such a manner that it should be benevolent not only to the exempted person but also to other accused and is also convenient to the Court — The consideration should be expeditious disposal of the case and to avoid undue harassment to the other accused who are before the Court — The matter of exemption from personal appearance in the Court is in the discretion of the Court — The discretion must be exercised properly — The question whether in a case the discretion under said section has been exercised properly or not depends upon the circumstances of each case — It is necessary that the Court must pass a speaking order — The reason for an accused being incapable of remaining before the Court must be borne out  from the record — It is not necessary that an accused is incapable of remaining before the Court due to sickness or inadequate physical or mental condition — There must be other reasons such like of earning livelihood, service or performing other functions but exemption from personal appearance must be qualified with the condition that the accused shall be represented through a pleader or counsel — The Court shall not grant exemption to an accused on frivolous grounds.M. Anwar v. Naveed & others 2013 SCR  270 (A)
  385. S. 540-A — Exemption from personal appearance — Provision of — Contemplated — The said section postulates that if a Judge or Magistrate is satisfied for reasons to be recorded that if any one or more of the accused is or are incapable of remaining before the Court and such accused is presented by a pleader he can be dispensed with from personal appearance from attendance on every date of hearing  — He can be allowed to appear through the counsel  and trial may continue in absence of such accused  — Of course, the said section lays down that at subsequent stage of inquiry or bail, if the Court feels that the attendance of such accused is necessary and in the appropriate cases, after recording reasons, the Court can again order for appearance of such accused. Muhammad Anwar v. Naveed and 3 others 2013 SCR (SC AJ&K) 270 (B)
  386. Section 540-A, Cr.P.C. — exemption for personal appearance — the Judge or Magistrate at any stage of the trial or inquiry in case of two or more accused before the Court is satisfied for the reasons to be recorded may dispense with the attendance of one or more accused and permit to appear through pleader and may direct such person for appearance before the Court at any subsequent stage. Maqbool H. v. M. Suleman alias Abu Bakar & another 2014 SCR 113 (A)
  387. Section 540–A, Cr.P.C. — exemption for personal appearance — three condition; (I) there shall be two or more accused; (ii) the accused before the Court, and (iii) one or more of such accused is/ are incapable of remaining before the Court are necessary for passing an order of exemption from personal appearance. Maqbool H. v. M. Suleman alias Abu Bakar 2014 SCR 113 (B)
  388. Section 540-A, Cr.P.C.— Scope — exemption on the ground that the accused wants to proceed abroad for earning livelihood — Section deals with the situation, where number of accused before the Court is two or more — if any of the accused becomes incapable of remaining before the Court, the exemption can be granted. Held: the provisions of Section 540-A, Cr.P.C. are to be interpreted with benevolence. The aim of provisions of Section is to expedite the trial in absence of some of the accused if there are more than one accused in the case. Maqbool Hussain v. Muhammad Suleman alias Abu Bakar & another 2014 SCR 113 (C)
  389. Section 540-A, Cr.P.C. — Scope — exemption — accused applied for personal exemption on the ground that they want to proceed out of the jurisdiction of Court for earning livelihood — the accused were exempted — appeal dismissed. Maqbool H. v. Muhammad Suleman alias Abu Bakar & another 2014 SCR 113 (D)
  390. Section 540-A, — Exemption from attendance in the Court — If sufficient reasons are assigned, the Court is fully empowered to grant exemption — under the provisions of law as well as principle enunciated by the Courts, exemption from personal appearance cannot be refused to the accused woman merely on the ground that she is not pardanashin. Muhammad Rafique v. Shahzad Hussain & 8 others 2016 SCR 1124 (A) PLD 1973 Karachi 273 rel.
  391. —Section 544-A—Payment of compensation—when the accused is convicted under section 302, APC, and awarded death sentence as Qisas or Tazir, then he cannot be ordered to pay the compensation, however, when the sentence is altered to life imprisonment, the sentence of compensation can be awarded under section 544-A. Mst. Nazir Begum vs Muhammad Habib alias Shikra 2018 SCR 775 (B)
  392. section 544-A (2) — compensation — default in payment — maximum imprisonment — the learned Shariat Court while converting the death sentence into life imprisonment has directed for payment of Rs. 3, 00,000/- as compensation and in case of default in payment of compensation the convict will have to undergo further sentence of one year’s rigorous imprisonment. Perhaps, the statutory provision has escaped from the sight of the learned Shariat Court as according to the statutory provision in case of default, the period of maximum imprisonment prescribed is 6 months. Thus, in case of default of payment of compensation under section 544-A, Cr.P.C, the maximum imprisonment which a convict has to undergo is 6 months as is clearly ordained in the statutory provision. Tasawar H. v. The State & 9 others 2016 SCR 373 (F) PLD 1979 Lahore 551 rel.
  393. Ss. 540-A, 205, 353 — See AJ&K Islamic Penal Laws Enforcement Act, 1974, S. 25. Muhammad Anwar v. Naveed and 3 others 2013 SCR (SC AJ&K) 270 (C)
  394. S. 544-A — Mandatory and directory nature of — Where a person is convicted for an offence of commission of death the Court shall also award the compensation to legal heirs of deceased — When the Court did not award compensation it has to record reasons for it — It has been clearly provided in S.544-A.(1) Cr.P.C. Muhammad Khurshid Khan  v. Muhammad Basharat & another 2007 SCR 1 (U) PLJ 1996 SC 51, 1977 SCMR 471 and PLD 1976 SC 44 relied.
  395. Under section 544-A while awarding sentence of life imprisonment or other the Court could order for praying compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased — Omission to award sentence of compensation while awarding imprisonment for life under section 302 held to be serious error. M. Khurshid Khan  v. M. Basharat 2007 SCR 1 (T) 1990 P.Cr. L.J. 1646 and 1996 P.Cr.LJ.230 rel.
  396. Section 544-A, Cr.P.C. — Compensation to the legal heirs of deceased — Contention that it was obligatory for the Court to award compensation to the legal heirs of deceased persons — Section 544-A, Cr.P.C. was incorporated in Pakistan by Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 and adapted by an Act of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly and promulgated on 12th December, 2001 — The occurrence took place on 18th January, 1993 — Section 544-A Cr.P.C. was not applicable at the time of occurrence, therefore, the compensation cannot be awarded under section  544-A Cr.P.C. Ghulam Rasool & another v. The State and another 2011 SCR 324 (J)
  397. S. 550 Cr.P.C — The scope of this section is wide enough — Under this provision of law a police officer is competent to seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen or create suspicion of the commission of any offence — The vehicle, in discussion, was under use on forged registration papers, moreover the custom duty has not been paid — Order passed by the S.D.M. maintained by High Court — Appeal to this Court also dismissed. Kabir Hussain  v. State 2001 SCR 575 (A)
  398. S. 561-A Cr.P.C. is applicable where there is no specific provision — If another provision is available Courts do not pass order u/s 561-A — This Rule not inflexable and can be departed from if there are special circumstances in a particular case. Sher Alam  v. The State 1998 SCR 331 (A)
  399. 561-A–Read with Ss. 497/498 Cr.P.C. subsequent challan — Effect of — On the basis of report police submitted a challan u/s 173 Cr.P.C. — A subsequent challan was also submitted stating that accused-respondents were innocent, therefore they may be exonerated — Respondents moved an application for bail before the District Court of criminal jurisdiction — The matter was pending when an application for transfer of case was moved before the Shariat Court — The leaned Chief Justice of the Shariat Court treated the application as one u/s 561-A read with Ss. 497/498 Cr.P.C. and ordered the release of accused-respondents — It was ordered that when respondents are declared by the police innocent and deleted from the challan their detention is without lawful authority—Held: that Shariat Court in releasing the respondents did not apply its judicial mind — It simply followed the ipsi-dixit of police which is not the requirement of law — Held: also that it is a celebrated principle of criminal jurisprudence that no embargo can be placed on the powers of investigation of police — Even during pendency of challan the police is competent to reinvestigation and submit a supplementary challan — Courts of law have to from their own independent judicial opinion about the guilt of commission of non-bailable offence — Judgment of the Shariat Court was set aside — Case remanded to District Court of criminal jurisdiction to decide in the first instance the question whether to proceed against the accused-respondents on the basis of first challan or supplementary challan or both of them simultaneously. Muhammad Arshad and another  v. Muhammad Mushtaq and 5 others 2001 SCR 488 (A)
  400. Section 561-A — Inherent powers of the High Court are very wide and indefinable — The High Court in suitable cases can pass all such orders which may be necessary for real and substantial justice — However, powers u/s 561-A Cr.P.C. are not exercised in routine because these powers are neither alternative nor additional — These are invoked where no other specific provisions is available for redressal of grievance of an individual in the interest of justice — This provision cannot be invoked to make ordinary course of criminal procedure ineffective. Muhammad Yaseen v. Doctor Zafar Iqbal and 3 others 2004 SCR 338 (A)
  401. S. 561-A — Order passed in revisional jurisdiction — Invocation of inherent powers of High Court — Held: Where the revisional jurisdiction is exercised totally illegally or extravagantly and in fanciful manner, then the powers under said section can be exercised, if abuse of the process of the Court is established.  Saleem Akhtar v. Abdul Waheed and 6 others 2013 SCR 115 (B)
  402. Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. — scope — section confers powers upon the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code of Criminal Procedure or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Shan Muhammad v. Muhammad Younas & 4 others 2014 SCR 183 (B)
  403. Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. — inherent jurisdiction of High/Shariat Court — quashment of FIR at investigation stage — scope — order which can be made by the High/Shariat Court in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. — Exercise of inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. for quashment of FIR—the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the police to perform the duties in a particular sphere.  The registration of FIR and investigation of case is the sole duty of the police.  After registration of a cognizable case, the police has to collect the material and after thorough investigation it has to submit a report to the Magistrate.  If the police reaches the conclusion that from the material collected, the accused is connected with the crime, then challan has to be submitted.  If the police reaches the conclusion that there is no evidence, it may make a request in its report u/s 173 to the Magistrate for cancellation of case.  Held; the High Court/Shariat Court while acting under section 561-A Cr.P.C. has no powers to take the role of investigating agency and declare that the FIR was not correctly registered.  It has powers to interfere under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. for implementation of order of the Court and to secure the ends of justice.  If the proceedings are pending before any Court and it appears that there is abuse of process of Courts only then it can make order for quashment of proceedings.  It is settled that High Court/Shariat Court has no jurisdiction to quash the FIR at investigation stage under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Shan M. v. M. Younas 2014 SCR 183 (C) PLD 1976 SC 461, PLD 206 SC 598 and PLD 2007 SC 189 ref.
  404. S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. — inherent jurisdiction of Shariat Court — quashment of FIR — Shariat Court quashed the FIR on the ground that it has been lodged after a delay of l0 days, it has been registered with mala fide intention having ulterior motives to harass and pressurize the accused and it is case of glaring exercise of authority of police and if the proceedings are allowed, it will be sheer abuse of process of law.  This Court held that Shariat Court is not empowered to quash the FIR at investigation stage while exercising powers under section 561-A, Cr.P.C.  The police has yet to form a opinion after collecting the material whether the offence has been committed or not and present the report under section 173 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate.  There was no occasion for interference by the Shariat Court at investigation stage. Shan M. v. M. Younas & others 2014 SCR 183 (D)
  405. S. 561-A — powers of High Court and its scope — section 561-A confers wide powers in the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order of the Court or to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.  Such powers are very wide and of indefinable nature and in exercise of these powers, the High Court can make all such orders which may be necessary to do the real and substantial justice and to prevent the abuse of process of the Court subject only to limitation that it cannot override the express provision of the Code.  Atta-ur-Rehman v. Anjum Javaid & 9 others 2014 SCR 493 (A)
  406. Section 561-A — a direction under section 561-A, cannot be issued for registration of a case — direction for registration of a case can be issued by the High Court in writ jurisdiction. Atta-ur-Rehman v. Anjum Javaid & 9 others 2014 SCR 493 (B)
  407. Section 561-A — application to the High Court for registration of FIR — the provisions of section 561-A can be invoked for preventing the abuse of process of the Court and make such orders which are for doing substantial justice—the appellant wants a direction for registration of case. The process of Court will start when the case is registered.  After registration of the case the High Court can look into the matter whether it is necessary to intervene for doing the complete justice under section 561-A, or not.  Held: the application under section 561-A for a direction to the police for registration of FIR is not maintainable. Atta-ur-Rehman v. Anjum Javaid  2014 SCR 493 (C)
  408. Section 561-A — its scope—queshment of FIR — if according to the contents of FIR no offence is constituted or there is no disclosure of cognizable offence then powers u/s 561-A, Cr.P.C. can be exercised but held: when according to the contents of FIR prima facie commission of cognizable offence is disclosed, then the investigating agency is vested with the powers to draw conclusion after completion of necessary investigation. M. Saleem v. M. Zaman & others 2014 SCR 809 (B)
  409. Section 561-A — its scope — exercise of inherent powers by the High Court and Shariat Court under the provision — held: while exercising powers u/s 561-A, the High Court or Shariat Court cannot assume the role of investigating agency for the purpose of appreciation of the material which is yet to be finalized by the investigating agency.M. Saleem v. M. Zaman 2014 SCR 809 (C)
  410. Section 561-A — exercise of inherent powers — offence under sections 427, APC and 14, EHA — Shariat Court quashed the FIR — held: the Shariat Court cannot while exercising the inherent powers u/s 561-A interfere with the process of investigation or hamper the same.  If such practice is allowed, it may amount to interfere in the domain of investigating agency which is abuse of the process of law and Court.  Such practice must be avoided at all costs.  Muhammad Saleem v. Muhammad Zaman & 6 others 2014 SCR 809 (D) 1999 P.Cr.L.J. 258 rel.
  411. Section 561-A — queshment of FIR — offences under sections, 10/11, 16, ZHA & 109 APC — quashing of a criminal case under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. is an extraordinary remedy which can be invoked only in exceptional circumstances, i.e. when no case is made out against the accused, when no probability of conviction of the accused is existed or when there is sheer, abuse of the process of law. If such extraordinary circumstances exist, the Shariat Court under section 561-A, Cr.P.C can quash the F.I.R or even proceedings for that matter. Ashfaq-ur-Rehman & another v. SHO Police Station Thothal & 2 others 2016 SCR 1068 (A) 2009 SCMR 141 & 2013 SCR 42 rel.
  412. Section 561-A — queshment of FIR — alternate remedy under sections 249-A and 265-K, Cr.P.C. — powers of Shairat Court to quash an FIR during pendency of trial — Contention that as alternate remedy is available to the appellants to approach the trial Court while filing application under section 249-Cr.P.C. therefore, provisions of section 561-A, Cr.P.C cannot be invoked — Held: in such like cases, where the Court came to the conclusion that there is no iota of evidence on the basis of which conviction can be recorded and the trial of the case would be a futile exercise, the provisions of section 561-A, Cr.P.C. can be invoked without exhausting the remedy before the trial Court. The powers under section 249-A, 265-K and 561-A, Cr.P.C. are co-extensive and there is no absolute clog on the powers of Shariat Court to quash an F.I.R,  even during the pendency of trial — it is not necessary to direct accused to first exhaust remedy available under section 249-A or  265-K, Cr.P.C. Ashfaq-ur-Rehman v. SHO Police Station Thothal 2016 SCR 1068 (B) 2004 P.Cr.L.J. 606 rel.
  413. Ss. 561-A, 439, 145 — Initiation of proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. — Order for attachment of house was passed — Proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. — Prior to filing complaint before Magistrate and the order of Magistrate civil suit was already pending in the Court — Sessions Judge dismissed revision petition — Second revision petition in High Court was convicted into application for quashment of proceedings under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. and attachment order passed by Magistrate was quashed — It was argued that High Court was not justified in treating revision petition as application under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. when second revision petition was not competent — Validity — If the Magistrate had acted illegally, without lawful authority and the reasons given by the Sessions Court while agreeing with Magistrates were not legal and well-reasoned, and there was material irregularly in the order, it is an abuse of process of Court and in that case High Court order powers vested in S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. could interfere in the and recorded by Sessions Court under revisional jurisdiction. Saleem Akhtar v. Abdul Waheed and 6 others 2013 SCR (SC AJ&K)115 (C)
  414. S. 561-A r/w Ss. 337-F (iii), 337-F(vi), APC. — Murderous assault — Commission of occurrence — F.I.R.  — Accused-respondent moved an application under Section561-A, Cr.P.C. before Shariat Court on which proceedings pending before I.O. were quashed — Impugned order — Principle of law — Quashment of F.I.R. is not warranted and investigation start — No such evidence came on record from accused side on basis of which it could be ascertained by I.O. that no case was made out as the matter was at stage of investigation — Held: In instant case, no such eventuality of quashment of F.I.R. in question emerged — At this stage, application under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. was pre-mature — Further held: If a prima facie case is made out, the proper course is to investigate the matter and both the parties should be provided the fair opportunity to place their point of view before I.O. and after calculating the evidence provided by both the parties, if the I.O. and after calculating the evidence provided by both the parties, if the I.O. comes to the conclusion that no case is made out, then he is fully competent to recommend for the cancellation of the case — Even otherwise, if the challan is submitted before the Court of competent jurisdiction, the new situation emerges, then the accused has more than one remedy to move an application under Section 249-A and 265-K, Cr.P.C. as the case may be, before the trial Court seeking the acquittal — In instant case no such occasion arose and Shariat Court, without keeping in mind the principal laid down by superior Courts on the subject, had quashed proceedings — Criminal appeal accepted. QUASHMENT OF F.I.R. — (Exercise of inherent powers)[Allegation of murderous assault/case was under in Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. was pre-mature/Shariat Court had erroneously quashed impugned F.I.R./Supreme Court accepted appeal]. Muhammad Maqsood v. Zohaib Asghar and 8 others 2013 SCR  1139
  415. —Section 561-A—inherent jurisdiction—exercise of— Held: the inherent powers available to the High court u/s 561-Ahave to be brought into operation sparingly in special circumstances. Anwar Baig vs Sessions Judge & others 2018 SCR 868 (A)
  416. —Sections 561-A, 249-A and 265-K—powers of the Court—exercise of—petition u/s 561-A filed—Court held that final report has been submitted and the trial Court under sections 249-A, and 265-Kis vested with the powers to acquit the accused at any stage while recording reasons that there is no probability of the accused being convicted—all the grounds taken in the petition can be very effectively taken before the trial Court vested with the vast powers to attend all the grounds, points and objections raisedbefore it—Further held: the inherent powers are conditional and can be exercised under compelling circumstances for securing ends of justice and preventing the abuse of process of Courts. Anwar Baig vs Sessions Judge & others 2018 SCR 868 (A)
  417. —section 561-A—inherent powers of the High Court–exercise of— the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice—such powers cannot be exercised as a substitute for remedies otherwise made available under law—jurisdiction u/s561-A, can only be exercised in respect of orders or proceedings of a Court and not in respect of executive or administrative orders. Asad Muneer Khan V. The State & 16 others 2020 SCR 413 (B)
  418. —section 561-A—the powers vested can only be exercised with relevance to judicial proceedings. Asad Muneer Khan V. The State & 16 others 2020 SCR 413 (B)
  419. —section 561-A —exercise of powers by the High Court–scope of words “otherwise to secure the ends of justice” have to be read along with the earlier objects mentioned—these words cannot be interpreted to allow the High Court to pass any order in nonjudicial proceedings—words ‘ends of justice’ means justice administered by the Courts and not the justice in abstract sense. Asad Muneer Khan V. The State & 16 others 2020 SCR 413 (B)
  420.  —section 561-A—inherent jurisdiction of the High Court–exercise of powers—inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked, where alternate remedy is available— powers are meant to meet the lacuna in extraordinary cases—such powers are to be invoked when gross injustice is caused and no alternate and efficacious remedy is available—such powers cannot be extended to uncalled for and unwarranted interference with the procedure prescribed by law Asad Muneer Khan V. The State & 16 others 2020 SCR 413 (D)
  421.  —section 561-A—inherent jurisdiction of the High Court–exercise of—pendency of declaratory suit—suit pending in respect of ownership of vehicle, meaning thereby that party approached the proper forum for redressal of main grievance—it was not proper to set aside the order of sessions Judge while exercising powers under section 561-A, Cr.P.C.—the purpose of invoking provisions of section 561-A, Cr.P.C. is mainly to prevent abuse of process of Court and to secure the ends of justice– Subedar (R) Muhammad Hanif Khan v. Muhammad Nazir Khan & 3 others 2020 SCR 572 (A) 
  422. —section 561-A—inherent jurisdiction—exercise of—the powers under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. being extraordinary in nature has to be exercised sparingly with caution and only where such exercise of power is essential and justified—interference under section 561-A,Cr.P.C. will be justified where injustice is of clear character and there exists no other provision of law by which aggrieved can seek relief— Subedar (R) Muhammad Hanif Khan v. Muhammad Nazir Khan & 3 others 2020 SCR 572 (A)
  423.  —Section 561-A, Cr.P.C—-scope—determination of ownership of vehicle not judged u/s 561-A—-Held: the question of ownership of the alleged vehicle, as has been claimed by the learned Advocate for the appellant, can neither be judged by us nor the High Court in the application under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Muhammad Amin Khan v. The State through Advocate-General & 4 others 2020 SCR 802 (A)
  424.  —Section 561-A, CR.P.C—Scope—Quashment of FIR— Held: A bare reading of the said section reveals that; firstly, only those orders can be passed by the Court under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. which are necessary for implementation of the orders passed by any Courts under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and secondly, to prevent the abuse of the process of Courts and law. Under this section, the Court can also pass the order for securing the ends of justice. The quashment of the proceedings under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. is neither permissible nor justified until and unless the case of misuse of the process of law is pointed out. Muhammad Amin Khan v. The State through Advocate-General & 4 others 2020 SCR 802 (A)
  425. — Section 561-A—quashment of FIR— High Court or Shariat Court is not empowered to assume the role of investigating agency– if after completion of the investigation, the  agency reaches the conclusion that a cognizable offence is made out, the proper course is to investigate the matter while providing fair opportunity to both the parties —if the investigating agency reaches the conclusion that no case has been made out, then law empowers it to recommend for cancellation of the case—if the challan is presented in the Court the new situation emerges and the accused can file application under sections 249-A and 265-K, Cr.P.C but according to the settled law the High Court/Shariat Court has no jurisdiction to quash the FIR at investigating stage. Muhammad Nazir Versus Muhammad Aslam & 3 others 2021 SCR 124 (A) 2014 SCR 183 rel.
  426. — Section 561-A—Powers & Scope—the powers under section 561-A, Cr. P.C. being extraordinary in nature must be exercised sparingly with utmost care and caution and it should not be exercised in casual and cursory manner. Muhammad Nazir Versus Muhammad Aslam & 3 others 2021 SCR 124 (B)
  427. — Section 561-A— according to the settled principle of law, the High Court/Shariat Court cannot quash the FIR at investigation stage. Muhammad Nazir Versus Muhammad Aslam & 3 others 2021 SCR 124 (C)
  428. —Section 561-A, AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974— Art. 44–Quashment of FIR—Jurisdiction of the High Court— until the case completes its investigation phase, the High Court cannot intervene and quash the proceedings and assume role of the investigating agency— only extraordinary circumstances require such intervention. Mumtaz Hussain Versus State & 2 others 2021 SCR 605 (B)
  429. —Section 561-A—FIR—quashment of — exercise of powers by High Court—according to the spirit and scheme of law, it is duty of the Investigating Agency to conclude the investigation and draw the conclusion—no doubt, in the exceptional cases, if according to the contents of F.I.R, there is no disclosure of commission of cognizable offence, the powers u/s 561-A, Cr.P.C can be exercised, but according to contents of F.I.R, prima facie,  when the  commission of cognizable offence is disclosed, in such situation the investigating agency is vested with the powers to draw conclusion after completion of necessary investigation. Suriya Batool v. The State & others 2022 SCR 162 (A)
  430. —Section 561-A— exercise of powers by High Court— while exercising powers u/s 561-A, the High Court cannot assume the role of investigating agency for the purpose of appreciating the material which is yet to be finalized by the investigating agency— if such practice is allowed, it may amount to interfere in the domain of investigating agency, which is abuse of process of law and the Courts. Suriya Batool v. The State & others 2022 SCR 162 (A)
  431. —section 561-A, Cr.P.C.— jurisdiction of the High Court under section 561-A—legal distinction between filing of direct application for registration of case— and application to examine the vires of the order of Ex-officio Justice of Peace—Held: there is a legal difference between directly invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, under section 561-A, and knocking at the door of the High Court under the said section to examine the order of Ex- officio Justice of Peace. Sikandar Azam & others v. Zulqarnain Akhtar & others  2022 SCR 1133 (E) PLD 2015 SC 581 ref.
  432. —Section 561-A Cr.P.C—It would be safe administration of criminal justice to pronounce that the High Court has powers under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. to make judicial review of the order of the Ex-officio Justice of Peace to prevent the abuse of the process of law or to secure ends of justice. Sikandar Azam & others v. Zulqarnain Akhtar & others  2022 SCR 1133 (F)
  433. —Section 561-Cr.P.C—Powers of the High Court under section 561-A, Cr. P.C.—Supreme Court declared that powers under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. are very wide and of indefinable nature and in the exercise of these powers, the High Court can make all such orders which may be necessary to do the real and substantial justice and to prevent the abuse of process of Court. Sikandar Azam & others v. Zulqarnain Akhtar & others  2022 SCR 1133 (G) 2014 SCR 493 rel.
  434. —Section 561-A, Cr. P.C.—challenge to order passed by Justice of Peace—quasi-judicial function of Ex-officio Justice of Peace—Held: Quasi-judicial functions performed under section 22-A, Cr.P.C. by the Justice of Peace can be challenged under section 561-A, Cr.P.C.  Sikandar Azam & others v. Zulqarnain Akhtar & others  2022 SCR 1133 (H & I) 2009 P.Cr.L.J. 374 rel.
  435. —Section 561-A—quashment of FIR—writ—after investigation and submission of Challan—effect of—High Court cannot assume the role of investigation—the accused party has more than one alternate remedies available before the trial Court;i.e. under sections 265-K and 249-A—Held: after thorough investigation and submission of Chalan, the High Court cannot interfere with the proceedings in the garb pf constitutional petition— it was held by the superior Courts in a number of cases that the Courts should be reluctant to interfere in a case where competent Court has taken cognizance. Even otherwise, in such situation, the accused party has more than one alternate remedies available before the trial Court; i.e. under sections 265-K and 249-A, Cr.P.C., as the case may be, in presence of which, the extraordinary remedy under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. or writ petition under Article 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974, is not attracted ordinarily. Zarar Ismail & others v. S.S.P &  others  2022 SCR 1225 (A & B) 2021 SCR 124 rel.
  436. —Section 561-A—quashment of FIR— In exercise of powers vested u/s 561-A, Cr.P.C, the High Court is not empowered to wear the robe of an investigating agency. Ch. Mazhar Hussain v. Kashif Ali & others 2022 SCR 1365 (A) 2021 SCR 124 ref.
  437. — section 561-A — quashment of FIR — inherent powers of High Court — exercise and scope of — according to spirit and scheme of law, it is the duty of investigating agency to conclude the investigation and thereafter, draw a conclusion according to law — in case of false implication, law has also prescribed a proper course — no doubt in exceptional cases. If according to the contents of FIR, no offence is constituted on the face of it, there is no disclosure of commission of cognizable offence, in such situation, the powers vested u/s 561-A can be exercised — when according to contents of FIR, prima-facie, the commission of cognizable offence is disclosed, in such situation the investigating agency is vested with the powers to draw a conclusion after completion of necessary investigation. Abdul Rauf  versus Qadeer Bashir & others 2023 SCR 835 (A)
  438. — section 561-A — quashment of FIR — scope and extent of exercise of powers by the High Court — appellant was impleaded party in application u/s 561-A — High Court without summoning and hearing the appellant quashed the FIR — held: according to phraseology of section 561-A and principles of law enunciated by Superior Courts, while exercising such powers the High Court cannot assume the role of investigating agency for the purpose of appreciation of material yet to be finalized by the investigating agency — High Court drawn conclusion on the basis of some presumption, further held, it is not a proper course of law, hence such practice must be avoided at all. Abdul Rauf  versus Qadeer Bashir & others 2023 SCR 835 (B) 2022 SCR 162 ref.
  439. — section 561-A — quashment of FIR — suit for jactitation of marriage — pendency of suit — effect of — admittedly suit for jactitation of marriage is pending in the Family Court — criminal proceedings are at investigation stage and not finalized so far — criminal proceedings have very close link with the suit pending — if the proceedings in criminal matter are allowed to continue, it may prejudice case of either party before Family Court — criminal proceedings kept in abeyance till decision of suit by Family Court. Sonia Aziz & others vs State & others 2024 SCR 176 (A)
  440. The accused still absconding and is fugitive of law — Taking overall circumstances of the case instead of whole amount of Rs. 2, 00, 000/= Rs. 1, 60, 000/= ordered to be deposited in Government treasury as a result of forfeiture of surety bond. M. Asghar v. M. Shafique 1995 SCR 141 (B)
  441. The prosecution could not show that these witnesses were not available at the trial stage and there is also nothing on record to show that the prosecution was prevented by sufficient cause or by circumstances beyond its control to bring evidence of these witnesses on record or there was any mis-understanding or any mistake on the part prosecution. M. Ibrahim v. A. Rashid and others 1995 SCR 301 (B)
  442. Private complaint filed after about 16 years of the occurrence belated and after thought, furnishing no volid explanation for the inexcusable delay — Appeal being devoid of any merit dismissed. Noorullah vs. Mst. Phullan & another 1995 SCR 396 (E)
  443. The complaint is analogous to first information report which is filed to move the machinery of law to take action against the culprits. It in itself is not a proof. The omission of the names of the witnesses in complaint cannot be regarded fatal to prosecution case, neither can be statements of the related witnesses be discarded, if otherwise trust worthy. Muhammad Sadiq v. Raja Muhammad Nasim & others 1996 SCR 215 (B)
  444. The Shariat Court can not only transfer a Criminal case from one District Criminal Court to another District Criminal Court but a case can be transferred from one Tehsil Criminal Court to District Criminal Court if the ends of justice so require. M. Mahroof Khan v. State 1996 SCR 141 (B)
  445. It is well settled principle of law that in cross cases the trial by the same Court has always been regarded as just and proper so as to avoid a conflict between the judgment of the two Courts about the same incident. Muhammad Mahroof Khan v. The State & 4 others 1996 SCR 141 (C)  PLD 1981 SC 522 and 1986 P.Cr.L.J. 989 relied.
  446. Bail — grant of — statutory grounds — an accused can be released on bail if the trial court has not concluded the trial even after lapse of 2 years in a murder case and delay has not been occasioned due to the accused — the concession is not available to the accused who is hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal. Nishad Khan v. The State & another 2014 SCR 1460 (A)
  447. Challan & complaint case — same incident — trial of — According to settled practice and procedure, when there are challan case and private complaint regarding the same incident — held: the trial has to be conducted firstly in the complaint case. Muhammad Ayub & & others v. Imran & 6 others 2015 SCR 325 (A) PLD 1966 SC 708 rel.
  448. —Subsequent challan—Discharge of accused in first challan—no bar in taking cognizance of subsequent challan–when discharge of accused not on merits— order of discharge which is not based upon any findings on merits of the case, creates no bar in the way of taking cognizance if the subsequent challan is based on some evidence brought on the record against the accused. Muhammad Ayub v.State & others  2019 SCR 162 (B)
  449. — opportunity of cross examination cannot be repeated without valid reason and not on the ground that a new counsel has been engaged. Afaq Khan v. The State & others 2023 SCR 98 (B) PLD 1986 Kar. 385 ref.
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