- Conflict apparent between the P.S.C. Act, the Civil Servants Act on the one side and the Regularisation Act on the other — The Regularisation Act could not validly override the P.S.C. Act and the Rules made thereunder. Azad Govt. v. M. Youns Tahir & other 1994 SCR 341 (AA)
- Public Service Commission Act and the Civil Servants Act both fell within the ambit of ‘subordinate legislation’ — The provisions contained in Public Service Commission Act would not override or preval’ against the provisions contained in the Civil Servants Act merely on the ground that the Public Service Commission Act has been enacted in pursuance of section 48 of the AJK Interim Constitution Act — The said section has not been made operative subject to other provisions of the Interim Constitution Act because the expression ‘subject to this Act’ has not been used in the aforesaid provisions whereas section 49 of the Interim Constitution Act under which Civil Servants Act has not been enacted has been made operative subject to the Act. Azad Government v. Muhammad Youns Tahir & other 1994 SCR 341 (RR)
- Irrespective of the fact whether the expression ‘subject to this Act’ finds place in any of the provisions of the Constitution or not, any statute made in consequence of a constitutional provision would not attain the status of constitutional provision and the one statute would not ‘override’ the provisions of other in case of conflict between the two. Azad Government v. Muhammad Youns Tahir & other 1994 SCR 341 (SS)
- — rule 23, Pakistan Citizenship Rules, 1952 and section 5, AJK State Subject Act, 1980—rule 7, AJK State Subject Rules, 1980— provisions of both territories provide different periods for eligibility to obtain domicile—domicile of choice—which law to govern and cater the conflict and eventuality in the case—held: the law enforced in AJK will prevail and applicant aspiring for domicile of choice in Pakistan has to live continuously for five years in Pakistan — the Domicile Act, 1980 or the Rules 1980, do not provide or distinguish between ‘domicile of origin’ and ‘domicile of choice’ but as mentioned above the same are creation of Private International Law. It has been laid down in Beenish Bashir’s case, supra and other judgments that a person who had abandoned his domicile of origin by obtaining domicile certificate from Pakistan, has to live continuously for five years in AJ&K to revive his domicile of origin. If for the sake of argument, it is presumed that a refugee settled and living in AJK, intends to change his domicile and obtain domicile of choice, on the same footing, and deriving the analogy from settled legal position that a applicant must be living in Azad Jammu and Kashmir for five years, then a refugee also must live for five years in other place to make him eligible for issuance of domicile of choice, i.e., refugee settled in Pakistan. But, in the existing legal regime relating to State Subject and Domicile, read with Notifications, supra, the same cannot be allowed, as due to change of domicile of origin to domicile of choice, as refugee settled in Pakistan may adversely affect the refugee quota and benefits available to the refugees settled in Pakistan, under Notification dated 24.08.1972. In this context we can safely conclude that the appellant was not a refugee settled in Pakistan and was domicile holder of refugee settled in Azad Kashmir, Mirpur district. His domicile of district Mirpur has not been cancelled till the filing of application with Public Service Commission for the post of assistant engineer. Sabeel Ahmed Chohan v. Iftikhar-ul-Hassan & others 2023 SCR 303 (O) (2014 SCR 327). ref. & rel.
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